Private Contractors in Conflict Zones

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 1

n Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors has reached a level unprece-

dented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States

deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Con-

tractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) work-

force in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan.

ese numbers include both armed

and unarmed contractors. us, for the purposes of this paper, the term contrac-

tor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specied. e

presence of contractors on the battleeld is obviously not a new phenomenon

but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military per-

sonnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in Iraq

and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.

is increase is the logical outcome of a series of decisions going back de-

cades. Force structure reductions—ranging from the post-Vietnam decisions that

moved most Army logistics support elements to the Army Reserve and Guard

to the post–Cold War reduction that cut the Army from 18 to 10 divisions with

corresponding cuts in support forces—greatly reduced the Services’ ability to sup-

port long-term operations. Next, a series of decisions in the 1990s led to the em-

ployment of contractors in the Balkans for tasks ranging from traditional camp-

building to the new concept of “force development” that saw contractor MPRI

training the Croatian army. Finally, the decision to invade Iraq with minimum

forces left the United States with too few troops in-theater to deal with the disor-

der that resulted from the removal of Saddam Hussein. us, it is understandable

that the immediate, unanticipated need for large numbers of logistics and security

personnel, the shortage of such troops on active duty, and the precedent for using

Private Contractors

in Conict Zones:

The Good, the Bad, and

the Strategic Impact

by T.X. Hammes

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

About the Author

Dr. T.X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine

Corps ofcer, is a Senior Research

Fellow in the Center for Strategic

Research, Institute for National

Strategic Studies, at the National

Defense University. Comments and

questions may be directed to thomas.

[email protected].

Key Points

 The United States has hired record

numbers of contractors to serve

in the conict zones of Iraq and

Afghanistan but has not seriously

examined their strategic impact.

 There are clearly advantages to

using contractors in conict zones,

but they have three inherent

characteristics that have serious

negative effects during counterin-

surgency operations. We cannot

effectively control the quality of

the contractors or control their

actions, but the population holds

us responsible for everything the

contractors do, or fail to do.

 Contractors compete with the

host government for a limited

pool of qualied personnel and

dramatically change local

power structures.

 Contractors reduce the political

capital necessary to commit U.S.

forces to war, impact the legitima-

cy of a counterinsurgency effort,

and reduce its perceived morality.

These factors attack our nation’s

critical vulnerability in an irregu-

lar war—the political will of the

American people.

November 2010

2 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

contractors in the Balkans caused the Pentagon to turn to

contractors to ll the immediate operational needs. How-

ever, the subsequent failure to conduct a careful analysis

of the wisdom of using contractors is less understandable.

e executive branch has conducted numerous investiga-

tions into fraud, waste, and corruption in the contracting

process. Congress has held hearings and established the

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Af-

ghanistan. Yet the U.S. Government has not systematically

explored the essential question: Does using contractors in

a conict zone make strategic sense?

is paper explores that question. It examines the

good, the bad, and the strategic impact of using contractors

in conict zones. It concludes with policy recommenda-

tions for the future employment of contractors and outlines

additional actions needed to understand and cope with the

rapidly expanding use of armed contractors worldwide.

The Good

Contractors provide a number of advantages over

military personnel or civil servants—speed of deploy-

ment, continuity, reduction of troop requirements, re-

duction of military casualties, economic inputs to local

economies, and, in some cases, executing tasks the mili-

tary and civilian workforce simply cannot. is section

examines each of these advantages in turn.

Speed of deployment—the ability to quickly mo-

bilize and deploy large numbers of personnel—is par-

ticularly important when a plan fails to anticipate prob-

lems. Since the Pentagon had not planned to keep large

numbers of troops in Afghanistan or Iraq for any period

of time, it had not planned for the required logistics

support. e Pentagon also failed to anticipate the re-

there has been little investigation

by the U.S. Government into the

strategic impact of contractors in

conict zones

quirement for large numbers of security personnel to

protect all U.S. activities (including political and recon-

struction activities) once the Afghan and Iraqi govern-

ments were toppled.

By tapping into databases, running job fairs in the

United States, and contracting for labor from ird World

companies, contractors were able to quickly recruit, process,

and ship personnel to run base camps, drive trucks, and

perform the hundreds of housekeeping chores required to

maintain both combat forces and civil administrators spread

across Iraq and Afghanistan. More challenging was nd-

ing qualied personnel to provide security for the rapidly

growing U.S. presence in both nations. Private companies

managed to nd people, hire them, and move them into

the country—all without the political problems inherent

in mobilizing additional U.S. military forces to execute the

same tasks. e combination of speed and a low political

prole made contractors an attractive choice to provide the

resources for which the administration had failed to plan. In

addition, the use of contractors aligned with previous de-

cisions and the administration’s faith in the eciency and

eectiveness of private business compared to governmental

organization. Both inside and outside Iraq and Afghani-

stan, contractors replaced the tens of thousands of soldiers

normally required to move, stage, marshal, and transport

personnel and supplies into conict zones.

Continuity is a second major advantage of contrac-

tors. While the U.S. military has a policy that ensures the

vast majority of personnel rotate every 6 to 12 months,

contractors are often willing to stay for longer periods.

For key billets, companies can oer signicant bonuses to

personnel who stay. e companies know that they will

reap commensurate savings due to the personnel conti-

nuity, and employees see an opportunity for signicantly

increased pay. Sometimes, moreover, longevity leads to a

greater understanding of the situation. is can lead to

more eective decisionmaking to include an understand-

ing of the political impact of the contractor’s decisions.

e most highly prized attribute of private contrac-

tors is that they reduce troop requirements by replacing

military personnel. is reduces the military and political

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 3

resources that must be dedicated to the war. At the height

of the surge in April 2008, DOD stated it had 163,900

contractors supporting 160,000 troops in Iraq.

With-

out the presence of contractors, the United States would

have had to provide literally twice as many troops. e

U.S. Armed Forces struggled to maintain 160,000 troops

in Iraq; it is doubtful that they could have supported the

320,000 needed if contractors were not employed. While

the vast majority of contractor personnel were involved in

noncombatant logistics tasks, DOD estimated there were

over 20,000 armed contractors in Iraq during 2007. Other

organizations have much higher estimates.

