EXECUTION TO SATISFY A JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNABILITY OF JUDGMENT
DEBTOR’S RIGHTS OF ACTION
Summary
The Court considered whether a party who purchased a judgment debtor’s rights of action
could motion the Court to substitute themselves in as the real party in interest and dismiss the
appeal. The Court held that only “things in action” that are otherwise assignable may be subject to
execution to satisfy a judgment. The Court concluded that tort claims for personal injury—
including fraud/intentional misrepresentation and elder exploitation—are generally not assignable.
The Court further concluded that tort claims for injury to property and contract-based claims,
unless the claims are personal in nature, are generally assignable. Therefore, the Court granted the
respondents’ motion in part and the appeal was dismissed in part.
Background
This opinion was issued in response to a motion from the respondents, Raffi Tufenkjian
and Luxury Holdings LV, LLC, to substitute themselves in the place of the appellants, Robert G.
Reynolds and Diamanti Fine Jewelers. Through the motion, the respondents additionally sought
to voluntarily dismiss this appeal because they purchased the appellants’ rights and interests in the
underlying district court action through a judgment execution sale.
In the underlying action, the appellants alleged breach of contract, fraud, and tort claims
against the respondents. After the appellants purchased a jewelry store from the respondents, the
appellants brought forward these claims in district court, alleging they relied to their detriment on
false representations from the respondents regarding the store’s value. The district court granted
summary judgment for the respondents and awarded the respondents $57,941.92 in attorney fees
and costs, pursuant to terms in the parties’ contract.
The appellants then appealed the judgment but did not obtain a stay of execution for the
award of attorney fees and costs; the appellants claimed they could not afford to post a supersedeas
bond. The respondents then obtained a writ of execution, allowing them to execute against
Reynolds’ personal property. Through the writ, the sheriff was directed to “levy and seize upon
any and all causes of action, claims, allegations, assertions or defenses of” the appellants, including
any from the underlying district court action.
The respondents then purchased “all the rights, title and interest of” the appellants in the
underlying district court action for $100 at the sheriff’s sale. Following this purchase, the
respondents sought to substitute themselves in place of the appellants (pursuant to NRAP 43) and
to voluntarily dismiss the appeal (pursuant to NRAP 42(b)). While the respondents asserted this
was proper because they now owned the claims, the appellants argued that granting the
respondents’ motion would prevent parties who are not financially able to satisfy a contested
judgment from asserting their rights to an appeal.
The Nevada Supreme Court then ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on the
issue of whether, through the execution sale, each of the appellants’ claims were properly assigned
to the respondents. The respondents argued, based on statutory law, that all claims were assigned