In the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United States
In the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United States
In the Supreme Court of the United States
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD.; AND JACK C. PHILLIPS,
Petitioners,
v.
COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION;
C
HARLIE CRAIG; AND DAVID MULLINS,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of Colorado
BRIEF FOR AARON AND MELISSA KLEIN AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001
NO. 16-111
KELLY J. SHACKELFORD
Counsel of Record
HIRAM S. SASSER, III
KENNETH A. KLUKOWSKI
STEPHANIE N. TAUB
FIRST L IBERTY I NSTITUTE
2001 West Plano Parkway
Suite 1600
Plano, Texas 75075
Telephone (972) 941-4444
Facsimile (972) 941-4457
Counsel for Amici Curiae
TYLER S MITH
TYLER SMITH & ASSOCS. P.C.
181 North Grant Street
Suite 212
Canby, Oregon 97013
HERBERT G. GREY
4800 SW Griffith Drive
Suite 320
Beaverton, Oregon 97005
(503) 641-4908
September 7, 2017
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether applying Colorado’s public-accommodation
law to compel artists to create expression that violates
their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage
violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................. iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................. 2
ARGUMENT ............................... 4
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE RIGHT
NOT TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE. .............................. 4
A. Weddings Are Expressive Ceremonies
Protected By The First Amendment........ 5
B. The First Amendment Protects The Right
Not To Be Compelled To Contribute To
Expressive Events. ..................... 8
C. Wedding Cakes Always Convey A Message
About The Wedding..................... 9
D. Colorado’s Enforcement Of Its Law
Unconstitutionally Discriminates Between
Viewpoints On Same-Sex Marriage. ...... 14
E. Other States Like Oregon Impose Additional
Restrictions on Speech. ................ 16
II. GOVERNMENT CANNOT FORCE CITIZENS TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRACTICING THEIR
PROFESSION OR VIOLATING THEIR CONSCIENCE.17
CONCLUSION ............................ 19
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) ..................... 9
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach,
621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) .............. 10
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786 (2011) ...................... 10
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,
521 U.S. 457 (1997) ....................... 9
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Bos.,
515 U.S. 557 (1995) .................. passim
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n,
544 U.S. 550 (2005) ....................... 9
Kaahumanu v. Hawaii,
682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012) .............. 2, 6
Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115 (1973) ...................... 10
Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus.,
No. CA A15899
(Or. Ct. App. argued Mar. 2, 2017) ......... 1, 5
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000,
567 U.S. 298 (2012) ....................... 8
Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ....................... 6, 7
iv
Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) .................... 15
Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) ................ passim
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1 (1986) ......................... 8
S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty.,
372 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2004) ............... 7
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994) ....................... 7
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
529 U.S. 803 (2000) ...................... 10
United States v. United Foods,
533 U.S. 405 (2001) ....................... 9
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ................... 5, 8, 9
Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) ..................... 8, 9
STATUTES
O
R. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 .................. 4, 5
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.409 ................... 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Rachel Gross with Douglas Laycock, Gay Rights &
Religious Freedom: Can We Find Common
Ground?, M
OMENT MAGAZINE (June 30, 2014),
http://www.momentmag.com/gay-rights-
religious-freedom-common-ground/.......... 19
v
Betty Hallock, Inauguration 2013: The Big Cakes of
the Inaugural Balls, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/21/news/la-
dd-inauguration-2013-big-cakes-at-inaugural-
balls-20130121. ......................... 13
Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88
S. CAL. L. REV. 619
(2015) ................................. 18
Petitioners’ Brief, Excerpt of Record, Klein v. Or.
Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. CA A15899
(Or. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2016) .......... 11, 13, 14
Transcript of Record, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor
& Indus., No. CA A15899 (Or. Ct. App. argued
Mar. 2, 2017) ........................ 12, 13
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ......... 18
Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech,
12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367 (2004) ....... 5
Curtis M. Wong, Duff Goldman, ‘Ace Of Cakes’
Chef, Offers To Bake Rejected Lesbian Couple’s
Wedding Cake For Free, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
4, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/02/04/duff-goldman-gay-wedding-
cake-offer-oregon-lesbians_n_2617583.html . . 13
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
1
In 2007, Amici Curiae Aaron and Melissa Klein and
their family opened a storefront bakery in Gresham,
Oregon, called “Sweet Cakes by Melissa.” Six years
later, after they declined to create a custom-designed
cake celebrating a same-sex wedding because their
sincere religious beliefs prohibit them from doing so,
the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries imposed a
financially devastating penalty of $135,000 against the
Kleins and imposed a gag order forbidding them from
discussing their views on standing for their faith in this
situation.
2
The penalty forced the Kleins to shut down
their family bakery, which they had worked for years
to build. The Kleins appealed the decision to the
Oregon Court of Appeals, where their case is currently
awaiting decision.
3
This Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission will determine
whether the government can force individuals like
Aaron and Melissa to choose between practicing their
1
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief, either by
blanket consent filed with the Clerk or individual consent to amici.
No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person or entity other than amici or their counsel made a
monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or
submission.
2
This $135,000 financial exaction was actually styled as monetary
damages for declining to bake a wedding cake and the emotional
toll that the declination allegedly had upon the same-sex couple in
question.
3
Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. CA A15899 (Or. Ct.
App. argued Mar. 2, 2017).
2
livelihoods and violating their consciences. Because
the First Amendment does not permit the government
to force such a choice upon individuals like the Kleins,
the judgment should be reversed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A marriage is of “transcendent importance” to a
couple: it creates a permanent bond that brings
together two people, their families, and the
surrounding community. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015). The wedding is the
quintessential expression of that important union. A
couple’s wedding is therefore an intrinsically
expressive event—conveying “important messages
about the couple, their beliefs, and their relationship to
each other and to their community.” Kaahumanu v.
Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 2012). Each aspect
of and participant in this event contributes to that
message: the venue, the celebrant, the music, the
flowers, the photography—and the wedding cake.
Participating in a wedding—even by mere
attendance—is an expressive message communicating
support and approval for a marriage, a message that is
squarely protected by the First Amendment. Indeed,
those who support same-sex marriage plainly
understand this, as they proudly attend, support, and
contribute their talents to same-sex wedding
ceremonies.
But this freedom extends both ways. Those who
support same-sex marriage hold an unquestioned First
Amendment right to support those weddings, whether
by attending, performing wedding ceremonies, or
plying their craft in support of such a marriage—such
as the bakers who design a cake celebrating the union
3
of a same-sex couple. But those who oppose same-sex
marriage enjoy equal First Amendment rights not to
express such support, even when such support is
recharacterized as an anodyne “public
accommodations” law. The First Amendment entitles
Jack Phillips, like every other American, to refrain
from supporting same-sex marriages per his “decent
and honorable” beliefs, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602,
and this Court’s compelled-speech doctrine holds that
Colorado’s efforts to compel Phillips’s support violates
the First Amendment in a fundamental way. But no
less a violation is Colorado’s persistent viewpoint
discrimination between those who support same-sex
marriage, like several Colorado bakers permitted to
refuse orders designed to oppose same-sex marriages,
and Phillips, who wishes the same latitude to refuse
orders that support them.
This brief focuses on the importance of the right
that Jack Phillips holds along with millions of
Americans: the right not to be compelled by force of
law to abandon his decent and honorable belief
opposing same-sex marriage. If permitted to stand, the
coercive exercise of authoritarian power below
threatens to quash dissent not only on debates
regarding marriage, but also on all hotly contested
issues of public concern. Without the power to dissent,
millions of Americans could be put to the intolerable
choice of forfeiting their professional lives or betraying
their consciences. The First Amendment does not
tolerate the government’s putting anyone to such a
choice.
Amici know just how intolerable it is. Oregon’s
imposition of a financially devastating $135,000 fine
4
under the auspices of “damages” due to the mental and
emotional distress felt by a same-sex couple
4
—plus a
gag order—for Aaron and Melissa’s refusal to create a
custom-designed wedding cake for a same-sex marriage
ceremony forced them to close their family-owned
business. Amici therefore also focus in this brief on the
human cost when the government arrogates to itself
the power to suppress dissenting ideas.