Even using

the Pentagon’s lower estimate, contractors provided three

times more armed troops than the British. It should also

be noted that in Iraq and Afghanistan, many unarmed,

logistic support personnel functioned in what the military

would dene as a combat role. e drivers were subjected

to both improvised explosive devices and direct re attacks.

is combination of drivers willing to run the gauntlet of

ambushes and armed contractors replaced at least two full

combat divisions. Given the very low support-to-operator

ratio that contractors maintain, it is not unreasonable to

estimate they actually replaced three divisions.

e contractors not only provided relief in terms of

personnel tempo but also reduced military casualties. Con-

tractors absorbed over 25 percent of the killed in action

in Iraq, which reduced the political resources required to

maintain support for the conict. By the end of 2009, con-

tractors reported almost 1,800 dead and 40,000 wounded in

Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the ghting in Afghanistan gets

worse, contractors are now suering more deaths than U.S.

forces: “In the rst two quarters of 2010 alone, contractor

deaths represented more than half—53 percent—of all fa-

talities. is point bears emphasis: since January 2010, more

contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan than U.S.

military soldiers.”

For practical purposes, these casualties

were “o the books” in that they had no real impact on the

political discussions about the war. As Peter Singer noted:

ere was no outcry whenever contractors were called

up and deployed, or even killed. If the gradual death

use of contractors aligned with

the administration’s faith in

private business compared to

governmental organization

toll among American troops threatened to slowly

wear down public support, contractor casualties

were not counted in ocial death tolls and had no

impact on these ratings. . . . ese gures mean that

the private military industry has suered more losses

in Iraq than the rest of the coalition of allied nations

combined. e losses are also far more than any single

U.S. Army division has experienced.

Contractor casualties are not reported via the Pen-

tagon, but only through the U.S. Department of Labor.

Its Web site notes that these are not comprehensive sta-

tistics but only represent those injuries and deaths that

resulted in insurance claims.

us, it is dicult if not

impossible to determine how many additional casualties

were suered by other nations’ contractors in either Iraq

or Afghanistan.

Replacing these contractors, both armed and

unarmed, would have required additional major

mobilizations of Reserves or a dramatic increase

in Army and Marine Corps end-strength. In eect,

the mobilization of civilian contractors allowed the

United States to engage in a protracted conict in

Iraq without convincing the U.S. public of the need

for additional major mobilizations or major increases

in the Active Armed Forces. e decision to hire

contractors can be taken out of view of the public

while decisions to increase troop strength are usually

subject to intense debate. Opponents of contractors

point out that this makes it easier for U.S. political

leaders to commit forces to protracted conicts

precisely because it reduces uniformed casualties.

Whether the tendency of contractors to reduce the

4 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

political cost of operations is a good thing depends

upon one’s view of the particular conict.

Another advantage frequently cited by proponents of

the use of contractors is that of cost. According to their

calculations, contractors are much cheaper to use than gov-

ernment employees. In fact, the actual costs remain a point

of contention. e Congressional Research Service report-

ed that the “relative cost advantage of the contractors can

vary, and may diminish or disappear altogether, depend-

ing on the circumstances and contract.”

Determining

actual costs is extremely dicult due to the large number

of variables involved—some of them currently impossible

to document. For instance, with over 40,000 U.S. contrac-

tors wounded to date, we are unable to estimate potential

long-term care costs to the U.S. Government. While con-

tractors may claim their insurance covers those costs, the

government, in fact, paid for that insurance through the

contract, and if the coverage proves insucient, the gov-

ernment may well end up paying for the continued care

through various governmental medical programs. In short,

long-term costs associated with employing contractors in a

conict environment are essentially unknowable.

However, one cost benet of contractors is indis-

putable. As soon as the need goes away, they can be let

go when the contract expires. us, unlike military or

government employees who continue on the payroll or

return to Reserve status, contractors are simply paid o

and sent home.

Another useful aspect of contracting is that it can

provide economic inputs to local economies by hiring

locals to provide services. Creating jobs and stimulat-

ing the economy are key aspects of population-centric

counterinsurgency. In the Balkans and Afghanistan,

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have

hired large numbers of local personnel to conduct both

armed and unarmed tasks. Carefully targeted contracts

can be used to co-opt local power structures to support

the government.

General David Petraeus, ISAF commander,

specically tasked his commanders to be aware of

both the benets and dangers of contracting in

Afghanistan. He ordered them to monitor their

contracts carefully to ensure they are contributing to

the counterinsurgency campaign.

A nal, critical advantage is that contractors can

execute tasks that U.S. military and civilian forces sim-

ply cannot. Some tasks, such as providing large numbers

of interpreters, are obvious and widely applicable. Oth-

ers are situation-specic. For instance, in Afghanistan,

we lack the forces to secure our primary supply lines

to Pakistan because they run through areas controlled

or heavily contested by either the Taliban or bandits

and police who charge for use of the road. Further-

more, if history is any guide, even a heavy presence of

U.S. troops would not guarantee the delivery of sup-

plies. Fortunately, Afghan contractors display the mix

of force, personal connections, and negotiation skills to

maintain our supply lines.

The Bad

When serving within conict zones, particularly

during a counterinsurgency, contractors create a number

of signicant problems from tactical to strategic levels.

ree inherent characteristics of contractors create prob-

lems for the government. First, the government does not

control the quality of the personnel that the contractor

hires. Second, unless it provides a government ocer or

noncommissioned ocer for each construction project,

convoy, personal security detail, or facilities-protection

unit, the government does not control, or even know

about, contractors’ daily interactions with the local popu-

lation. Finally, the population holds the government re-

sponsible for everything that the contractors do or fail

to do. Since insurgency is essentially a competition for

the mobilization of civilian

contractors allowed the

United States to engage in a

protracted conict in Iraq

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 5

legitimacy between the government and insurgents, this

factor elevates the issue of quality and tactical control to

the strategic level. In addition to these inherent char-

acteristics, there are numerous other negative outcomes

that ow from using contractors. Contractors compete

directly with the host nation for a limited pool of edu-

cated, trained personnel. eir presence and actions can

dramatically change local power structures. ey frag-

ment the chain of command. And when they fail to per-

form, contractors can be dicult to re.

