IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

MIKE K. STRONG,

Plaintiff,

vs.

HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.;

CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC., US Bank

Trust N.A. as Trustee of LSF9 Master

Participation Trust; KOZENY &

MCCUBBIN, Kerry Feld, Successor

Trustee; and KERRY FELD,

Defendants.

8:15CV466

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Caliber Home Loans, Inc.’s (Caliber)

Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for More Definite Statement (Filing No. 9) and

Defendants Kozeny & McCubbin and Kerry Feld, Successor Trustee’s (collectively,

K&M) Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement

(Filing No. 11).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (e). Plaintiff Mike K. Strong (Strong)—

proceeding pro se—opposes the motions (Filing Nos. 15, 16). For the reasons stated

below, the Court grants Caliber’s and K&M’s respective motions to the extent they seek

a more definite statement and denies the motions to the extent they seek dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2007, Strong and his wife executed a $357,000 promissory note in

favor of HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. (HSBC) in return for a loan on their home in

Gretna, Nebraska. According to the Complaint, HSBC later sold Strong’s debt to Caliber

and K&M acted as trustee under a deed of trust on the property. On March 18, 2015,

K&M recorded a notice of default on the loan based on Strong’s failure to make

payments when due. The notice identified HSBC as the beneficiary of the deed of trust

K&M treats Kozeny & McCubbin, L.C. and Kerry Feld, Successor Trustee, as

separate defendants. Kerry Feld is also listed separately as a defendant on the docket

sheet. Strong’s Complaint and summons seem to treat them as a single defendant.

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and the lawful holder of Strong’s promissory note. On May 15, 2015, K&M notified

Strong the property would be sold at a foreclosure sale on June 8, 2015. In response,

Strong filed a quiet title action in state court and requested a temporary restraining order

but later voluntarily dismissed the Complaint and filed for bankruptcy. Strong avers his

bankruptcy petition was dismissed because he “did not qualify.” It is not clear from the

Complaint whether the foreclosure sale ever took place.

On December 29, 2015, Strong filed the present “Quiet Title Action Declaratory

Judgement” against HSBC, Caliber, and K&M in state court, alleging they “willfully

violated, consumer credit reporting requirements, State and Federal mortgage disclosure

and notice requirements, [and] State and Federal consumer protection regulations” and

committed “fraud for profit and or unjustified risk based pricing ‘Mortgage Loan’ fraud.”

That same day, Caliber removed the action to federal court (Filing No. 1) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 because Strong asserted “numerous claims arising under and invoking

federal law.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446. Upon removal, Caliber and K&M

separately moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Named Defendants

As an initial matter, the Court has some additional questions about the status of

some of the named defendants. HSBC is named in the Complaint, but the docket sheet

indicates HSBC has not entered an appearance in this case. The materials Caliber

submitted in support of removal (Filing No. 1-1) give some indication HSBC—like

Caliber and K&M—was served with summons by certified mail in November 2015 while

this case was pending in state court.

Caliber’s Notice of Removal states it “solely addresses § 1331” but also indicates

Caliber “believes this action is also subject to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity

jurisdiction).” Caliber might be right, but at this point at least, the record does not

establish complete diversity.

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Section 1446(b)(2)(A) provides “[w]hen a civil action is removed solely under

section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or

consent to the removal of the action.” In its Notice of Removal (Filing No. 1), Caliber

(1) explains US Bank Trust N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, (US

Bank) is a separate entity from Caliber and was never served with summons and

(2) asserts “[t]o the extent [Strong] has properly served US Bank,” the Notice of Removal

is also filed on US Bank’s behalf. But Caliber’s Notice of Removal is otherwise silent as

to the consent of the other named defendants, including HSBC. If HSBC was properly

joined and served, Caliber presumably would have obtained and noted HSBC’s consent

to remove this action.

For his part, Strong did not allege any defect in removal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),

and has not responded to Caliber’s assertion that US Bank is a separate entity that has not

been served. Indeed, Strong and Caliber both refer to US Bank in their respective briefs

regarding Caliber’s Motion to Dismiss. Strong also has not addressed HSBC’s failure to

enter an appearance in this case. In opposing dismissal, Strong opines HSBC “is the only

defendant who has provided the correct response to plaintiff’s complaint, which is no

response, therefore subject [sic] to declaratory judgment and relief as defined in

plaintiff’s complaint” (Filing No. 16). But Strong has not sought entry of default or

default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.

The parties shall jointly or separately advise the Court in writing of the status of

HSBC and US Bank as defendants in this case within ten (10) days of the date of this

order.