ARGUMENT
I. T
HE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE RIGHT
NOT TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE.
A wedding cake communicates a First-Amendment-
protected message of support for a wedding because
everything in a wedding, including attendance,
communicates a protected message. Few aspects of life
are so thoroughly ritualized and so uniquely expressive
as a wedding, where one cannot participate in any
manner without sending a message—typically of
support and celebration. Phillips and amici seek the
First Amendment protection that anyone would enjoy
in any other context: the right not to communicate
such a message against their will. Colorado seeks to
compel participation in same-sex weddings, and thus to
compel a message of support for same-sex marriage.
The First Amendment denies Colorado the power to
coerce such support. Likewise, the Constitution
protects Aaron and Melissa Klein, bakers in Oregon
who are being prosecuted by Oregon for allegedly
violating the State’s public-accommodation law, OR.
4
See supra note 2.
5
REV. STAT. § 659A.403.
5
The Kleins’ case was argued
before the Oregon Court of Appeals on March 2, 2017,
and is awaiting a decision from that court.
6
A. Weddings Are Expressive Ceremonies
Protected By The First Amendment.
A wedding is an expressive event, with nearly every
component suffused with centuries of tradition and the
participants’ place in that tradition. Each detail—from
the venue, to the garments, to the celebrant, to the
cake—contributes to the wedding’s message, both in
support for the happy couple and in relation to
centuries of tradition. Every aspect of a wedding
contains symbolic significance, and thus each
component, itself a symbolic expression, is protected by
the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects not only speech, but
symbols, for “symbolism is a[n] . . . effective way of
communicating ideas.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). An object, service,
event, action, or graphical representation becomes a
symbol precisely when it is well associated with one or
a handful of meanings, and thus is associated with one
or more ideas. Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic
Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367,
390–91 (2004). The American flag is a symbol of the
5
Although this is a civil legal action initiated by a regulatory
agency, Oregon refers to such a legal action as a prosecution, and
its coercive character bears some of the punitive aspects typically
seen in a criminal proceeding.
6
See generally Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. CA
A15899 (Or. Ct. App. argued Mar. 2, 2017).
6
United States; red roses are a symbol of romantic love;
a Latin cross is a symbol of the Christian faith. Each
is associated with a corresponding idea; the use of each
is protected by the First Amendment.
So too with weddings. Aside from its role in
enabling the fundamental right to marry, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), a wedding is itself a
symbol fully protected by the First Amendment. A
wedding “offer[s] symbolic recognition” of a couple’s
union, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601, where “a couple
vows to support each other,” while “society pledge[s] to
support the couple.” Ibid. Any wedding thus
“convey[s] important messages about the couple, their
beliefs, and their relationship to each other and to their
community.” Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 799.
Secular couples frequently “marr[y] in non-religious
ceremonies that reflect their beliefs and personal
commitments,” and religious couples likewise “express
their religious commitments and values in their
wedding ceremony.” Id. A wedding held outdoors can
mean something different than a wedding in a church,
which can differ from a wedding at City Hall. A couple
expresses a different meaning in being married by a
priest than by a judge or by a friend. A rainbow flag
wedding cake expresses a different meaning than a
three-tiered traditional white wedding cake. The
symbols inherent in a wedding are nearly endless, and
each is protected expression under the First
Amendment. Id.
In this, weddings are akin to—though even more
expressive than—many other religious ceremonies, or
even parades. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568
7
(1995) (describing participation in parade as inherently
expressive); S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., 372
F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that
“religious ceremonies” are expressive). Just as parades
are not merely groups of people “march[ing] from here
to there,” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568, weddings are not
merely assemblies of guests, food, and statements. See
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (noting that marriage can
“define and express [a couple’s] identity”). Each is fully
protected by the First Amendment, among other rights.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
In short, a wedding, like other concerted ceremonial
expressions, is at minimum expressive activity,
participation in which is protected by the First
Amendment. These concerted activities enjoy the same
protection as the expressive activities of individuals.