Quality control is a well-publicized issue. Repeated

reports of substandard construction, fraud, and theft

highlight the problems associated with unarmed con-

tractors. As noted above, these incidents are being in-

vestigated. In addition, the U.S. Government is working

hard to rene contracting and oversight procedures to

reduce these types of problems. Despite their best ef-

forts, however, contracting ocers cannot control how

contractors treat their local employees. Poor treatment,

lack of respect for local customs, skills, and methods—

and even physical abuse to include sexual exploitation—

have been recurrent problems with unarmed contractors.

Unfortunately, the problem is just as prevalent with

armed contractors. While high-end personal security

details generally are well trained, less visible armed con-

tractors display less quality. When suicide bombers be-

gan striking Iraqi armed forces recruiting stations, the

contractor responsible for recruiting the Iraqi forces sub-

contracted for a security force. e contractor was prom-

ised former Gurkhas. What showed up in Iraq a couple

of weeks later were untrained, underequipped Nepalese

villagers.

Not only did these contractors provide inad-

equate security, the United States armed them and au-

thorized them to use deadly force in its name.

Since the government neither recruits nor trains in-

dividual armed contractors, it essentially has to trust the

contractor to provide quality personnel. In this case, the

subcontractor took shortcuts despite the obvious risk to

the personnel manning the recruiting stations. Even if

the government hires enough contracting ocers, how

can it determine the combat qualications of individuals

and teams of armed personnel? e U.S. military dedi-

cates large facilities, major exercises, expensive simula-

tions, and combat-experienced stas to determine if U.S.

units are properly trained. Contractors do not. We need

to acknowledge that contracting ocers have no truly

eective control over the quality of the personnel the

contractors hire. e quality control problems are greatly

exacerbated when the contractor uses subcontractors to

provide services. ese personnel are at least one layer

removed from the contracting ocer and thus subject to

even less scrutiny.

In reality, it is virtually impossible to determine the

actual eectiveness of any contractors—armed or un-

armed—until they begin to operate in theater (and only

then if a member of the U.S. Government can observe

the contractors as they operate).

Compounding the problems created by lack of qual-

ity control, the government does not control the contrac-

tors’ daily contact with the population. Despite continued

eorts to increase government oversight of contractor

operations, nothing short of having sucient numbers

of qualied U.S. Government personnel accompanying

and commanding contractors will provide control. is

lack of control usually means we may get poorly wired

buildings, malfunctioning computer systems, and unn-

ished projects. However, too often, it includes incidents

of bullying, abuse, intimidation, and even killing of local

civilians such as the DynCorp employee who ran a child

sex ring in the Balkans or the September 2007 Blackwa-

ter shootings in Nisour Square, Baghdad.

is lack of quality and tactical control greatly

increases the impact of the third major problem: the

United States is held responsible for everything the

contractors do or fail to do. Despite the fact the United

contractors can execute tasks

that U.S. military and civilian

forces simply cannot

6 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

States has no eective quality or operational control

over the contractors, the local population rightly holds

it responsible for all contractor failures. Numerous

personal conversations with Iraqis revealed a deep dis-

gust with the failure of many contractors to provide

promised services despite being well paid. ere was

even more anger with the actions of armed contrac-

tors. Iraqis noted the United States gave the armed

contractors authority to use deadly force in its name.

While Iraqis were not condent that American forc-

es would be punished for killing Iraqis, they believed

it was at least a possibility. However, the Iraqis were

convinced that contractors were simply above any

law. e Iraqi perception that it will be impossible to

prosecute a contractor is reected in a Congressional

Research Service report that required 17 pages simply

to outline the various legal structures under which a

contractor might be prosecuted. e paper indicated

that there was no clear legal precedent for prosecuting

contractors, and it noted none had been prosecuted up

through August 2008.

ese perceptions can seriously undercut the legiti-

macy of both the host nation and U. S. Government. A

key measure of the legitimacy of a government is a mo-

nopoly on the use of force within its boundaries. e very

act of hiring armed contractors dilutes that monopoly.

Legitimate governments are also responsible for the ac-

tions of their agents—particularly those actions taken

against their own populations. Despite eorts to increase

the accountability of contractors, the Congressional Re-

search Service noted the widespread perception that con-

tractors who commit crimes against host nation people are

outside the legal reach of both the host country and the

United States.

Contractors, armed or unarmed, could be

quickly own out of the country if their company believed

they violated a law. And while the United States has laws

criminalizing certain activities, the cost and diculty of

trying a contractor for crimes that occurred overseas in a

conict zone have so far deterred U.S. prosecutors. In over

7 years of activity in Iraq, no contractor has been convicted

in a U.S. court of a crime against Iraqi citizens.

Exacerbating the legitimacy issue, contractors of all

kinds are a serious irritant to the host nation population.

Armed contractors irritate because they are an unac-

countable group that can and does impose its will upon

the population in many daily encounters: forcing locals

o the road, using the wrong side of the road, and point-

ing weapons at civilians. Even unarmed contractors irri-

tate the population when they take relatively well-paying

jobs that local people desperately need while at the same

time driving up prices. Contractors, when they do hire

locals, often treat them with a lack of respect and trust.

Furthermore, the complete control over who works on

projects combined with the disrespect shown those locals

that are hired reinforces local perceptions of the United

States as an occupying power.

In addition to undercutting government legitimacy,

the use of contractors may actually undercut local gov-

ernment power. In Afghanistan, security and reconstruc-

tion contracts have resulted in signicant shifts in relative

power between competing Afghan qawms

as well as al-

legations of corruption. Dexter Filkins, writing in the New

York Times, notes that the power structure in Orugzan

Province, Afghanistan, has changed completely due to the

U.S. Government’s selecting Matiullah Khan to provide

security for convoys from Kandahar to Tirin Kot:

With his NATO millions, and the American

backing, Mr. Matiullah has grown into the

strongest political and economic force in the region.