B. Rule 12 Motions

Caliber and K&M have each moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) to dismiss Strong’s Complaint for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted” (Filing Nos. 9, 11). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The court accepts as true all

factual allegations, but is ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.’” McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

In challenging the Complaint, Caliber and K&M do not take a scalpel to Strong’s

allegations, opting instead for a broadsword and attempting to end this case with a single

blow. Without delving into Strong’s allegations, despite some prior experience with

Strong’s claims and this type of case, Caliber simply complains that Strong’s

“nonsensical statements and accusations” fail “to provide any valid factual or legal basis

for the relief he requests beyond conclusory statements.” According to Caliber, Strong

“cites to random statutory regulations that [he] alleges Caliber has violated” but “has

failed to identify, in any way, which of the defendants allegedly violated which of the

statutory provisions, or even how the regulations have been violated.”

K&M likewise summarily describes the Complaint as “a compilation of

nonsensical allegations that do not state any valid legal or factual basis for the relief

requested.” K&M also emphasizes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a party

alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” As

Caliber and K&M see it, Strong’s Complaint is so deficient as to warrant prejudicial

dismissal. Short of that, Caliber and K&M seek a more definite statement to enable them

to reasonably respond to the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

Caliber’s and K&M’s briefs are short on detailed analysis of the multitude of

“claims,” but their arguments have some merit. See, e.g., Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan

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Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming the dismissal of three

quiet-title theories “because the plaintiffs’ pleadings, on their face, have not provided

anything to support their claim that the defendants’ adverse claims are invalid, other than

labels and conclusions, based on speculation that transfers affecting payees and

assignments of the notes were invalid”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

That “requires more than labels and conclusions” or a “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. As it stands, it is not

clear Strong’s Complaint can satisfy that standard.

After briefly describing a general mishandling of his mortgage loan, Strong

provides a laundry list of more than a dozen state and federal statutes and regulations the

defendants “presumably” violated. Strong then—largely failing to distinguish between

the defendants—makes a series of vague and conclusory allegations that the defendants

acted improperly in some way or violated one provision or another of the cited statutes

and regulations. But Strong’s random allegations do not effectively establish a basis for a

legally cognizable claim under state or federal law. Nor do they include sufficient facts

to raise a plausible claim for relief under any of the statutes and regulations he lists or

allow the defendants to respond. Bare allegations that the defendants violated a statute or

regulation do not suffice, particularly when the allegations do not describe each specific

defendant’s degree of participation, if any, in the alleged misconduct.

Strong’s “allegations are variously legal conclusions, which this court may ‘set

aside,’ abstract statements of fact, statements of fact whose relevance to the asserted

claims are dubious,” and obscure contentions apparently based on undeveloped legal

theories cobbled together from the long list of statutes and regulations Strong

haphazardly cites. Vang v. PNC Mortg., Inc., 517 F. App’x 523, 526 (8th Cir. 2013)

(unpublished per curiam) (quoting Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594

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(8th Cir. 2009)). Rule 8(a)(2) “demands more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. For allegations of fraud,

Rule 9 requires even more. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc.,

441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b),

the Complaint must plead such facts as the time, place, and content of the defendant’s

false representations, as well as the details of the defendant’s fraudulent acts, including

when the acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a result.”). This

Court “‘will not supply additional facts, nor . . . construct a legal theory for plaintiff that

assumes facts that have not been pleaded.’” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.

2004) (quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)).

At this time, the Court will not dismiss Strong’s claims without affording him an

opportunity to address the significant deficiencies in the Complaint.

See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally

construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))). Strong must provide factual allegations based on

more than conjecture and naked legal conclusions. The Court will closely review

Strong’s Amended Complaint for plausible claims; the defendants should do the same

and respond specifically and appropriately.

In light of the foregoing, the Court grants Caliber’s and K&M’s motions to the

extent they seek a more definite statement and denies the motions to the extent they seek

prejudicial dismissal.

Strong attempts to provide a more-definite statement in his opposition, but his

clarifications, which focus on state substantive law, suffer almost all of the same

deficiencies as his Complaint.

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. The parties must advise the Court of the status of HSBC and US Bank as

defendants within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

2. Caliber’s Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for More Definite Statement

(Filing No. 9) and K&M’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for

More Definite Statement (Filing No. 11) are GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part in accordance with the terms of this order. The motions are granted to

the extent they seek a more definite statement and denied to the extent they

seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

3. Strong shall file an Amended Complaint consistent with this order no later than

August 12, 2016. Failing to comply with this order may result in the dismissal

of the Complaint.

Dated this 26th day of July, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.

United States District Judge

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