After all, “a private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to
isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject
matter of the speech.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. Nor is
it of any moment that the participants’ activities are
typically directed by the couple; the transmission of the
couple’s message is, in any event, protected First
Amendment activity, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994), and the decision to
participate in the wedding is, standing alone, a
protected, expressive act. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70.
No less than a parade, a wedding combines multiple
communicative expressions into a single expressive
ceremony: both the ceremony, witnessed by all, and
each component, provided by one, are protected First
Amendment expressions.
8
B. The First Amendment Protects The Right
Not To Be Compelled To Contribute To
Expressive Events.
The First Amendment does not merely protect those
who speak. It equally protects the right not to speak.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. If those who support same-
sex marriage engage in protected First Amendment
expressions by attending, celebrating, and providing
services for same-sex marriages, those who elect not to
do so enjoy the same First Amendment right not to
communicate these messages. Colorado and similar
States seek to compel this message of support—and
thus to compel speech in violation of the First
Amendment.
The Free Speech Clause’s core protection against
compelled speech guarantees that government may not
require individuals like Phillips or amici to “affirm in
one breath that which they deny in the next.” Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16
(1986) (plurality opinion). Thus the government cannot
“compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves,”
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 309 (2012), or
require individuals to repeat the government’s message
or symbolically express it, through art, public
demonstration, or otherwise. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
These rights are most vital when “individuals” wish
“to hold a point of view different from the majority and
to refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally
objectionable.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715
(1977). This guarantee protects not only personal
liberty, but also personal integrity. Every individual is
entitled to his own “freedom of mind” and to “avoid
becoming a courier” for communicating speech that
9
conflicts with her moral, political, or religious beliefs.
Id. at 714, 717.
7
It likewise promotes the “open and
searching debate” through which citizens attempt to
convince each other of their positions on sensitive social
issues such as same-sex marriage. Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2607. The First Amendment’s prohibition on
compelled speech is therefore the obverse of its
prohibition on banning speech: the government may
not compel speech that it cannot prohibit. United
Foods, 533 U.S. at 410–11. If government cannot
prohibit expressive contributions to weddings, it cannot
demand them either. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The
First Amendment guarantees “that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2013).
C. Wedding Cakes Always Convey A Message
About The Wedding.
Even if weddings were somehow less symbolic than,
say, parades, requiring bakers to make cakes for
weddings to which they are opposed undoubtedly
compels bakers’ symbolic speech. The First
Amendment protects as speech a variety of visual and
audial media well beyond the written or spoken word.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. It protects all “pictures,
7
The First Amendment right to silence is so vital that this Court
has concluded that the First Amendment prohibits requiring even
financial contributions to speech with which a speaker disagrees.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557–58 (2005);
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 411, 413 (2001) (citing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997)).
10
paintings, drawings, and engravings,” Kaplan v.
California, 413 U.S. 115, 119 (1973), along with all
auditory expressions, whether typically understood as
music, and whether accompanied by lyrics or not,
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. The Free Speech Clause
protects even video games. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). “[E]sthetic and moral
judgments” about what qualifies as “art and literature
. . . are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree.” United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
Custom-designed wedding cakes are individualized
creations, typically made through consultation between
the couple and the baker, who creates the cake to
express the vision and message that the couple wishes
to convey, along with the baker’s own perceptions and
expressions of support for the couple and their
wedding. This collaborative creative activity is akin to
a commissioned artwork, where both client and artist
are engaged in expressive activity. Anderson v. City of
Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010).
While both “contribute to the creative process,” in
which “the customer has [the] ultimate control over
which design she wants,” and the artist “provide[s] a
service,” the result is no less an expression by the
creator, “because there is no dispute that the
[commissioned artist] applies his creative talents as
well.” Ibid.
When a baker creates a custom cake for a wedding,
she necessarily communicates a message of support for
that wedding. The Kleins’ faith teaches that God
instituted marriage as the sacred union of one man and
one woman that mirrors the union between Jesus
11
Christ and his church on earth. Petitioners’ Brief,
Excerpt of Record (“E.R.”) 365–67, 373–76, Klein, No.