He estimates that his salaries support 15,000 people

in this impoverished province. . . . is has irritated

some local leaders, who say that the line between Mr.

Matiullah’s business interest and the government

it is virtually impossible to

determine the effectiveness of any

contractors until they begin to

operate in theater

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 7

has disappeared. . . . Both General [Nick] Carter

[commander of ISAF South] and Hanif Atmar,

the Afghan interior minister, said they hoped to

disband Mr. Matiullah’s militia soon—or at least

to bring it under formal government control. . . .

General Carter said that while he had no direct

proof in Mr. Matiullah’s case, he harbored more

general worries that the legions of unregulated

Afghan security companies had a nancial interest

in prolonging chaos.

us, an unacknowledged but serious strategic im-

pact of using contractors is to directly undercut both the

legitimacy and the authority of the host nation govern-

ment. In this case, the shortage of ISAF troops and sheer

diculty of maintaining security along this route mean

that there is currently no feasible alternative. at makes

it more important than ever that the U.S. Government

takes specic actions to minimize the negative strategic

impacts of this operational necessity. Contracting actions

must be seen as an integral part of the campaign rather

than simply treated as a logistics function.

Contracting also has a direct and measureable im-

pact on the local economy. When the U.S. Government

passes its authority to a prime contractor, that contractor

then controls a major source of new wealth and power in

the community. However, the contractor is motivated by

two factors: maximizing prot and making operations run

smoothly. is means that even if he devotes resources to

understanding the impact of his operations on society, his

decisions on how to allocate those resources will dier

from those of someone trying to govern the area. For in-

stance, various contractors’ policies of hiring South Asians

rather than Iraqis angered Iraqis during the critical early

phases of the insurgency. Desperate for jobs, the Iraqis saw

third country nationals getting jobs that Iraqis were both

qualied for and eager to do.

While there were clear

business and security reasons for doing so, the decision

was a slap in the face of Iraqis at a time of record un-

employment. In Afghanistan, the contractor can literally

shift the local power structure by picking one qwam over

another to execute the contract. e winning qwam gains

rich resources and access to both U.S. and Afghan ocials.

In contrast, the U.S. Government in the form of a

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commander or a

unit commander writes contracts specically to inuence

the political and security situation in the area. Com-

manders see the contracts themselves as a campaign tool.

While such contracts are limited by the cultural under-

standing of the commander and are often less ecient

for the specic project, this system can be much more

eective in the overall counterinsurgency campaign.

A related problem is the perception of the local

population concerning how these contracts are managed.

In Afghanistan, many Afghans are convinced that some

contracts expend up to 80 percent of the funds on man-

agement. e Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan

Relief states that 40 percent of nonmilitary aid goes

straight to corporate prot and salaries. Prot margins

run as high as 50 percent, and full-time expatriate con-

sultants cost between $250,000 and $350,000 per year.

Many of the contracts run through multiple subcontract-

ing companies before the aid reaches the Afghan people;

each subcontractor takes a percentage for administrative

overhead.

ese conrmed cases of misuse of develop-

ment funds further reduce the weak legitimacy of the

Afghan government as well as ISAF eorts.

ere are also a number of indirect consequences of

employing armed contractors. First, this practice opens the

door for local organizations to build militias under the cover

of being a security company. It is dicult to object to other

elements of a society hiring security when the government

is doing so. is is particularly true when the government is

hiring both locals and foreign nationals to provide security.

even unarmed contractors irritate

the population when they take jobs

that local people need while at the

same time driving up prices

8 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

If the government needs private contractors to feel safe, the

citizens, local businesses, or even local political organiza-

tions can certainly argue that they do, too. is fact has cre-

ated signicant problems for ISAF in Afghanistan:

Because PSCs [private security companies] are

under the control of powerful individuals, rather

than the Afghan National Security Forces, they

compete with state security forces and interfere

with a government monopoly on the use of force.

ere is growing pressure from ISAF and within

the Afghan government to reform and regulate

these companies. Major General Nick Carter, the

commander of Regional Command–South, recently

briefed that ISAF was developing a strategy to

regulate PSCs as part of the Kandahar Operations

unfolding in summer 2010.

In addition, private security companies can com-

pete directly with host nation attempts to recruit and

retain military and police personnel. In January 2010,

Major General Michael Ward, Deputy Commander Po-

lice, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, stated that

Afghanistan’s government was considering capping

the pay of private security rms because Afghan po-

lice were deserting in large numbers for the better pay

and working conditions associated with private compa-

nies.

is has created signicant problems for ISAF.

General Carter told reporters:

[P]rivate security companies and militias are a

serious problem. . . . this is, of course, something that

is of our own creation to a degree . . . where we

contracted out everything to the civilian market,

has created these private security companies.

And of course they are paid a great deal more

than our Afghan security forces, which in itself is

counterproductive because, of course, the temptation

for a soldier in the ANP [Afghan National Police]

is to go across to a private security company because

he might earn double in pay.

Contract hiring of unarmed personnel also com-

petes directly with the host nation civil government. In

both Iraq and Afghanistan, educated professionals took

jobs as drivers or clerks with contractors and nongovern-

mental organizations (NGOs) simply because the jobs

paid more than they could earn working for their own

governments. In eect, ISAF and NGO hiring has creat-

ed an internal “brain drain.” is is of particular concern

in Afghanistan where human capital is a major limita-

tion on the ability of the government to function.

On August 16, 2010, President Hamid Karzai de-

creed that all private security contractors must cease

operations in Afghanistan within 4 months.

Unfor-

tunately, currently ISAF and most humanitarian agen-

cies rely on armed contractors to provide security for

essential operations, and neither ISAF nor the Afghan

Security Forces is prepared to execute those missions.

At the time of this writing, it is too early to evaluate

the impact of President Karzai’s announcement, but it

does highlight the political complications that such con-

tractors inject into counterinsurgency campaigns.