CA A15899 (Or. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2016). Consistent
with their sincerely held religious beliefs, the Kleins do
not believe that other types of interpersonal unions are
marriages, and they believe it is sinful to celebrate
them as such. Ibid. Indeed, the Kleins created
wedding cakes, in part, because they wanted to support
celebrations of what their millennia-old faith views as
sacred unions between one man and one woman. Ibid.
So too with bakers who support same-sex marriage
and likewise understand that wedding cakes
communicate a clear, identifiable message of support
for same-sex marriage. For example, when the Kleins
declined to create a cake to support a same-sex
wedding, several bakers stepped in to do so. They
described themselves as artists and expressed deep
pride in their ability to contribute a powerful symbol to
the couple’s same-sex wedding. One baker, Laura
Widener, created an intricate, multiple tiered, peacock-
themed cake for the wedding. Id. at E.R. 18–19. The
peacock’s feathers streamed down each tier, flaring out
wider as they reached the cake’s foundation; Widener
hand-made and hand-painted each individual peacock
feather. Ibid.
Widener testified about her experience as a witness
for the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries in its
proceedings against the Kleins—highlighting her
understanding that her contribution as a baker and
artist significantly contributed to the wedding in an
expressive manner:
12
Q. So you felt that your cake was part of the
celebration?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. It was a big part of the celebration?
A. Any cake is. It’s either—when someone is
designing their wedding, it’s dress and then
cake. So, yeah, it’s a big part in any wedding
celebration.
8
Expressing her pride in her expression of support
for the same-sex couple, she continued:
Cakes are an artistic expression for me. And, as
an artist, you want to be able to share that with
the public and the community. And this was one
of my artistic creations, and I wanted to share it
with the public.
9
Widener affirmed that she has publicly discussed
her belief in the message of same-sex weddings and
that she was proud to be a part of the celebration:
It’s all about the love and commitment these two
people share. They want to declare that
commitment in the company of their friends and
family, and I’m proud that my cake will be a
part of that celebration.
10
8
Transcript of Record 595:1–7, Klein, No. CA A15899 (emphases
added).
9
Id. at 594:7–10.
10
Id. at 594:15–25 (affirming that she had previously given this
quote in an article).
13
A celebrity baker also contributed another cake to
the couple in lieu of a traditional groom’s cake. The
“edible art” cake maker Duff Goldman, known for his
Food Network television show Ace of Cakes,
11
has
designed and created cakes for numerous high-profile
events, including President Barack Obama’s Second
Inauguration.
12
He created a cake that mirrored an
Irish fairy tree tattoo born by one member of the
couple.
13
And he explained that his creation of the cake
stemmed from his longstanding support of same-sex
marriage, and his belief—which the Kleins do not
share—that same-sex marriage is no different from “a
straight couple getting married”: “Two people who
pledge to spend the rest of their lives together, that’s
cool. Doesn’t matter who they are, if they are both girls
or both guys.”
14
When accepting Goldman’s offer to
design a second cake, the couple expressed their
gratitude to “both bakeries for being a part of making
[their] wedding date incredibly special.” Petitioners’
Brief, supra, E.R. 22. Both the baker and the couple
understood that Goldman’s cake was an expressive
11
Petitioners’ Brief, supra, E.R. 22, App. 497.
12
Betty Hallock, Inauguration 2013: The Big Cakes of the
Inaugural Balls, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/21/news/la-dd-inauguration-
2013-big-cakes-at-inaugural-balls-20130121.
13
Transcript of Record, supra, 356:4–16.
14
Curtis M. Wong, Duff Goldman, ‘Ace Of Cakes’ Chef, Offers To
Bake Rejected Lesbian Couple’s Wedding Cake For Free,
H
UFFINGTON P OST (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/duff-goldman-gay-
wedding-cake-offer-oregon-lesbians_n_2617583.html.
14
creation—precisely the sort of material protected by
the First Amendment, regardless of its medium.