Contractors, both armed and unarmed, also repre-

sent a serious military vulnerability. In the uprising in

Iraq during the spring of 2004, both Sunni and Shia

factions conducted major operations against coalition

forces. e insurgents eectively cut Allied supply

lines from Kuwait. U.S. forces faced signicant logis-

tics risks as a result. Despite the crisis, U.S. ocials

could not morally order unarmed logistics contrac-

tors to ght the opposition. e contractors lacked the

training, equipment, and legal status to do so. Had the

supply line been run by military forces, it would have

using contractors directly

undercuts both the legitimacy

and the authority of the host

nation government

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 9

been both moral and possible to order them to ght

through. Despite this demonstrated operational vul-

nerability, the fact that unarmed contractors are spe-

cically not obligated to ght has not been discussed

as a signicant risk in employing contractors rather

than military logistics organizations. Furthermore,

while military logistics units can provide their own

security in low-threat environments, unarmed con-

tractors cannot. e government must either assign

military forces or hire additional armed contractors to

provide that security.

e substitution of unarmed contractors for Sol-

diers and Marines creates yet another vulnerability: lack

of an emergency reserve. In the past, support troops

have been repeatedly employed in critical situations

to provide reinforcements for overwhelmed combat

troops. Contractors are simply unable to fulll this

emergency role. is limitation, as well as the unarmed

contractor’s inability to ght, is even more signicant in

conventional conicts than in irregular war.

Contracting also takes key elements of the counter-

insurgency eort out of the hands of the commander.

In the spring of 2010, ISAF determined that DynCorp

had failed in its contract to train and mentor the Afghan

police.

ISAF then put the contract out for competition.

General Stanley McChrystal, then-commander of ISAF,

stated that the police were one of the most critical ele-

ments of his campaign plan, so the contracting process

was accelerated. Not surprisingly, DynCorp did not win

the new contract. Since time is critical in Afghanistan,

plans were made to rapidly transition the contract to a

new provider to ensure that the Afghan police could play

their part in the counterinsurgency campaign. However,

DynCorp successfully protested the contract award.

us, it retains the training contract and will retain it

until all legal processes are exhausted. In short, the com-

mander lost control of one of the critical elements of

his counterinsurgency campaign at a critical time—and

there was nothing he could do about it. Despite Dyn-

Corp’s documented failure, at the time of this writing, it

remains in charge of police training and mentoring with

the full knowledge that as soon as possible ISAF will get

rid of DynCorp.

Contracts also fragment the chain of command. All

military units in a theater are under the command of a

military ocer, but contractors are not. While both con-

tractors and the government have worked hard to resolve

coordination issues, the fact remains that contractors are

not under military command. Complicating any attempt

to create unity of eort is the fact that contractors are in

direct competition with each other and treat a signicant

portion of the information concerning their operations

as proprietary information, which they will not share

with the government or their competitors.

Strategic Impact

Despite the numerous problems articulated above,

contractors will have an important and continuing role

in U.S. operations—both domestic and overseas. ere

are currently numerous important functions that the U.S.

Government is incapable of performing without con-

tractor support. is is not a new phenomenon. DOD—

particularly the Air Force and Navy—has long relied on

contractors to ll niche requirements such as maintain-

ing and, sometimes, even operating the newest high-

technology equipment. More recently, contractors have

been hired to execute many of the routine housekeeping

tasks at permanent U.S. military facilities.

However, despite conducting almost 9 years of com-

bat operations supported by contractors, the United States

still has not conducted a substantial examination of the

strategic impact the use of contractors has in counterin-

surgency. is does not mean contracts and contractors are

not being studied. Congress formed the Commission on

private security companies can

compete directly with host nation

attempts to recruit and retain

military and police personnel

10 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

Wartime Contracting specically “to assess a number of

factors related to wartime contracting, including the ex-

tent of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of war-

time contracts.”

Focused on improving the eciency of

wartime contracting, the commission did not discuss the

strategic impact of using contractors in its 2009 Interim

Report.

is author hopes that the commission will in-

clude the strategic impact in its nal report in 2011.

Within the executive branch, DOD and the Depart-

ment of State are conducting studies on how to reduce

fraud and increase the eciency of contractors. e Joint

Sta is running a major study to determine the level of

dependency on contractor support in contingency opera-

tions. Various Department of Justice investigations are go-

ing over past contracts for everything from fraud to abuse

of prisoners to inappropriate use of deadly force. Yet none

of these studies is looking at the fundamental questions

concerning the strategic impact of contractors in combat.

Contractors clearly can have a strategic impact on

the success of counterinsurgency operations in a vari-

ety of ways. e most important include reducing the

political capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to war;

potentially reducing the legitimacy of a counterinsur-

gency eort; and damaging the perceived morality of the

war eort. Rather than automatically defaulting to hir-

ing contractors as a relatively quick, easy, and politically

benign solution to an immediate problem, the United

States should rst answer several key strategic questions.

First, what is the impact of contractors on the initial

decision to go to war as well as the will to sustain the

conict? Contractors provide the ability to initiate and

sustain long-term conicts without the political eort

necessary to convince the American people a war is

worth ghting. us, the United States can enter a war

with less eort to build popular consensus. Most wars

will not require full-scale national mobilization, but

rather selective mobilization of both military and

civilian assets. Both proponents and opponents admit

that without contractors, the United States would

have required much greater mobilization efforts to

generate and support a force of 320,000 in Iraq (the

combined troop and contractor count) or a force of

over 210,000 in Afghanistan. The use of contractors

allowed us to conduct both wars with much less

domestic political debate.

But is this good? Should we seek methods that

make it easier to take the Nation to war? at appears

to be a bad idea when entering a protracted conict.

Insurgents understand that political will is the critical

vulnerability of the United States in irregular warfare.

ey have discussed this factor openly in their online

strategic forums for almost a decade.

Ensuring that

the American public understands the diculty of the

impending conict and is rmly behind the eort

should be an essential element in committing forces to

the 10 or more years that modern counterinsurgencies

require for success. us, while the use of contractors

lessens the extent of political mobilization needed, it

may well hurt the eort in the long term.

Second, as discussed earlier in this paper, con-

tractors can undermine the legitimacy of both U.S.

and host nation counterinsurgency eorts in a vari-

ety of ways. Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency,

states that the conict is a competition for legitimacy

between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent.

Widespread use of contractors can directly undercut

a central theme of counterinsurgency doctrine. Under

certain conditions, we may choose to use contractors

in spite of the negative impact on legitimacy, but we

should not do so in ignorance of that impact. Any de-

cision to use contractors in a conict zone should be

carefully considered for its impact on the strategy that

while contractors and the

government have worked hard to

resolve coordination issues, the fact

remains that contractors are not

under military command

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 11

we have chosen and the campaign plan we are using to

execute that strategy.

A third area that needs strategic consideration is the

morality of using contractors. What are the moral im-

plications of authorizing contractors, qualied or not, to

use deadly force in the name of the United States? What

about hiring poor ird World citizens to sustain casual-

ties in support of U.S. policy? What is the U.S. respon-

sibility for wounded and killed contractors—particularly

those from the ird World? While these sound like the-

oretical questions, they are in fact practical ones. Main-

taining long-term domestic popular support for conict

requires that U.S. actions be both legitimate and moral.

Recommendations

Currently, the Commission on Wartime Con-

tracting (www.wartimecontracting.gov) is exam-

ining a broad range of issues concerning wartime

contracting and will present its nal report in 2011.

Of particular interest will be the report’s nd-

ings on “inherently governmental” functions that

should not be done by contractors. Even as the

commission continues its work, the manpower re-

quirements of the current conicts mean that, for the

near term, the United States will continue to employ

a large number of contractors in war zones. In fact, as

our forces draw down in Iraq, the State Department

has stated its requirement for security contractors will

increase signicantly.

Near-term operational imperatives and the poten-

tial negative strategic impacts discussed above highlight

the need for clear guidelines about when and how the

U.S. Government should employ contractors. is ques-

tion should be a central part of our post-Afghanistan

force structure discussions. e size and type of force

that we build for the future depend on a clear concept

of how the United States plans to use contractors, both

armed and unarmed, in present and future conicts.

is discussion cannot wait until the commission’s re-

port is nalized and approved. e Secretary of Defense

is already pushing the department to reduce its budget

signicantly. e debate about future force structure is

well under way.

A number of factors are putting major pressure on

force structure planners. e primary pressure will be the

falling budgets that Secretary Robert Gates has clearly

warned the Services to expect. In addition, as U.S. forces

begin to withdraw from Afghanistan, force planners

will have to decide how to allocate limited resources to

position the Armed Forces to deal with future conicts.

ere is an intense, ongoing debate about which types

of conicts should take priority and then how the forces

should be structured, equipped, and trained to deal with

those contingencies. A tempting way to avoid tough

decisions will be to assume contractors will provide major

services across the spectrum of conict, thus dramatically

reducing the force requirements for logistics and security.

In the past, we have often sacriced force structure to

save weapons systems. Planning to use contractors in

future conict zones would reinforce this tendency.

Any force planning documents should clearly state

what assumptions have been made concerning the func-

tions of the contractors who will support the force. e

following guidelines should be employed in considering

when and how to use contractors in the future.

e U.S. Government’s default position should

be no contractors “outside the wire” in a conict zone.

Contractor presence outside secure facilities places

them in direct contact with the population. Contractors

can undercut the legitimacy of the host nation govern-

ment, reduce the accountability of the U.S. Government

for actions taken in its name, irritate the population,

compete directly for the most competent local person-

nel, fragment the chain of command, provide an excuse

for forming local militias, and are dicult to re—even

widespread use of contractors can

directly undercut a central theme of

counterinsurgency doctrine

12 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

when ineective. Given these issues, the United States

should strive to keep contractors out of conict zones.

is will not always be possible but should be the stan-

dard. Most of the problems highlighted in this paper

occurred in conict zones. e unique stresses on the

contractors combined with the severe limitations on

the government’s ability to oversee their performance

resulted in repeated actions that reduced operational ef-

fectiveness and undercut the U.S. strategic position. e

cost savings of using contractors are uncertain at best.

In contrast, the strategic and operational problems that

arise from using them in a counterinsurgency are clear

and documented.

e U.S. Government is unlikely to have enough

government employees to perform the numerous house-

keeping functions—mess, laundry, cleaning, and so

forth—that are an integral part of any operation. ere-

fore, the default position should remain that we hire con-

tractors only for those functions that take place within a

secure facility and require minimum contact with host

nation personnel. is means that DOD must be able

to provide security for other U.S. Government organiza-

tions working in conict zones until such time as they

can hire and train sucient government security person-

nel. Exceptions to this rule should be closely examined.

is position must be an explicit factor in force structure

planning. e one consistent exception to this rule will

be interpreters since the U.S. Government simply can-

not maintain sucient linguistic capability for the wide

range of possible future commitments.

If U.S. Government capacity is exceeded, the default

position should become using host nation organizations

rst and host nation contractors next with U.S. or for-

eign contractors being a choice of last resort. As noted,

even with a default position of not hiring contractors in

conict zones, some elements of the government would

most likely hire contractors, including armed contractors,

in future conicts. Some agencies could determine that

they cannot achieve an assigned task without contrac-

tors and would be unable to get other U.S. Government

partners to take the mission. To minimize the negative

impact of contractors in irregular war, policy should give

strong preference to the host nation providing the ser-

vices—even if they have to be funded and supported by

the United States.

Examples where local contractors should be rst

choice are inside secure facilities and as xed point se-

curity. Many of the jobs contractors perform inside fa-

cilities—meal preparation, cleaning—can easily be done

by local labor. Since local contractors would commute to

and from work, hiring them would require more eort

be dedicated to security than the current practice of im-

porting South Asian laborers and keeping them on base.