Indeed, one reason the Kleins started designing
wedding cakes was to celebrate the gift of marriage as
the union of one man and one woman, as their faith
teaches them. Id. at 367, 375. Melissa Klein often
prays that God will bless the couple and their
marriage. Ibid. The Kleins understand that their
contributions are an important part of celebrating what
their faith views as a spiritual union—and while the
Kleins will serve all comers, they cannot in good
conscience produce messages of support for weddings
that contradict their religious beliefs. The government
cannot make them, if the First Amendment is to have
any meaning. Just as the government cannot prohibit
Goldman and Widener from creating cakes expressing
their support of same-sex marriage, it cannot require
Aaron and Melissa Klein—or Jack Phillips—to do so,
either. The First Amendment protects the right of Duff
Goldman and Laura Widener to create cakes that
express support for same-sex weddings—just as it
protects the right of the Kleins and Jack Phillips not to
create cakes that express such support. The
government may not make persons choose between
their deeply held beliefs and their livelihoods, no
matter how it styles the attempt.
D. Colorado’s Enforcement Of Its Law
Unconstitutionally Discriminates Between
Viewpoints On Same-Sex Marriage.
The Free Speech Clause entitles individuals to
communicate or to refrain from communicating
messages concerning same-sex marriage with which
they disagree—but in Colorado, as in many States with
15
similar laws, those free-speech rights are selectively
enforced. That is, in Colorado, while opponents of
same-sex marriage are compelled to express support for
same-sex weddings, supporters are permitted to decline
similar requests for messages opposing same-sex
marriages. Even if the government could force
speakers to accept messages from all sides, it cannot
pick favorites in doing so. This, too, violates the Free
Speech clause.
As Colorado has conceded, Brief in Opposition at 11,
its law excepts works containing “specific designs or
messages that are offensive” to the producer. Relying
on this exception, Colorado permits bakers to refuse
orders from customers who ask them to create cakes
opposing same-sex marriage. Pet. App. 305a, 314a,
323–24a. But Colorado prohibits bakers from refusing
orders from customers who ask them to create cakes
supporting same-sex marriage—even though doing so
would violate their core religious beliefs. Colorado’s
position can only be that opposing same-sex marriage
is offensive, while supporting it is not. But Colorado is
no more entitled to decide what is offensive than the
Patent and Trademark Office, as the First Amendment
applies with equal force to each. Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).
There cannot be an “open and searching debate” if
a State may deem one side’s beliefs offensive. Far from
enabling frank and honest exchanges, Colorado’s
approach hardens hearts and steels resolve—and
engages in invidious discrimination between
viewpoints that the First Amendment prohibits.
16
E. Other States Like Oregon Impose
Additional Restrictions on Speech.
Although Jack Phillips has thankfully not had to
deal with additional forms of restriction on his free-
speech rights, Aaron and Melissa Klein have learned
that other States can be far more aggressive in
penalizing speech on marriage that does not accord
with the State-imposed orthodoxy. In addition to the
$135,000 penalty recast as “damages,” Oregon further
punished the Kleins for discussing their religious faith
on radio, and imposed a “gag order” on Aaron and
Melissa not to publicly discuss their views regarding
marriage in the future.
During the government’s prosecution of their case,
the Kleins were invited to participate in an interview
on a Christian radio show to share their ordeal. Aaron
and Melissa discussed their personal religious faith
during this interview, and explained why it led them to
decline to customize a wedding cake celebrating a
same-sex marriage. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra, at
14–15 (collecting various record entries). Consistent
with their representations on that radio show, when
Aaron and Melissa were forced to shutter their small
family business, they posted a note encouraging
customers and neighbors that Aaron and Melissa’s
religious faith was enduring through this difficult time,
that the “fight is not over,” and they would “continue to
stand strong” in their religious beliefs. Id. at 15–16
(citing record entries).
In response, Oregon declared that Aaron and
Melissa had violated O
R. REV. STAT. § 659A.409, a
statute that prohibits businesses from advertising
discriminatory messages to the public. This violation
17
of what is essentially a signing and commercial
advertising regulatory statute became the basis for a
gag order. In response to the radio interview and note
expressing the Kleins’ sincerely held religious beliefs,
Oregon enjoined Aaron and Melissa from expressing
such religious beliefs in the future, ruling that such
statements are the functional equivalent of a business’s
advertising to the public its intent to engage in illegal
discrimination in the future. Petitioners’ Brief, supra,
at 16 (citing record entries).
The First Amendment does not allow the
government to impose additional financial penalties for
sharing religious beliefs, or to enjoin American citizens
from speaking to the media about those beliefs.
II. GOVERNMENT CANNOT FORCE CITIZENS TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRACTICING THEIR
PROFESSION OR VIOLATING THEIR CONSCIENCE.
The risks to professionals from compelled-
expression laws like Oregon’s and Colorado’s are not
hypothetical. The Kleins, who hold “decent and
honorable” views about marriage, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
at 2602, have already been driven out of the
marketplace. Amici urge the Court to hold that the
First Amendment prevents government from imposing
fines and penalties—whether characterized as
“damages” or any other term—designed to exclude
people with “decent and honorable beliefs” from public
economic life—or the public square altogether.
Amici Aaron and Melissa Klein were penalized
$135,000 for a single instance of declining to express
support for a same-sex wedding—a ruinous financial
penalty that destroyed a family business which had
18
taken years to build. For context, federal crimes
punishable with a maximum similar financial
exaction—though forthrightly denominated as fines or
penalties, rather than “damages” from a sense of
personal offense and affront—under the U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL include reckless
involuntary manslaughter, id. § 2A1.4(a)(2)(A),
statutory rape, id. § 2A3.2(a), and domestic violence,
id. § 2A6.2(a). The Kleins’ penalty dwarfs those
permitted for other serious federal crimes, such as
aggravated assault, id. § 2A2.2(a), perjury, id.
§ 2J1.3(a), or tax evasion resulting in a tax loss of
$100,000, id. § 2T4.1(F). States such as Oregon and
Colorado are thus punishing conscientious dissenters
as serious felons—an approach that is anathema to the
values the Free Speech Clause protects and defends.
Advocates of same-sex marriage have also
recognized the high cost of forcing individuals to choose
between violating their conscience or practicing their
profession. For example, Andrew Koppelman has
acknowledged that “the human costs of refusing
accommodation[s]” to religious objectors “are serious.”
Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 652–53
(2015). As Koppelman concludes, the burden “of being
refused service, even if one counts the stress, is less
than the burden on” religious objectors like the Kleins
“of going out of business.” Id. at 645.
Similarly, Douglas Laycock has written that while
“same-sex couples have a right to marry, and to as
grand a wedding as they desire, they do not have to
force religious believers in traditional marriage to host
19
the wedding or cater the reception.”
15
He argues that
small, family-owned wedding vendors should have this
right. But Colorado, Oregon, and various other States
will not grant even this modest accommodation as a
sign of tolerance for longstanding, mainstream
religious beliefs of which the State disapproves. This
Court should not ignore the human cost when
government steps in to stigmatize dissent and force
religious objectors to choose between their beliefs and
their livelihoods.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Colorado
should be reversed.
15
Rachel Gross with Douglas Laycock, Gay Rights & Religious
Freedom: Can We Find Common Ground?, M
OMENT MAGAZINE
(June 30, 2014), http://www.momentmag.com/gay-rights-religious-
freedom-common-ground/.
20
Respectfully submitted,
KELLY J. SHACKELFORD
Counsel of Record
H
IRAM S. SASSER, III
K
ENNETH A. KLUKOWSKI
STEPHANIE N. TAUB
FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE
2001 West Plano Parkway
Suite 1600
Plano, Texas 75075
Telephone (972) 941-4444
Facsimile (972) 941-4457
TYLER SMITH
TYLER SMITH & ASSOCS. P.C.
181 North Grant Street
Suite 212
Canby, Oregon 97013
HERBERT G. GREY
4800 SW Griffith Drive
Suite 320
Beaverton, Oregon 97005
(503) 641-4908
Counsel for Amici Curiae
September 7, 2017