However, hiring local laborers provides economic stimu-

lus. In addition, the xed point security mission may well

be appropriate for local personnel because these jobs re-

quire little training and, because they are in a xed posi-

tion, are easier to supervise. e primary eort should be

to train local personnel to execute such jobs with those

security personnel transitioning to the appropriate host

nation government authority as soon as possible. Tran-

sitioning supervision of these personnel to local govern-

ments could be easier than doing so with regular army

or police. However, caution must be exercised whenever

considering armed contractors because the very act of the

government hiring contractors legitimizes the private use

of force. If a government needs to hire armed protection,

then it is dicult to deny businesses, political parties,

and other entities the right to hire armed contractors. In

both Iraq and Afghanistan, this dynamic led to private

militias that work for local strongmen rather than a local

community. NGOs, who often have been forced to hire

contractors as the security situation deteriorates, would

the size and type of force that

we build depend on a clear concept

of how the United States plans to

use contractors in present

and future conicts

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 13

continue to insist on protecting their people. us, a ma-

jor focus of the initial eort must be to replace contract

security with government-provided security.

In cases where the host nation lacks the necessary

capacity, local companies and personnel should receive

strong preference. In irregular war, it is important that

these jobs be assigned to the local population both to

stimulate economic growth and provide alternatives to

insurgent employment for local males. While such con-

tracts may be necessary, maximum eort should be made

to ensure that responsibilities are transferred to the host

nation government personnel as early as possible. Even

as host nation government capacity grows, there may be

some jobs that require local security contractors. In Af-

ghanistan, escorting logistics convoys from Pakistan to

Afghanistan falls into this category. e historical record

indicates ISAF or the Afghan government would require

massive forces to accomplish the mission. e Afghan

“security companies” have succeeded at this task, but op-

erate outside ISAF rules of engagement, upset local pow-

er structures, and can create additional enemies. Future

use of local security companies for such missions must

be carefully balanced against their negative side-eects

and employed only when there is no other solution. If

President Karzai enforces his order that contract security

cease operations by December 2010, this may provide a

valuable case study in how government forces can replace

armed contractors or the negative impacts if they attempt

to replace contractors but lack the capacity to do so.

e default position should be to hire contractors or

U.S. Government civilian employees to ll those billets

requiring deployment to locations outside the conict

zone. One of the greatest problems the U.S. military

faces in protracted war is personnel tempo—the period

Service personnel spend away from home. By hiring

contractors to ll jobs overseas but outside the conict

zone, the United States can reduce the personnel tempo

of the uniformed forces. Our current use of contractors

in Kuwait is a good example of this approach. While

deployments to Kuwait to support the eort in Iraq are

not dangerous, they do increase the personnel tempo of

the uniformed Services. us, DOD has lled most of

these billets with contractors, who have compiled a very

good record running the training, maintenance, and

transit facilities in Kuwait. is type of well-dened,

repetitive administrative task is ideal for contractors

particularly in a forward-deployed, nonconict loca-

tion. Furthermore, the contractors, like all expatriates

working in the country, are subject to Kuwait’s legal

system, and thus, the local population sees them as ac-

countable to Kuwait authority.

Aggressive eorts should be made to use either

DOD civilian employees or contractors to ll nonde-

ploying military billets. As stated, personnel tempo is a

major problem for the Services. Yet the Defense Busi-

ness Board noted that, despite 9 years of conict, fully

40 percent of Active-duty personnel have not deployed

to a conict zone, and an additional 30 percent have de-

ployed only once.

While a signicant number of these

nondeployers are rst-term personnel who have not yet

received sucient training to deploy, the number of ca-

reer force personnel who have not deployed is still high.

ese personnel are lling nondeploying billets. Rather

than hiring contractors to ll billets inside the conict

zone, we need to examine which of these nondeploying

billets can be lled by contractors, freeing uniformed

personnel to deploy.

If contractors are required, they must be under the

direct supervision of a U.S. Government employee. While

the government is making strenuous eorts to increase

the number of contracting ocers and to become more

specic in writing contracts, the fact remains that the

government cannot control contractor actions without

direct supervision. Unless it has direct supervision, the

if a government needs to hire armed

protection, then it is difcult to

deny other entities the right to hire

armed contractors

14 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

government will remain unaware of contractors whose

actions alienate the local population or fail to meet U.S.

standards. e degree of supervision will vary with the

type of work being done. Routine maintenance work in

a secure facility would require only normal contracting

oversight. Armed escorts or drivers who are in regular

contact with civilian populations would require constant

supervision in the form of a government employee rid-

ing with each vehicle and commanding each convoy. is

would give rise to a number of problems such as having a

government employee making less money but taking the

same risks as a contractor or having a less experienced

government employee supervising a more experienced

and often older contractor. However, these are minor

problems compared to those created by the population’s

perception of unsupervised contractors.

Long-term Requirement

is paper has focused on the current U.S. use of

contractors in conict zones, but the use of armed con-

tractors is on the rise around the world. Led by the Unit-

ed States, many nations have reintroduced armed con-

tractors to conict zones. In addition, the lack of security

in undergoverned areas has led NGOs, international or-

ganizations, private companies, and even nation-states to

hire armed contractors to provide security and unarmed

contractors to deliver services. In some cases, it is dif-

cult to tell if contractors are part of a private rm or

are hired by a government that does not wish to send of-

cial government personnel. e most serious potential

problems arise from the fact that large numbers of armed

contractors are being injected into an international secu-

rity arena that lacks recent experience in regulating them.

Armed contractors are having a global impact well

beyond that of the two irregular wars America is ghting.

Armed contractors introduce a new element into

international relations. Current international law and

international organizations such as the United Nations

have developed protocols and procedures for dealing

with the use of the armed forces of nation-states as well

as insurgents. However, these same organizations have

a paucity of experience in dealing with the introduction

of armed contractors into a conict zone whether those

contractors are hired by a private rm or a nation-state.

is leads to a nal recommendation.

e United States must develop policies and pro-

cedures to deal with the presence of armed contrac-

tors in conict zones. Because these armed entities

are generally outside the experience and mandate of

current international organizations and mechanisms,

they will continue to have unforeseen impacts. us,

the United States must work with other states, NGOs,

and international organizations to develop policies,

procedures, and institutions to deal with the presence

of armed contractors in conict zones. e Montreux

Document is an example of such an eort and de-

serves the support of the United States.

However, it

is only the rst step in learning to manage these new

players in the international arena.

Notes

Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in

Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis (Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2010), 5.

Congressional Budget Oce, “Contractors Support of U.S.

Operations in Iraq,” table 2, available at <www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/

doc9688/MainText.3.1.shtml>.

Schwartz, 5.

Peter W. Singer, “e Dark Truth About Blackwater,”

Salon, October 2, 2007, available at <www.salon.com/news/fea-

ture/2007/10/02/blackwater/print.html>.

Dan Baum, “Nation Builders for Hire,” e New York Times,

June 22, 2003, available at <www.informationclearinghouse.info/

article3905.htm>.

“Wising up, moving out,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 1, 2009, 29.

Steve Fainaru, “Private War: Convoy to Darkness,” e Wash-

ington Post, July 29, 2007, 1.

See <http://icasualties.org> and <www.propublica.org/series/

disposable-army>.

Steven L. Schooner and Colin D. Swan, “Contractors and the

Ultimate Sacrice,” Service Contractor, September 2010, 17.

Singer.

if contractors are required, they

must be under the direct supervision

of a U.S. Government employee

www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 15

Department of Labor, Oce of Workers Compensation

Programs, available at <www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsaboutdbareports.

htm>.

David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand

Strategy (Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, Janu-

ary 2009), 5.

Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Naka-

mura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status,

and Other Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,

updated August 25, 2008), 49.

David H. Petraeus, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Contracting Guidance,” Kabul, Afghanistan, September 8, 2010.

Author’s experience while serving on Coalition Military As-

sistance Training Team in Iraq during early 2004.

Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, 15–31.

ere are a limited number of cases where armed contractor

action can increase the legitimacy of a government—for instance,

protecting a hospital or refugee camp. However, even in these benign

cases, the presence of contractors shows the government cannot

protect its people and opens the door for any business or association

to hire its own armed guards—in essence a private militia.

Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, 13–14.

Afghans identify themselves by qawm, rather than by tribe

or nationality. A qawm identity is based on kinship, residence, and

sometimes occupation. Although qawm is sometimes translated

into English as tribe, the qawm relationship may cross tribal or even

ethnic boundaries. e qawm is the basic unit of social community

in Afghanistan, but the relationships involved can vary from ethnic

group to ethnic group.

Dexter Filkins, “With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Em-

pire,” e New York Times, June 6, 2010, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html>.

Nicholas Pelham, “Contractors in Iraq Accused of Import-

ing Labor and Exporting Prot,” Financial Times, October 14, 2003,

available at <www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1014-01.htm>.

Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Eectiveness in Af-

ghanistan,” available at <www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/

ACBAR%20Aid%20Eectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf>.

Roya Wolverson, “Not So Helpful,” Newsweek, November 24,

2007, available at <www.newsweek.com/id/72068>.

Carl Forsberg and Kimberly Kagan, “Consolidating Private

Security Companies in South Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study

of War, May 28, 2010, accessed at <www.understandingwar.org/les/

BackgrounderPSC.pdf>.

“Afghan-Cda Security Firms,” e Canadian Press-Broadcast

Wire, January 25, 2010, document BNW0000020100126e61p00011.

Major General Nick Carter’s Defense Department brieng via

teleconference from Afghanistan, May 26, 2010.

“Afghan Leader to Ban Security Contractors,” August 16,

2010, available at <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/16/world/

main6776999.shtml>.

Pratap Chatterchee, “DynCorp Oversight in Afghanistan

Faulted,” available at <www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50477>.

Government Accountability Oce Press Summary, “Deci-

sion on Bid Protest by DynCorp International Regarding U.S.

Army Contracts in Afghanistan,” available at <www.gao.gov/press/

dyncorp_2010mar15.html>.

e Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Af-

ghanistan, available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov>.

Ibid., “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and

Afghanistan,” June 2009, available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov/

docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-10-09.pdf>.

Middle East Media Research Institute, “Bin Laden Lieu-

tenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa’ida’s Combat

Doctrine,” February 20, 2002, available at <www.memri.org/report/

en/0/0/0/0/0/0/607.htm>.

Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication

3.33–5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart-

ment of the Army, December 2006), 1–1.

William Matthews, “U.S. Contractor Use in Iraq Expected to

Rise,” Defense News, July 12, 2010, available at <www.defensenews.

com/story.php?i=4704826>.

Defense Business Board, “Reducing Overhead and Improv-

ing Business Operations. Initial Observations,” accessed at <http://

defensenewsstand.com/showdoc.asp?docid=5192010_may19a>.

See e Montreux Document (Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-

national Committee of the Red Cross, August 2009), available at

<www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-

170908/$FILE/ICRC_002_0996.pdf>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secre-

tary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

unied combatant commands through studies, reports,

briengs, and memoranda. The center conducts directed

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and region-

al studies and engages in independent and leading-edge

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and

specialists in national security affairs from the United

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recom-

mendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reect the views of the

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Christopher J. Lamb

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders

Director of Research

Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

16 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

Global Commons and Domain

Interrelationships: Time for a

New Conceptual Framework?

Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes

(No. 259, October 2010)

Reforming the Inter-American

Defense Board

John A. Cope

(No. 258, August 2010)

Somalia’s Endless Transition:

Breaking the Deadlock

Andre Le Sage

(No. 257, June 2010)

Prioritizing Strategic Interests

in South Asia

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

(No. 256, June 2010)

Africa’s Irregular Security

Threats: Challenges for U.S.

Engagement

Andre Le Sage

(No. 255, May 2010)

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense:

A Compatible Interface

Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

(No. 254, February 2010)

Strengthening the IAEA:

How the Nuclear Watchdog

Can Regain Its Bark

Gregory L. Schulte

(No. 253, March 2010)

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence

in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves, Jr.

(No. 252, January 2010)

U.S.-Cambodia Defense

Relations: Defining New

Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern

(No. 251, December 2009)

North Korea: Challenges,

Interests, and Policy

James J. Przystup

(No. 250, November 2009)

Burma in Strategic Perspective:

Renewing Discussion of Options

Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia

A. Thompson

(No. 249, October 2009)

Unity of Effort: Key to Success

in Afghanistan

Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond

(No. 248, September 2009)

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publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu