DOI's Investigation into Mayor de Blasio's Security Detail

DOI’sInvestig ationinto

MayordeBlasio’s SecurityDetail

MargaretGarnett

Commissioner

EleonoraB.Rivkin

SeniorInspectorGeneral

October2021

NewYorkCity

DepartmentofInvestigation

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

NYC Department of Investigation | i

Executive Summary 1

Background 5

The New York City Police Department Executive Protection Unit 5

Applicable Rules 6

Federal Security Detail Practices 7

Findings of Investigation 10

1. Use of the Detail for Non-Protectees 10

a. Security Detail Protection Provided to the Mayor’s Children 11

b. Chiara de Blasio’s 2018 Move 14

c. Dante de Blasio’s Transport 18

d. Staff Transport 23

e. Guest Transportation 25

f. Campaign Transport 27

g. Additional Use of the Security Detail for Tasks Unrelated to

Protecting the Mayor and First Lady 28

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2. Presidential Campaign Travel 29

3. Record Keeping and Retention 30

a. Security Detail Communications 31

b. Production Issues 32

c. Retention of EPU Communications 37

d. Inspector Redmond’s Cell Phone Communications and Obstructive Conduct 39

e. Lack of Records Regarding Daily Movements 41

Conclusion and Recommendations 42

The New York City Police Department 44

The Office of the Mayor 45

The Conflicts of Interest Board 47

New York City Department of Records and Information Services 47

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Executive Summary

In August 2019, the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI)

initiated an investigation into several allegations concerning New York

City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s security detail. First, DOI’s investigation

probed whether Mayor de Blasio had ordered members of his security

detail to move his daughter, Chiara de Blasio, from her Brooklyn

apartment to Gracie Mansion. Second, DOI investigated whether Mayor

de Blasio ordered his security detail to drive his son, Dante de Blasio, to

Yale University and to various destinations throughout New York City.

Third, DOI investigated whether Mayor de Blasio ordered his security

detail to transport mayoral staff members, or members of his

presidential campaign staff, without him in the vehicle. Lastly, DOI

reviewed whether the City of New York had borne the ancillary travel

costs for the Mayor’s security detail during his presidential campaign.

Many of these allegations were also reported in contemporaneous news

articles alleging a variety of inappropriate uses of the Mayor’s security

detail.

This report reflects the pertinent facts identified in the course of this

investigation. As discussed in greater detail below, DOI’s findings

comprise a range of issues, including potential violations of the New

York City Conflicts of Interest Law, lapses in best practices, corruption

vulnerabilities, and inefficient uses of public resources.

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On July 15, 2019, The City published an article alleging that Mayor Bill de Blasio’s presidential

campaign had at that point cost taxpayers $100,000 in EPU travel expenses, including airfare,

hotel, meals, rental cars, and gasoline costs. Reuven Blau & Greg B. Smith, De Blasio Cross-

Country Presidential Run Takes NYC Taxpayers for a $100k Ride, T

HE CITY, July 15, 2019,

available at https://www.thecity.nyc/2019/7/15/21210942/de-blasio-cross-country-presidential-

run-takes-nyc-taxpayers-for-a-100k-ride. An article published on August 4, 2019, by the New

York Daily News reported that members of the EPU moved Chiara de Blasio from her apartment

in Brooklyn utilizing two unmarked NYPD sprinter vans and that First Lady Chirlane McCray

personally oversaw the move. Graham Rayman & Stephen Rex Brown, Mayor de Blasio Ordered

NYPD Executive Protection Unit to Move His Daughter Out of a Brooklyn Apartment, Sources

Say, N

EW YORK DAILY NEWS, Aug. 4, 2019, available at https://www.nydailynews.com/new-

york/ny-mayor-epu-move-20190804-tjn45baxivdf5fseljd4myku2e-story.html. An article

published on October 28, 2019, by the New York Daily News alleged further misuse of Mayor de

Blasio’s security detail in that members of the EPU were required to drive Dante de Blasio to

and from Yale University. Graham Rayman & Stephen Rex Brown, Mayor de Blasio’s Used His

NYPD Security Detail to Take His Son to Yale: Sources, N

EW YORK DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 2019,

available at https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-dante-epu-yale-probe-20191028-

innjjwz3ird2jkyjtuso6fjape-story.html.

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Mayor de Blasio’s security detail, as well as those of certain other City

elected officials, is comprised of members of the New York City Police

Department’s (NYPD) Intelligence Bureau. The purpose of these

security details is to provide personal security to individuals for whom

the NYPD has determined that such protection is necessary, whether by

virtue of their official position or due to a particular threat. Within the

Intelligence Bureau, the Executive Protection Unit (EPU) is responsible

for the security needs of the Mayor and, if necessary, his family.

Regarding Chiara de Blasio’s move, DOI’s investigation determined that

multiple EPU members were present during Chiara de Blasio’s move

from her apartment, and that an NYPD sprinter van was used to

transport some of Chiara’s belongings from her apartment to Gracie

Mansion. DOI’s investigation found that at least one EPU member

participated in moving Chiara’s belongings – specifically, a futon – into

and out of the sprinter van. DOI’s investigation was unable to determine

whether NYPD resources assisted in the move at Mayor de Blasio’s

direct instruction. However, the provision of the sprinter van and the

assistance of NYPD personnel in physically moving furniture was a

misuse of NYPD resources for a personal benefit, whether it was

requested or merely accepted.

Regarding Dante de Blasio’s use of the security detail, DOI’s

investigation identified multiple instances when EPU detectives drove

Dante de Blasio to or from Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut,

without the Mayor or First Lady present in the EPU vehicle. The

detectives interviewed by DOI asserted that the directives to drive

Dante de Blasio came from their superiors, not directly from Mayor de

Blasio. DOI also found that it was common practice for the EPU to drive

Dante de Blasio to locations around New York City without the Mayor

or First Lady present, typically at the direction of their EPU superiors.

However, both an EPU sergeant and a former mayoral staffer recalled

several instances when Mayor de Blasio directly requested that Dante

de Blasio be driven to locations throughout New York City, such as train

or bus stations, without the Mayor or First Lady present in the EPU

vehicle. Whether such rides were a misuse of NYPD resources for

personal benefit depends on whether Dante de Blasio was himself a

protectee or merely the child of a protectee. The children of protectees

are not entitled to use NYPD resources outside the presence of the

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protectee, absent an independent security determination by NYPD that

family members require protection. While multiple witnesses described

their understanding that Dante was “entitled” to NYPD protection,

there are no records documenting a security determination that Dante

de Blasio should be a protectee or identifying the level of security that

he should be provided. Although it is the position of the NYPD

Intelligence Bureau that both de Blasio children should have full-time

protection, both children declined an assigned detail as adults. Since

that time, in practice, Dante’s use of NYPD resources was determined

by his personal preferences and the availability of personnel, rather

than any risk assessment.

DOI’s investigation also revealed numerous instances when EPU

members transported mayoral staffers to various locations, including to

their homes, and assisted them in running errands for the Mayor.

Additionally, DOI identified several instances when the security detail

was asked to transport guests of the Mayor, at his direction, without

him present in the vehicle.

DOI determined that the City of New York expended $319,794 for the

members of Mayor de Blasio’s security detail to travel on the Mayor’s

presidential campaign trips. Mayor de Blasio has not reimbursed the

City for these expenses, either personally or through his campaign. DOI

also found that, during these campaign trips, EPU members

occasionally transported Mayor de Blasio’s campaign staffers while

driving the Mayor. Both reflect a use of NYPD resources for political

purposes.

In addition, DOI learned that, for approximately one year, the security

detail has been conducting frequent security checks at houses owned by

the Mayor in Brooklyn, where neither he nor his family members

currently reside.

Finally, DOI has concluded that the NYPD inspector in charge of the

First Family’s security detail actively obstructed and sought to thwart

this investigation, frustrating DOI’s efforts to learn the full facts

regarding these allegations.

In addition to the misuse of EPU staff and resources, DOI’s investigation

identified several vulnerabilities in the EPU’s policies and procedures.

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Based on its findings, DOI issues several policy and procedure

recommendations to address these matters.

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Background

The New York City Police Department Executive Protection Unit

The Intelligence Bureau of the NYPD contains the Executive Protection

Unit and the Uniformed Operations Unit (UOU). The EPU is

responsible for providing security for the Mayor and, where necessary,

his immediate family. The UOU is responsible for securing particular

locations, such as City Hall and Gracie Mansion.

Chief Thomas Galati heads the Intelligence Bureau. Inspector Howard

Redmond, who reports to Chief Galati, oversees both the EPU and the

UOU. He has held that position since the start of the de Blasio

Administration in early 2014. The reporting structure within both units

is largely the same. Each has a lieutenant in command who reports

directly to Inspector Redmond. Sergeants, who manage the day-to-day

operations, report to the lieutenants, while the detectives and officers

report to the sergeants.

Both the Mayor and First Lady Chirlane McCray have full-time security

details, staffed by the EPU, who are with the Mayor and First Lady

McCray 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The EPU staff is divided

into several teams, with each team working a rotating schedule to

ensure full-time coverage. Typically, the Mayor is protected by multiple

EPU members and multiple EPU vehicles, with the precise number

depending on the circumstances and any security concerns. EPU

members told DOI that mayoral staffers occasionally travel to official

events in the motorcade – either in the same vehicle as the Mayor or in

one of the additional vehicles.

The NYPD is responsible for determining eligibility for mayoral family

members to receive EPU protection; however, it is unclear what criteria,

if any, are used in these determinations. During its investigation, DOI

requested copies of NYPD policies and procedures concerning the EPU,

including any documentation concerning eligibility determinations, the

declination of EPU protection, and the use of EPU resources by

protectees, protectees’ families, and protectees’ staffers. In response, the

NYPD represented that it had “no written policies or procedures”

responsive to DOI’s request.

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Applicable Rules

The New York City Charter does not directly address security details,

but it prohibits public servants from using their City positions for

personal advantage, such as by having a subordinate perform personal

tasks unrelated to City work for the superior, regardless of whether the

superior requests the service or the subordinate volunteers. Using City

personnel for non-City purposes may also violate the City Charter. The

City Charter also prohibits public servants from using their City

position or City resources to benefit their family members or other close

associates.

The New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (“Board”) has adopted

Rules of the Board, Sections 1-13(a) and (b), which elaborate on the

Charter’s prohibition on the use of City time and City resources for any

non-City purpose. While these rules do not prohibit certain incidental

personal uses of City time and City resources (such as, for example, a

brief phone call during an employee’s workday to schedule a personal

appointment), no use of City time or City resources is permitted for

either personal profit or for political or campaign activities and there is

no “incidental use” exception for these activities.

In Advisory Opinion No. 2009-1, the Board created a limited exception

to this flat ban for City elected officials who are provided with a City-

owned vehicle and City personnel as drivers in order to perform their

official duties.

Such officials may make any lawful use of the City-

owned vehicle for personal purposes in or near New York City, including

political activities, provided the use is not itself a conflict of interest and

the official is in the vehicle during all such use. In delineating this

exception, the Board concluded that it applied only to the elected

official’s own use of the City vehicle and City-provided driver. “Absent

an independent security need as determined by the NYPD, a public

official . . . may not send a City car with security personnel . . . on

personal errands for the official or utilize the car and/or driver to

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See NY City Charter §§ 2604(b)(3) and 2604(b)(2).

Board Advisory Opinion 2012-5.

The Conflicts of Interest Board publicly addressed these matters for the first time in March of

2009. Any comparable activity of City elected officials preceding this guidance is not governed

thereby, and is therefore not germane to any analysis of conduct taken subsequent to the

issuance of this public guidance.

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transport members of the official’s family to and from their own daily

pursuits . . . unless the Elected Official is in the car at the time or unless,

as noted, the NYPD has determined that the official’s family member

has an independent security need.”

The exception articulated in Advisory Opinion No. 2009-1 addresses

only the elected official’s use of a City-owned car in or near New York

City; it does not extend the exception to political travel other than by

City-owned car. Absent a Board opinion specifically addressing such

travel, the applicable guidance on campaign related activities is

provided by Advisory Opinion No. 2012-5, which provides a “flat ban” on

using City resources for political or campaign activities.

Federal Security Detail Practices

Several federal agencies, including the United States Secret Service

(USSS), the United States Department of State (USDOS), and the

United States Marshals Service (USMS) provide executive protection

details to eligible individuals, domestically and internationally. DOI

interviewed members of these federal agencies with significant

experience in executive protection, including supervision and training,

to identify effective policies and best practices for operating security

details and preventing abuse.

The general structure and operation of federal security details are

similar to those managed by the NYPD’s Executive Protection Unit.

Some federal protectees receive larger, more complex, 24/7 details, akin

to that provided to the Mayor, while others may receive smaller

permanent details or temporary details. Details are comprised of teams,

or shifts. Each detail team has a supervisor.

Those interviewed told DOI that certain individuals were protectees due

to their position in the government, while others were assigned

protection in response to changing threat levels or specific threats.

Interviewees stated that protection was not usually extended to family

members of designated protectees, with certain limited exceptions. For

example, U.S. law provides that spouses and immediate family members

of the United States President and Vice President are automatically

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provided protection, through the Secret Service, unless declined by adult

family members, as set forth below.

USSS, USDOS, and USMS follow formal processes to determine

whether an individual is entitled to security detail protection, and the

level of protection provided. One interviewee stated that the USDOS

routinely receives requests for protection from the diplomatic

community. USDOS then engages in a decision-making process

wherein, among other things, it considers the threat level. Other

interviewees similarly stated that USSS and USMS research potential

threats before determining the appropriate levels and methods of

security to provide a potential protectee. For all three agencies, these

findings are recorded in a formal written document.

Additionally, each of these federal agencies have formal processes for

declining protection, including the completion and submission of forms

documenting the declination. One interviewee stated that USSS will not

disapprove requests to decline protection, explaining that this decision

is the prerogative of all adult protectees, excepting the President and

Vice President of the United States. The Secret Service agent explained

that an eligible protectee’s declination of protection was not permanent

or irrevocable, but was typically only for a specified period of time.

Similarly, an interviewee told DOI that USMS will resume providing

protection to a protectee on request so long as an updated assessment

finds that a threat remains that warrants USMS protection.

All interviewees explained that federal security details do not drive the

family members of protectees, who are not themselves protectees or who

have declined protection, without the protectee present. When asked

about the conditions under which such a scenario may occur, one

interviewee simply declared, “It just wouldn’t happen.” Interviewees

told DOI that a protectee’s family members, or their staffers, may travel

in the protectee’s vehicle or motorcade, but only if space is available and

the protectee is present.

Additionally, interviewees told DOI that supervisors of federal security

details meet with new protectees in person, before the detail formally

begins, to set clear expectations concerning the role of the security

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18 U.S.C. § 3056(a).

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detail. Protectees are notified in advance that the detail will not drive

anybody, including the protectee’s family members, without the

protectee present, nor run errands for the protectee or their family

members or staffers.

One interviewee explained to DOI that agents often feel pressured to

please protectees, given their power and prominence, and agents may be

afraid to lose their jobs or be reprimanded. The interviewee stated that

USDOS training addresses how a protectee’s small requests may

escalate over time, and recommends declining small requests from the

start.

Interviewees also detailed their methods of movement tracking and

record keeping regarding protective details and use of government

vehicles. While specific policies and forms varied, all included a means

of recording and maintaining records of all vehicles used, personnel

present and their roles, and all stops and destinations (including

matters not on the protectee’s official itinerary, such as personal

appointments and meals).

Two interviewees from the USDOS stated that security detail agents

were rotated to different assignments approximately every two years,

although the supervisor typically remained for a longer period of time.

One interviewee explained that the practice of rotating agents acted as

a means of maintaining appropriate boundaries between the protectee

and the detail. In addition to the pressures of serving high-level

protectees noted above, agents may also feel pressured to accommodate

a protectee’s inappropriate requests, if such accommodation may result

in the extension of the agent’s prestigious detail assignment. By rotating

agents regardless of protectee preference, such accommodating behavior

is not rewarded. Instead, qualified agents bid for two-year assignments

that they know will be limited in length. Interviewees emphasized that

close relationships between detail members and protectees, such as

those formed during long assignments, risk the detail’s ability to protect

the protectee from harmful or embarrassing situations, including

behavior that could lead the press to allege unprofessionalism or

unethical behavior on the part of the protectee or the detail.

Interviewees from the other federal agencies told DOI that they share

similar concerns of maintaining appropriate boundaries with protectees.

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DOI also inquired into the modes of communications used by federal

security details, and whether they use text or encrypted text messaging

applications to communicate. While one interviewee told DOI that he

had not observed USSS detail members using encrypted text messaging

applications to communicate, other interviewees stated that USDOS

and USMS agents have used them. However, interviewees indicated

that the USDOS’s use of encrypted text messaging applications was

limited, with one stating that a messaging application is typically used

only to communicate last minute moves. Another interviewee

represented that USMS had approved the use of encrypted text

messaging applications. Interviewees explained to DOI that federal

agencies are still developing policies around the retention of

communication records conducted on more recent technologies.

Findings of Investigation

1. Use of the Detail for Non-Protectees

During their interviews with DOI, Mayor de Blasio and First Lady

McCray repeatedly stated that they had not received any guidance

concerning the appropriate or inappropriate uses of their security

details at any point during the Mayor’s administration. They both stated

that their understanding of the security detail came from their past

experiences working in government, as well as common sense, resulting

in a general understanding that they would be provided with security

protection at all times and that the security detail could not be used for

personal or political matters other than merely accompanying them to

such events. Mayor de Blasio stated that, when he may have had

questions about his security detail, he has brought those questions to

the NYPD because “they had to determine how their people would

operate.”

DOI requested copies of any guidance provided by the NYPD to the

Mayor or his representatives concerning the use of EPU resources. In

response, the NYPD represented that it had no documents, including no

general written policies or procedures, responsive to DOI’s requests.

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a. Security Detail Protection Provided to the Mayor’s Children

During the course of its investigation, DOI learned that Chiara de Blasio

and Dante de Blasio were assigned standing full-time security details at

various times during Mayor de Blasio’s administration. According to

Inspector Redmond, Chiara de Blasio was assigned a standing detail at

the start of the administration in 2014, until she left for college in

California, although DOI notes that Chiara de Blasio was already

attending college at the start of her father’s term on January 1, 2014.

Chiara was reassigned a standing detail in 2016, when she returned to

New York City. Several detail members told DOI that her standing

detail was again dissolved shortly thereafter, at Chiara’s request.

Inspector Redmond estimated that Chiara’s standing detail dissolved

approximately one year after her return from college, and confirmed

that the dissolution came at Chiara’s request. DOI was informed that

none of these arrangements or changes were documented in writing, and

so DOI had to rely on the recollections of participants.

Dante was also assigned a standing security detail at the start of Mayor

de Blasio’s administration. The standing detail was dissolved in 2015,

when he left for college at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut.

DOI learned that Dante continued to be transported, on request, by

members of the EPU when he returned to New York City on breaks from

school and after graduating in 2019. According to Inspector Redmond,

Dante was assigned a “quasi-type detail,” consisting of one UOU

detective, at some point after his college graduation. DOI notes that the

UOU detective was not “assigned” to Dante’s detail, but was assigned to

a post at Gracie Mansion and was instructed to give Dante rides when

he requested them. Mayor de Blasio and First Lady McCray denied that

Dante’s security detail had ever been dissolved, although both agreed

that he had not had a permanent, 24/7 security detail since he departed

for college in 2015. Both the Mayor and the First Lady McCray deferred

questions about Dante’s security arrangements to Inspector Redmond,

claiming that they did not know specifics. As with Chiara de Blasio, DOI

was informed that there was no documentation regarding security

arrangements for Dante de Blasio or any changes to those arrangements

over the years.

Mayor de Blasio explained that, over the course of his administration,

Dante’s and Chiara’s lives had evolved, as had their willingness to

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accept detail protection. Mayor de Blasio stated that it was his

understanding that the NYPD wanted to provide Dante and Chiara with

as much security as they would accept, so there was a “strategic effort

to make it as attractive as possible to use detail whenever possible.” The

Mayor explained that he was told that it was NYPD’s position that if his

children were willing to accept security detail protection 30% of the time,

as an example, that would be better than 0% of the time, when

considering their total security risk. Mayor de Blasio explained that he

understood that Dante and Chiara were eligible for NYPD security

“anytime, anywhere,” in “any circumstance,” with or without notice,

because “every single additional minute” that they are with a member

of the NYPD is “a minute [they] would be secure.” This understanding

is based on the conclusion of the NYPD Intelligence Bureau that both

children should have full-time protection, which they have declined.

NYPD informed DOI that there is no written documentation of this

conclusion, or of the children’s decisions to decline full-time protection.

Inspector Redmond similarly told DOI that he believes Chiara and

Dante should be provided with EPU transportation on request because

they are entitled to security detail protection if they want it, even though

they are not currently assigned permanent security details. Inspector

Redmond explained to DOI that he believes his job includes protecting

the Mayor’s children, so he takes every available opportunity to ensure

they are protected.

In practice, this means that Dante and Chiara currently receive

transportation from NYPD personnel – either EPU or UOU – in NYPD

vehicles upon request and if personnel and vehicles are available. It is

DOI’s understanding that such transportation is provided by one officer,

who neither “advances” nor inspects the destination for security

purposes, neither leaves the vehicle nor accompanies Dante or Chiara

upon arrival, and does not remain at the location after Dante or Chiara

have departed the NYPD vehicle.

In other words, since the dissolution

of their standing security details, Dante and Chiara’s use of NYPD

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DOI learned that at least one federal agency may assign “portal-to-portal” security protection

to designated protectees, as an established lesser level of protection than full-time 24/7

protection. This means that a protectee receives transportation – and security – from his/her

residence to his/her workplace and back, as well as to events scheduled during or following work.

Dante’s and Chiara’s current security arrangements do not adhere to this or any other specific

level of protection.

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resources is driven solely by their preference and the availability of

personnel and vehicles, without regard to any particularized threat

assessment or the relative security concerns posed by any given

situation; they may be unaccompanied in potentially high-risk

situations and accompanied in low-risk situations.

Several other EPU interviewees expressed to DOI their understanding

that Dante was entitled to protection because he is the Mayor’s son, even

after he declined a standing detail. They understood this to mean that

Dante was entitled to transportation upon request. Two EPU detectives

claimed that this understanding came from conversations with

Inspector Redmond following Dante’s graduation from Yale, when he

returned to live full-time at Gracie Mansion.

Neither the Mayor nor First Lady McCray could provide timelines of

when Dante or Chiara had standing security details or other security

arrangements and indicated that, if such records existed, they would be

maintained by the NYPD. DOI requested any relevant information

concerning the date ranges and dissolutions of Chiara and Dante’s

security details from the NYPD. In response, the NYPD represented

that it had no responsive records.

The Board’s guidance makes clear that Chiara and Dante’s use of NYPD

resources for their own transportation would be a misuse of City

resources unless “the NYPD has determined that the official’s family

member has an independent security need.”

Although witnesses

informed DOI that such a general determination had been made,

without documentation of the determination, it is impossible to know

the timeframe and scope of the security need, in order to evaluate any

potential misuse. Additionally, Mayor de Blasio and First Lady McCray

told DOI that Chiara and Dante had each received threats at points

during the administration. It is unclear whether or how their security

arrangements were adjusted in response to these threats, as NYPD did

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Mayor de Blasio provided the following example during his DOI interview: “[Dante] was out

[working]…on Eastern Parkway two months ago…and there was a major fight, like a big group

of guys started fighting with each other and folks were very concerned. The detail didn’t happen

to be there at that moment, but folks working with him were very concerned because he is

obviously someone very prominent. If detail saw a situation like that, if they happened to be

nearby, unquestionably they would intervene in that situation.”

Board Advisory Opinion No. 2009-01 at 11.

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not maintain records concerning the evolution of Chiara’s or Dante’s

security arrangements. DOI found that the asserted general security

determination (that the children actually “need” as much security as

possible) bears little relationship to the NYPD resources provided,

which, as discussed below, are driven by the personal preferences of the

children and the availability of resources at the time the preference is

expressed, not any specific or particularized security assessment.

b. Chiara de Blasio’s 2018 Move

On August 10, 2018, NYPD resources and personnel assisted in the

move of Chiara de Blasio’s belongings from her Brooklyn apartment in

Sunset Park (“the Apartment”) to Gracie Mansion (“the Move”). DOI

identified four NYPD employees who were present for the Move,

including three EPU detectives assigned to First Lady McCray’s

security detail and a UOU officer typically assigned to a fixed post at

City Hall.

During her interview with DOI, First Lady McCray stated that she had

learned approximately two weeks to one month before the Move that

Chiara planned to return to live at Gracie Mansion, and First Lady

McCray had then decided to assist with her daughter’s move. First Lady

McCray was shown her official schedule for the date of August 10, 2018,

which did not include a stop at the Apartment. First Lady McCray told

DOI that personal stops are not included on her official schedule,

although DOI notes that at times personal stops are included on these

schedules (for example, time at the gym or meals).

On the date of the Move, First Lady McCray believed that she texted her

detail members about stopping at Chiara’s apartment. Two of her

assigned EPU detectives recalled that the stop was made at First Lady

McCray’s verbal request, following the first stop on her daily schedule,

the gym, located in Brooklyn approximately three miles from the

Apartment. One of the detectives recalled texting another EPU detective

about the stop and providing the address. First Lady McCray told DOI

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DOI notes that Chiara and Dante de Blasio are entitled to security detail protection if the

NYPD has determined that they have an independent security need. However, because this

would be an exception to the otherwise applicable rule that City resources cannot be used to

benefit family members, the security determination should be documented and the resources

tailored to the nature of the documented need.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

NYC Department of Investigation | 15

that she had planned to move Chiara’s belongings to Gracie Mansion in

her detail vehicle, as she believed that Chiara would not have many

belongings.

Meanwhile, the UOU officer told DOI that, on the date of the Move,

Inspector Redmond told him that Chiara would be moving and verbally

instructed him to use the NYPD sprinter van

parked at City Hall to

assist in moving her belongings. The UOU officer stated that he drove

the sprinter van to the Apartment; when he arrived, he observed First

Lady McCray and Chiara bringing out Chiara’s personal belongings,

which consisted of bags and other small items. He claimed that he did

not assist in moving any items, and was not aware of any furniture being

moved.

First Lady McCray recalled loading her detail vehicle with some of

Chiara’s belongings but, at some point, realized that Chiara had a futon

which would not fit in the detail vehicle. First Lady McCray stated that

the futon was ultimately placed into a van, which had “miraculously”

arrived to assist in the Move. First Lady McCray stated that while she

and Chiara moved most of the belongings on their own, she recalled that

one of the detail members helped move the futon due to its heavy and

unwieldy nature. She did not recall which member assisted, but stated

that she did not ask for assistance. First Lady McCray told DOI that she

did not request the van, and that she did not know, either at the time of

the Move or at the time of her DOI interview, how the van had been

arranged to assist with the Move.

First Lady McCray stated that she and Chiara returned to Gracie

Mansion in her detail vehicle, which contained some of Chiara’s

belongings; the remainder were moved in the NYPD sprinter van. First



DOI notes that First Lady McCray’s use of her own security detail throughout the Move –

driving her on a personal errand, and transporting Chiara and her belongings in the vehicle –

was appropriate, given that McCray was present in the vehicle at all times.

The UOU officer told DOI that the NYPD sprinter van was typically used to transport metal

detectors to the Mayor’s Town Hall events and, to his knowledge, the Move was the only instance

during his time at City Hall that the van was used for another purpose.

First Lady McCray told DOI that she did not know that the van was an NYPD vehicle when

she saw it outside the Apartment and placed some of Chiara’s belongings inside it. She initially

stated that she only learned much later, possibly from a news article, that it was an NYPD van.

Later in her DOI interview, she corrected these statements and stated that she believed she

learned that it was an NYPD van while the Move was in progress, although she could not recall

any details about when, how, or from whom she had learned that fact.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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Lady McCray believed that detail members helped unload the futon at

Gracie Mansion. She stated that most of Chiara’s belongings were

placed on an elevator and put into Chiara’s bedroom, while the futon

and other belongings were placed in a storage area at Gracie Mansion.

Two of First Lady McCray’s EPU detectives told DOI that the First Lady

left her detail vehicle when they arrived at the Apartment,

unaccompanied by any member of the detail, then returned alone, not

carrying anything, approximately 10 to 30 minutes later. They both told

DOI that they did not observe Chiara at the Apartment, did not drive

Chiara to Gracie Mansion, did not leave the detail vehicle while parked

near the Apartment, and did not help move any of Chiara’s belongings.

In light of the other evidence, DOI finds this testimony to be not credible.

First Lady McCray told DOI that she did not notify her security detail

or Inspector Redmond of Chiara’s plan to move to Gracie Mansion, and

did not discuss the logistics of the Move with anybody at the NYPD.

Mayor de Blasio did not recall a specific conversation with Redmond

about Chiara’s plan to move, but noted that such a conversation

“wouldn’t have been unusual.” He likewise did not recall when he

learned that Chiara intended to return to live at Gracie Mansion but

acknowledged that he was likely aware of the Move before it happened.

Inspector Redmond told DOI that he did not recall discussing the Move

with Mayor de Blasio, First Lady McCray, or any mayoral staffer.

Rather, he told DOI that he was acting on his own initiative when he

instructed the UOU officer to drive the NYPD van to the Apartment.

Inspector Redmond explained that, although he did not know whether

the van was needed, he hoped that it would “streamline” the moving

process by preventing the need for an unauthorized vehicle, such as an

Uber or U-Haul, to enter Gracie Mansion and then be inspected by UOU

personnel.

Inspector Redmond also told DOI that he did not inform First Lady

McCray, Chiara, or anybody at City Hall, that he was sending the NYPD

van to assist in the Move. He claimed that the relevant EPU members

knew the van was being sent, but was unable to explain how they were

notified of this important fact. None of First Lady McCray’s three



Inspector Redmond also told DOI that he had “assigned” the UOU officer to Chiara on the

date of the Move.

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assigned EPU detectives told DOI that they knew that the van was

coming; in fact, each told DOI that they did not even know until later

that Chiara moved to Gracie Mansion at this time.

The UOU officer

driving the NYPD sprinter van told DOI that he did not know which

detail members were driving with First Lady McCray that morning, and

thus he could not have informed them that he was on his way to the

Apartment with an NYPD van.

At approximately 11:32 a.m. on August 10, 2018, First Lady McCray’s

cell phone records show a two-minute-long incoming call from Mayor de

Blasio. First Lady McCray told DOI that she did not recall what they

discussed or whether they discussed the Move or the van on the call.

Mayor de Blasio also told DOI that he had “no memory” of the phone

call, and did not recall speaking with his wife during the Move or

learning of any problems encountered during the Move.

In his interview with DOI, Mayor de Blasio stated that he did not know

much about Chiara’s move. He repeated his general understanding,

discussed above, that Chiara was entitled to detail transportation upon

request, which he believed was provided for the Move.

Mayor de Blasio

told DOI that he did not know that an NYPD van, rather than a detail

vehicle primarily intended for passengers, was used to move Chiara’s

belongings. He further stated that his DOI interview was the first he

had learned that such a van was used in the Move. When asked whether

he had asked Redmond or a member of the detail for assistance in

advance of Chiara’s move, Mayor de Blasio stated that he had “no

memory of that at all.” Similarly, he stated that he did not remember

asking his staffers to seek assistance from anyone for Chiara’s move.

DOI’s efforts to resolve discrepancies in witness testimony were stymied

by a combination of poor record keeping and lack of clear lines of

authority over the detail’s modes of communications, among other

factors. During the course of its investigation, DOI reviewed the City-

Hall-issued email accounts of Inspector Redmond and the three EPU

detectives assigned to First Lady McCray’s detail in August 2018, but



DOI notes that this claim, as well as others made by First Lady McCray’s assigned detectives

in their DOI interviews, does not appear plausible, given First Lady McCray’s testimony.

Mayor de Blasio further explained his understanding of Chiara’s access to detail resources,

stating: “if [Chiara] was going from Point A to Point B and wanted detail to take her, that would

be perfectly normal. If she had belongings with her, that would also be perfectly normal.”

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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found no communications about the Move. However, DOI’s investigation

determined that members of the EPU primarily used other forms of

communication with each other and with mayoral staffers, such as text

messages or encrypted text messaging applications. As discussed in

more detail below, despite repeated requests, DOI was unable to obtain

access to much of these communications.

On June 30, 2021, DOI received the text message communications from

the City-Hall-issued cellphones of two of First Lady McCray’s three

assigned EPU detectives. The text messages received did not include

those from August 2018; rather, they dated from approximately

December 2018. DOI did not receive the encrypted text messaging

application communications of the detectives in the First Lady’s detail,

including those from August 2018. However, DOI notes that, by the time

of DOI’s request, the EPU was no longer using the same encrypted text

messaging application as was used in August 2018. According to the

Office of the Mayor, the third detective’s cell phone could not be located.

Although the Office of the Mayor issued the requested cell phone, DOI

was instructed to follow up with the NYPD about the phone. DOI

requested, but did not receive, the text message or encrypted text

messaging application communications of the UOU officer who drove the

NYPD sprinter van during the Move. The Office of the Mayor informed

DOI that the UOU officer’s phone could not be located because he had

since retired from NYPD.

DOI sought for approximately 19 months to obtain access to Inspector

Redmond’s text and encrypted messaging communications. However, as

discussed more fully below, the communications DOI ultimately

received were deficient for, among other reasons, not including Inspector

Redmond’s communications from August 2018.

c. Dante de Blasio’s Transport

As discussed above, the Mayor, First Lady McCray, and Inspector

Redmond all acknowledged that, after the dissolution of his standing

security detail, Dante de Blasio was transported by NYPD personnel on

numerous occasions, on an ad hoc basis. None of the three could provide



DOI notes that the UOU officer was never issued a City Hall phone. DOI requested, from the

NYPD, the text message and encrypted text messaging application communications from his

NYPD-issued cell phone, but these communications were never produced for DOI’s review.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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specifics about those trips, but all three took the position that it was

their understanding that Dante was entitled to be transported by NYPD

personnel at any time, at his sole option. Each witness couched their

understanding of this prerogative in terms of “security” for Dante,

although DOI’s investigation determined that, regardless of what his

true security needs may have been, in practice, the use of this

prerogative was not correlated with any security analysis but was

instead driven solely by a combination of Dante’s preferences and the

availability of personnel who were otherwise assigned to the Mayor, the

First Lady, or to protect the premises at City Hall or Gracie Mansion.

These practices made it difficult for DOI to determine the full scope of

Dante’s transportation by NYPD personnel after the dissolution of his

standing security detail in 2015. DOI’s investigation included the review

of text message communications of two EPU sergeants and two EPU

detectives assigned to the Mayor’s and First Lady’s security details. DOI

requested, but did not receive, the text message communications of other

EPU members, nor the encrypted text messaging application

communications of any EPU members. Even in its limited review of text

message communications, DOI identified approximately 34 instances

when Dante de Blasio was transported by NYPD personnel in NYPD

vehicles, without the Mayor or First Lady present.

(i) Transportation to Yale University

Of the ten EPU detectives, three EPU sergeants, and two supervisors

interviewed by DOI, four detectives recalled driving Dante to or from

Yale without the Mayor or First Lady McCray present. One other EPU

member told DOI that she had never personally driven Dante to or from

Yale without the Mayor or First Lady McCray present, but was aware

of other detail members having done so. Additionally, one EPU member,

two sergeants, and Inspector Redmond stated that members of the EPU

transported Dante to or from train and bus stations located in New York

City for transit to or from Yale.



DOI’s review identified approximately eight examples of Chiara de Blasio being transported

by NYPD personnel in NYPD vehicles without the Mayor or First Lady present, after her

standing security detail was dissolved. According to Inspector Redmond, these requests

generally came directly from Chiara.

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One EPU detective recalled driving Dante de Blasio to or from Yale

approximately seven or eight times without the Mayor or First Lady

present. Another EPU detective recalled driving Dante de Blasio to or

from Yale between five and seven times without the Mayor or First Lady

present. These detectives also told DOI that they were often asked to

transport Dante de Blasio to various other New York City locations

without the Mayor or First Lady present; one added that he often also

transported Dante’s friends on these occasions. One text message

reviewed by DOI also mentioned an EPU detective being asked to drive

Dante “and his two friends.” Two other EPU detectives each told DOI

that they each drove Dante de Blasio to or from Yale on one occasion

without the Mayor or First Lady present.

None of these EPU detectives told DOI that they were asked to drive

Dante de Blasio to or from Yale directly by the Mayor. Two detectives

stated that these instructions came from Inspector Redmond, with one

recalling that they sometimes came from his EPU sergeant. In his

interview with DOI, Inspector Redmond claimed that he never asked

EPU members to transport Dante to or from Yale without the Mayor or

First Lady present, even after being told that DOI’s investigation

indicated otherwise. DOI does not find this statement credible.

One EPU detective recalled assisting Dante de Blasio move while he

attended Yale. The detective recalled driving to Yale and entering

Dante’s dorm room with Dante. The detective did not recall whether

Dante drove with him from New York or was already at Yale. The

detective, Dante, and Dante’s roommate each carried a large box from

the dorm room, but the detective did not recall whether the boxes were

driven in the NYPD vehicle to Dante’s new apartment, or whether the

three men brought the boxes there on foot.

While Dante attended Yale, EPU members were also asked to transport

him between Gracie Mansion and train or bus stations within New York

City for transit to or from the university. One detective told DOI that he

drove Dante to or from a bus stop “a lot of times” without the Mayor or

First Lady present, at the instruction of Inspector Redmond. One EPU

sergeant stated that he arranged NYPD transportation for Dante to or

from Grand Central Station “a couple of times” at the instruction of

Inspector Redmond or the EPU lieutenant. Another sergeant recalled

driving Dante to or from another train station on multiple occasions,

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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typically at the instruction of Inspector Redmond. He also told DOI that

Mayor de Blasio asked him to arrange such transportation for Dante on

“under five” occasions. On these occasions, Mayor de Blasio asked the

sergeant in person, upon arriving at Gracie Mansion, to have someone

retrieve Dante from the train at a certain time. Inspector Redmond

confirmed that members of the detail transported Dante de Blasio to or

from train and bus stops, but did not recall specifics about these

occurrences, including how frequently they occurred. Inspector

Redmond stated that he may have learned the time and location of

Dante’s transportation from the EPU detectives, mayoral staffers,

Mayor de Blasio or First Lady McCray. Inspector Redmond did not

specifically recall discussing these rides with Mayor de Blasio or any

mayoral staffer.

A former City Hall staffer interviewed by DOI stated that she witnessed

Mayor de Blasio request that his security detail drive Dante de Blasio

without the Mayor or First Lady in the vehicle approximately three or

four times. She recalled that these requests were typically made by the

Mayor while they were driving. She did not recall the requests being

directed at specific detectives, explaining that all members of the

security detail wore radios, so speaking to one was like speaking to all.

The staffer stated that the Mayor requested rides for Dante to or from a

bus or train station. The staffer told DOI that her understanding was

that this was an appropriate use of the Mayor’s security detail, and that

his children were entitled to rides even if they did not have their own

security details. She was not able to say from where or from whom she

got that understanding.

Regardless of the Intelligence Bureau’s view of Dante’s actual security

needs, the totality of the circumstances around the use of NYPD

personnel to assist in transporting Dante de Blasio to and from Yale

University indicates that these decisions were driven primarily by

personal preference and availability of NYPD resources, rather than any

security analysis. When a detective could be spared to drive Dante all

the way to New Haven, Connecticut, and then return to his post at

Gracie Mansion, that was arranged. When that three-hour-plus round

trip was not feasible, an EPU member might be directed to instead drive

Dante to Grand Central Terminal, for example, where he would be

dropped off at the curb and proceed alone through the terminal, ride a

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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Metro-North train alone to New Haven, and proceed from there alone to

his residence. No interviewee provided any security-related rationale for

eliminating the addition of a subway or taxi trip from Gracie Mansion

to Grand Central and substituting an NYPD escort, other than the

general principle articulated by the Mayor, First Lady, and Inspector

Redmond that something was better than nothing.

DOI’s text message review did not find evidence that Mayor de Blasio

directly requested that members of the EPU transport Dante de Blasio

to or from Yale, or anywhere else in New York City. DOI notes that it

received insufficient records of Inspector Redmond’s communications.

Based on witness testimony and the routine operation of the EPU,

Inspector Redmond likely directed much of Dante’s transportation by

EPU personnel, and may have communicated directly with Mayor de

Blasio about Dante de Blasio’s transportation needs.

(ii) Daily Commutes

Dante de Blasio graduated from Yale in May 2019. Since that time, he

has lived at Gracie Mansion.

A UOU detective who is assigned to the front booth at Gracie Mansion

recalled that Dante first approached the front booth to request a ride in

the summer of 2019. The UOU detective confirmed that, after

determining that no EPU members were available, he called his

supervisor, who directed the detective to transport Dante. A UOU

sergeant told DOI that she called Inspector Redmond to ask whether the

UOU should provide rides to Dante, and he responded affirmatively. The

sergeant stated that she took Redmond’s response to mean that the

UOU should provide rides to Dante as needed, but she did not anticipate

the frequency with which Dante would request rides. The UOU detective

recalled personally driving Dante to Brooklyn two or three times in the

summer of 2019, and driving him to a Metro North train station in

Harlem several times in December 2019.

Beginning in approximately December 2019 or January 2020, Dante

began receiving rides from NYPD personnel each weekday morning

from Gracie Mansion to his place of employment, located in Brooklyn.

These daily rides ceased at some point in the spring of 2020, due to the

coronavirus pandemic. Initially, Dante requested these daily rides by

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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walking to the front guard booth at the entrance to Gracie Mansion and

speaking to the officer on duty. Transportation was provided by

available EPU or UOU personnel, who would leave their assigned

locations and use detail-designated EPU vehicles. Eventually, one UOU

detective became the designated driver for Dante’s morning commute.

The UOU detective told DOI that Inspector Redmond had approved this

arrangement. Inspector Redmond, however, told DOI that the UOU

detective had approached him and asked to be assigned to Dante’s daily

rides.

The UOU detective also told DOI that, when Dante was driven to

Brooklyn, he occasionally asked to be picked up later in the day. The

UOU detective did not retrieve Dante on these occasions because the

pickups occurred after his shift ended. The UOU detective stated that

he relayed Dante’s requests to the EPU sergeant on duty, who arranged

for a different NYPD member to pick up Dante. DOI notes that the daily

rides provided to Dante were not recorded in any way.

While First Lady McCray told DOI that she knew that Dante was

regularly transported to Brooklyn by the NYPD during this time, Mayor

de Blasio denied knowledge of this arrangement.

d. Staff Transport

Inspector Redmond, the EPU lieutenant, two EPU sergeants, and

several EPU detectives told DOI that City Hall staffers have received

rides from EPU members without the Mayor or First Lady present. The

third EPU sergeant told DOI that he had never been asked to, and was

not aware of, EPU members transporting City Hall staffers without the

Mayor or First Lady present. However, DOI finds this representation

implausible, given its review of his text messages.

The EPU lieutenant stated that Inspector Redmond had instructed him

to arrange rides for the staffers, and he did not know whether the Mayor

or First Lady were involved in these requests. One EPU sergeant told

DOI that the requests to provide transportation to mayoral staffers

came either from Inspector Redmond or from the staffers themselves.

This latter assertion is confirmed in text messages reviewed by DOI,

which contained numerous examples of mayoral staffers texting the

EPU sergeants to request transportation to various locations, including

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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to run errands for the Mayor, and to or from their homes. Two sergeants

explained that Inspector Redmond authorized the practice, but stated

that they had not received specific guidance about transporting mayoral

staffers without the Mayor or First Lady present.

Inspector Redmond confirmed that he directed his detectives to provide

transportation to mayoral staffers because he believed working and

staying close with them enabled a “smooth operation” and helped the

EPU detectives do their jobs. Inspector Redmond stated that he typically

asked the staffers directly whether they would like rides; he did not

recall that Mayor de Blasio had ever asked him to arrange

transportation for a staffer. DOI’s limited review of EPU

communications found one text message, sent from a mayoral staffer to

an EPU sergeant, stating that the “Mayor would like a member of [the]

detail to give [a staffer] a ride” because she “is Jewish and needs to get

back for Passover.”

Mayor de Blasio stated that it was his understanding that his staffers

may not generally use detail vehicles for transportation, but that they

may use detail vehicles in his motorcade for transportation to official

events. Mayor de Blasio admitted that transportation may also have

been provided to staffers in cases of “emergencies,” or when they “had

worked really late into the night,” though he believed that this rarely

occurred.

The Mayor stated, in substance, that on these rare occasions,

using the detail for this purpose reflected “a culture of people trying to

be helpful,” where “everyone tries to just support each other, pitch in,

whatever.” Mayor de Blasio stated that he did not recall any other

occasions when his staffers used detail personnel or vehicles, and he did

not recall requesting his staffers to use detail resources to run errands

on his behalf. He added that he did not ask members of the NYPD to run

errands for him.

DOI’s limited review of EPU communications identified approximately

36 instances of the EPU transporting mayoral staffers without the

Mayor or First Lady present, including approximately 16 instances

facilitated by the EPU sergeant who implausibly told DOI that he was



DCAS provides a pool of cars and chauffeurs to City Hall for use by mayoral staff in the course

of official duties. The policies and procedures for the use of those resources are set by City Hall

and the City’s Vehicle Use policies. Outside of assigned security details, the NYPD is not

assigned to provide transportation to mayoral staff.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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not aware of this practice. Approximately 12 of the 36 instances involved

the staffer running an errand for Mayor de Blasio, such as getting him

coffee or food. On two occasions, the detail drove a staffer to the airport;

in both, the request originated with the EPU sergeant. It is unclear how

the sergeants learned of the staffers’ transportation needs.

In addition, three detectives told DOI about their considerable

experience transporting mayoral staffers. One detective told DOI that

he was asked by EPU sergeants approximately ten to fifteen times to

drive members of the Mayor’s or First Lady’s staffs to or from the

staffers’ homes without the protectee. Another detective recalled driving

at least three mayoral staffers without the protectee. He stated that he

drove one staffer “a lot,” estimating between five and ten times, when

he was assigned to a security position at Gracie Mansion, typically at

the direction of Inspector Redmond or his EPU sergeant. He also

recalled an incident, following a City parade, when Inspector Redmond,

an EPU sergeant, and the mayoral staffer went to a Manhattan bar

together. The detective stated that Inspector Redmond instructed him

to wait while they were at the bar; when they emerged from the bar after

approximately three hours, Inspector Redmond directed the detective to

drive the staffer to her Brooklyn apartment. No protectee was present

for this excursion. Another former EPU detective recalled being asked

by his sergeant to drive this same mayoral staffer without a protectee

on more than ten occasions. He recalled picking her up at her apartment

and bringing her to meet the Mayor at his gym in Brooklyn, and also

driving her to or from City Hall and Gracie Mansion without a protectee.

e. Guest Transportation

DOI’s investigation identified approximately eight instances when

Mayor de Blasio directly requested that his guests be transported,

without his accompaniment, by members of the EPU. In addition to

specific examples identified in DOI’s review, both Mayor de Blasio and

First Lady McCray confirmed that they had requested that members of

the NYPD drive official guests, such as visiting dignitaries or

prospective candidates for high-level City positions, from Gracie

Mansion to their hotels. Mayor de Blasio explained that he viewed these

instances as “official business,” and that the transportation was an

“appropriate courtesy.” Mayor de Blasio estimated that this occurred

approximately five to ten times.

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According to two EPU sergeants, the Mayor’s brother has visited New

York City on more than one occasion. Both sergeants recalled retrieving

the Mayor’s brother from the airport. While one recalled that the Mayor

was present for these trips to the airport, the other sergeant stated that

he did not recall whether the Mayor was present, but admitted that only

one EPU vehicle, not the motorcade, drove to the airport to retrieve the

Mayor’s brother, indicating that the Mayor was not present. This

sergeant recalled that Inspector Redmond had instructed that the

Mayor’s brother be provided transportation. In one visit, in September

2019, text messages indicate that the security detail drove the Mayor’s

brother to pick up a Zipcar in Palmyra, New Jersey, a drive time of

approximately one hour and forty-five minutes. It is unclear whether

the Mayor was present for this excursion. Subsequently, the security

detail drove the Mayor’s brother to an Alamo rental car location without

the Mayor present.

Mayor de Blasio told DOI that he was typically present when his brother

was driven in detail vehicles. He stated that there may have been

occasions when his brother was driven by the detail without him present

due to “a last minute change” in schedule, and suggested that the detail

may have offered to drive his brother on those occasions.

One detective recalled an incident when Mayor de Blasio asked him and

his EPU partner to drive a guest of the Mayor from Gracie Mansion to

her residence on the Upper West Side of Manhattan.

A text message sent from an EPU sergeant to an EPU detective in

February 2021 stated: “Just FYI …. He might request we give his guest

a ride home. Please be available just in case.” The sergeant stated that

the Mayor’s guest was “a political analyst and friend who worked on his

mayoral campaign.” It is unclear whether the guest was, in fact,

transported home by the EPU detective. Mayor de Blasio did not recall

asking his security detail to drive this guest without him in the vehicle.

In another message reviewed by DOI, an EPU detective reported that,

“Per [the Mayor],” another EPU member “is going to drive this girl

home.” No other information about the guest was shared in the message

thread.

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One EPU sergeant told DOI that he recalled at least two occasions when

Mayor de Blasio directly asked that his guests be driven home.

According to the sergeant, both occasions were at Gracie Mansion at the

end of the night. The sergeant did not recall the names of the guests.

The sergeant also recalled at least two other instances when a mayoral

staffer asked him to drive a guest of the Mayor. The sergeant assumed

these instructions likewise came from Mayor de Blasio.

A former City Hall staffer recalled another occasion when Mayor de

Blasio requested that his security detail drive a guest to the airport

following a speech at the Museum of Natural History. The staffer did

not recall which detail members were present at the event, and did not

believe that the Mayor directed this request at any specific detail

member. Mayor de Blasio did not recall asking his security detail to

drive this guest without him in the vehicle.

In addition to the transportation that occurred at the direct request of

Mayor de Blasio, DOI’s limited text message review identified

approximately eight more occasions when the EPU transported guests

of the Mayor without the Mayor or First Lady present. It is unclear who

requested the transportation on these occasions.

f. Campaign Transport

Four members of the EPU, including two EPU sergeants and the EPU

lieutenant, told DOI that, while traveling with the Mayor on trips

related to his 2019 presidential campaign, they transported campaign

staffers with the Mayor in the detail vehicles. At times, these staffers

rode in the same vehicle as the Mayor, and at times they rode in other

motorcade vehicles.

The staffers were mayoral staffers who had taken

leaves of absence from their City positions to work on the Mayor’s

presidential campaign. Several detail members, including two EPU

sergeants, told DOI that they were never notified that these staffers had

taken leaves of absence, and were working for the campaign and not

City Hall, while traveling. Two detail members told DOI that Inspector

Redmond instructed them that campaign staffers should not be given



As a general matter, the protectee may have anyone, including political or campaign staff,

ride in the same vehicle as the protectee. Political or campaign staff should not be transported

by the detail in additional cars where the protectee is not present, even if such motorcade

transport would be permissible for mayoral staff.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

NYC Department of Investigation | 28

rides on campaign trips. However, one of these interviewees admitted

that he did not know whether the staffers on campaign trips were

employed by the City or the campaign at the time.

One former campaign staffer told DOI that campaign staffers obtained

and used rental cars while traveling on the Mayor’s campaign trips.

Mayor de Blasio similarly told DOI that his campaign staffers typically

arranged their own transportation while on campaign trips, but that it

was possible that campaign staffers had accompanied him in detail

vehicles. Mayor de Blasio also stated that he was not always aware of

the specific dates that mayoral staffers had taken leaves of absence to

work on his campaign, and he did not know whether this information

was shared with his security detail or Inspector Redmond.

g. Additional Use of the Security Detail for Tasks Unrelated to Protecting the

Mayor and First Lady

DOI’s limited review of EPU communications also determined that EPU

members have been regularly checking on houses that the Mayor and

First Lady McCray own in Brooklyn. At the time of these checks, no

member of the de Blasio family resided at either home, and at least one

of the homes was used as an investment property with paying tenants.

The visits were purportedly for security issues, including conducting

perimeter checks of the premises. One EPU sergeant explained that this

practice began during the protests in 2020, following vandalism at the

residences of other City politicians. The sergeant stated that Inspector

Redmond initiated this practice, which remains ongoing. Mayor de

Blasio similarly told DOI that this practice began at the initiative of the

NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau, following protests and a “pattern” of other

activity at the two houses. The checks on the houses that the Mayor

owns are conducted approximately once per shift by members of the

EPU. The sergeant stated that any observed issues are reported to the

local precinct. When asked why these checks, if necessary, were not

being conducted by the local precinct, Mayor de Blasio deferred to the

NYPD’s Intelligence Bureau, explaining that they were “specialists,”

and that “they would not assume a local precinct does what they do.”



The purpose of the EPU is to provide personal protection to the Mayor, not to protect his

private property or business interests. Property crimes or nuisance matters should be handled

by the local precinct in the ordinary course. To the extent that events at these private properties

may provide valuable intelligence to be used in adjusting the Mayor’s personal security, merely

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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Lastly, DOI identified one additional instance when NYPD resources

appear to have assisted the de Blasio family move their belongings. One

detective told DOI that he moved items from the de Blasio’s Brooklyn

residence to Gracie Mansion in the first months of the Mayor’s

administration. He explained that he drove an NYPD vehicle from

Gracie Mansion to the residence and First Lady McCray, who was

already at the Brooklyn residence, brought approximately four boxes to

the curb. The detective stated that he and an NYPD officer, assigned to

the Brooklyn residence at the time, loaded the boxes into the vehicle and

the detective returned, alone, to Gracie Mansion. At Gracie Mansion, he

removed the boxes from the vehicle, placed them on a hand cart, and

brought them inside. The detective did not specifically recall, but

believed that these instructions came from his EPU sergeant. Neither

Mayor de Blasio nor First Lady McCray recalled the detail assisting in

their move to Gracie Mansion, with the Mayor adding that it was

conducted by a “professional” moving company.

2. Presidential Campaign Travel

On May 16, 2019, Mayor de Blasio announced his bid to be the

Democratic nominee for the 2020 United States presidential election.

Mayor de Blasio’s campaign (the “Campaign”) ended on September 20,

2019. During the approximately four months of active campaigning,

Mayor de Blasio made approximately 21 separate trips to numerous

destinations, totaling approximately 60 days, in whole or in part, of

travel. DOI notes that some members of the Mayor’s security detail

typically traveled to these destinations ahead of the Mayor, incurring

additional travel costs.

According to publicly available guidance issued by the Conflicts of

Interest Board, any use of City time or resources for political activities

is a violation of Chapter 68, except that City-owned vehicles may be used

by certain elected officials for political travel in or near New York City.



having EPU detectives drive by during their shifts is an ineffective and inefficient way to gather

such intelligence.

Other candidates in the same election who had personal security on campaign travel paid for

that security with campaign funds. See Nolan Hicks, Mayor Pete Pays for His Security, but de

Blasio Sticks NYC Taxpayers with Bill, N

EW YORK POST, July 18, 2019, available at

https://nypost.com/2019/07/18/mayor-pete-pays-for-his-security-but-de-blasio-sticks-nyc-

taxpayers-with-bill/; Bullock Reimburses Highway Patrol for Campaign Security, AP NEWS,

Nov. 5, 2019, available at https://apnews.com/article/770f561d036c4179b6264ccd9ea1ecce.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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The Board has not publicly articulated any exception that would allow

the Mayor to use City resources in connection with purely political travel

at a distance from the city.

In the course of this investigation, DOI found that the NYPD paid

approximately $319,794.20 for Mayor de Blasio’s security detail to travel

outside of New York City on his Campaign trips.

This total includes

only ancillary travel costs – namely flights, hotels, rental cars, fuel, and

meals – and does not include EPU salary or overtime costs. To date, the

City has not been reimbursed for these expenditures.

A supervisor in the NYPD’s Audits and Accounts Unit told DOI that she

had no knowledge of whether the NYPD had been reimbursed for these

travel expenses. This supervisor also stated that she was “not aware of

who” at the NYPD would know the total amount that the NYPD had

been reimbursed for these travel expenses.

She further represented

that she did not receive, nor was she aware of, any guidance specifically

concerning travel expenditures incurred by the security detail for out-

of-state travel related to the Mayor’s Campaign. She claimed, and NYPD

records confirm, that paperwork submitted to her unit does not specify

the purpose of the Mayor’s travel.

Mayor de Blasio did not comment on the City’s expenditures or his

Campaign’s reimbursement obligations beyond noting that “there

appear to be many different inputs, to some extent in conflict, I don’t

think anyone was able to resolve it squarely, and I mean I can’t say who

resolved it because I don’t think anyone did.”

3. Record Keeping and Retention

DOI’s investigation uncovered numerous issues related to the EPU’s

communication formats, record keeping, and record retention.



This total includes two trips taken only by First Lady McCray and her security detail, which

incurred ancillary travel costs of $7,981.37.

Both the NYPD and the Campaign confirmed to DOI that these costs have not been

reimbursed.

If any advice on this matter was sought from or provided by the Board confidentially, the

Mayor has declined to make it available for public disclosure.

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a. Security Detail Communications

Detail members told DOI that, in addition to their NYPD-issued cell

phones and email accounts, they received cell phones and email accounts

from City Hall. Detail members stated that they primarily used their

City Hall, not NYPD, devices for communicating with other members of

the EPU and with mayoral staffers. While detail members told DOI that

they used numerous modes of communication during the workday, most

stated that they primarily communicated with each other via encrypted

text messaging application and text message.

One former NYPD detective told DOI that Inspector Redmond

instructed EPU members assigned to the Mayor and his family to

communicate with the City Hall resources to impede the NYPD from

getting access to EPU communications when “dumping”

NYPD phones

and emails during investigations. The former detective stated that

Inspector Redmond had initially instructed EPU members to download

a Blackberry messaging application (BBM) to their City Hall phones to

use as their primary means of communication.

However, no other

detail member interviewed recalled how the use of messaging

applications originated. Several other detectives told DOI that, after the

BBM app was discontinued, detail members began using other

encrypted text messaging applications, including WhatsApp and Signal.

Based on DOI’s investigation, it is unclear if the use of these messaging

applications was formally approved, and if so by whom.

Three EPU

members added that they also used their personal cell phones to

communicate with other detail members about official business, often

via these same encrypted text messaging applications.

Most detail members told DOI that they communicated with mayoral

staffers via email and text message, although one former detail member



This term is used to reference the NYPD’s routine extraction of information from Department-

issued cell phones.

Mayor de Blasio has a Blackberry that he uses for email and other written communication.

An EPU sergeant interviewed by DOI stated that he did not believe the detail’s use of Signal

was the result of any official review or approval process, either at NYPD or City Hall. While one

detective recalled receiving instruction from Redmond, Redmond told DOI that he did not

instruct anyone regarding Signal, and he did not think that anybody approved its use. Text

messages reviewed by DOI indicate that the decision to use Signal was communal, and that an

EPU lieutenant suggested its use to other EPU members because it was “more secured” than

WhatsApp.

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stated that the detail also used an encrypted text messaging application

to communicate with the Mayor’s staff. Two former City Hall staffers

interviewed by DOI stated that they used an encrypted text messaging

application to communicate with their City Hall colleagues, but not for

communications with the Mayor’s security detail.

In addition to the City-Hall issued phones assigned to individual

members of the detail, each detail had a “number 1” phone, which is a

City-Hall-issued cell phone that remained with the on-duty detail team

for direct and consistent communication with Mayor de Blasio and First

Lady McCray.

DOI learned of these “number 1” phones from one EPU

detective; no other interviewees mentioned these phones in their DOI

interviews.

b. Production Issues

(i) Records Requests

During the course of this investigation, DOI requested, from both the

NYPD and City Hall, communications between members of the EPU and

mayoral staffers conducted via email, text message, or messaging

applications. DOI initially requested text and email communications

from City Hall in December 2019, and requested additional

communications, including “messaging application communications,” in

April 2020. At the request of City Hall, DOI did not press these requests

for several months in recognition of the impact of the COVID-19

pandemic on City Hall operations and availability of resources. DOI

renewed its request in August of 2020. An initial production was made

by City Hall to DOI in November of 2020. However, this response was

lacking in several respects.

In January 2021, DOI requested EPU text



A December 2019 article in the Wall Street Journal reported that City Hall staff had used the

Signal app to discuss official business. Katie Honan, NYC Mayor’s Aides Communicate in

Encrypted Messages, W

ALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 2019, available at

https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyc-mayors-aides-communicate-in-encrypted-messages-

11576507167.

In other words, the “number 1” phone is a “duty phone” that is physically passed from one

detail team to another at the shift change, such that the same phone with the same assigned

number remains with the on-duty detail team at all times.

Specifically, text messages were produced via screenshots that did not indicate the custodian

of the text messages or who was participating in the messages. In addition, the production

included no communications from messaging applications. DOI identified these shortcomings to

City Hall immediately. Ultimately, City Hall indicated that it lacked the technological capacity

to collect and produce the information DOI had requested. DOI was therefore told to follow up

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message and encrypted text messaging application communications

from the NYPD. As discussed above, DOI received some of the requested

text messages on June 30, 2021.

With one small exception, DOI never received the requested encrypted

text messaging application communications. A review of text messages

clearly shows that members of the EPU also communicated, often

simultaneous to their text message exchanges, via those encrypted text

messaging applications on City-issued phones as well as via their

personal devices.

DOI requested the communications of twelve specific EPU or UOU

members, and ultimately received the text messages of only six

members, and some, not all, of the encrypted text messaging application

communications of one EPU sergeant. According to City Hall, two City-

Hall-issued cell phones could not be located because the members had

retired. Two additional cell phones could not be located for unknown

reasons. City Hall represented that a cell phone for one EPU sergeant

had not been issued. During the sergeant’s interview with DOI,

however, this sergeant told DOI that he had been issued a City Hall cell

phone, but that he conducted EPU business and communications on his

personal cell phone instead, which was never submitted for DOI’s

review.

One factor contributing to the apparent difficulties complying with

DOI’s communications records requests is the lack of clear lines of

authority and control over EPU members and their devices. EPU

members remain at all times members of the NYPD and subject to its

chain of command, and they do not answer to, and cannot be disciplined

by, City Hall personnel. However, they conduct official City business on

devices and via channels issued to them by City Hall. This diffusion of

responsibility and supervision can inhibit appropriate records retention,

enforcement of policies, and compliance with requests from DOI (or,

presumably, from the Law Department or via FOIL). As just one

example, when DOI requested forensic images of devices that City Hall

had issued to EPU members (rather than merely screenshots), DOI was

informed that City Hall did not have the capability to image phones, but



directly with NYPD to get communications from City Hall phones that had been issued to EPU

personnel.

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also could not allow DOI to use DOI’s equipment to image the phones

because they had been used for NYPD business and NYPD would need

to agree that DOI could image the phones. When DOI sought approval

from NYPD, NYPD’s initial position was that they were not involved and

would not get involved because the phones were not NYPD-issued

devices. Eventually, after extensive communication and coordination

among DOI, NYPD, and City Hall, the City-Hall-issued phones that

could be located were given to NYPD by City Hall, imaged by NYPD,

and the report of this analysis was provided to DOI.

DOI also encountered production issues with other records requested

from City Hall and the NYPD.

For example, in April 2020, DOI

requested copies of Gracie Mansion security camera footage from the

date of Chiara de Blasio’s move, as well as copies of Gracie Mansion

logbooks from November 2019 through March 2020, when Dante de

Blasio was receiving daily rides for his work commute from the NYPD.

On May 17, 2021, an NYPD representative stated that such security

camera footage is retained only for a limited time, so DOI’s requested

footage was no longer available and thus would not have been available

at the time of DOI’s request. On June 25, 2021, DOI received the

logbooks from November 2019, December 2019, and the second half of

March 2020; the NYPD was “unable to locate the corresponding log(s)

for the dates of December 29, 2019 through March 14, 2020.”

(ii) “Number 1” Phones

In February 2021, DOI asked City Hall to provide information about

“certain cell phones issued to the security details assigned to the Mayor

and the First Lady,” known as the “number 1 phone.” A City Hall

representative initially informed DOI that they were not aware of the

existence of these phones or their use by EPU personnel to communicate

with the Mayor and First Lady.



While some delays and challenges with production were justly attributable to the COVID-19

pandemic and its corresponding impact on NYPD operations and priorities in City Hall, that is

by no means a complete explanation of the difficulties encountered in this investigation.

On June 29, 2021, City Hall formally responded to DOI’s February 2021 request for

clarification of and records from the number 1 phones used by the Mayor’s and First Lady’s

security details. City Hall represented that, “[p]er consultation with the Mayor’s Office of

Information Services [“MIS”] and the head of the NYPD Executive Protection Unit [Inspector

Redmond], there is no ‘number 1 phone’ that has been used” by the Mayor’s security detail

“during any of the dates covered by this request.” In response to DOI’s request that City Hall

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DOI’s investigation confirmed that the First Lady’s security detail

currently uses a “number 1” phone to communicate with the First Lady.

It is not clear whether, or to what extent, a “number 1” phone is

currently used by the Mayor’s security detail. In communications with

DOI after their initial interviews, five detail members acknowledged

that a “number 1” phone had been used by the Mayor’s security detail,

though their accounts of how and when differ. Two detectives claimed

that they did not know whether the “number 1” phone remained in use,

but they knew that there had been such a phone in the past. Two other

detail members indicated that the phone remains in use; one stated that

it remains with a certain EPU member in the protectee’s vehicle, while

the other stated that the phone is kept in another EPU vehicle. Two

detail members told DOI that the phone was provided to the detail by

Inspector Redmond in January 2014. One sergeant told DOI that the

“number 1” phone had been intended to be a consistent phone number

for “emergency” situations when someone needed to get in touch with

the Mayor’s security detail, without wasting time finding out which

members were on duty. Mayor de Blasio stated that he was not aware

of a “number 1” phone used by his detail and that, when he needed to

communicate with any members of the detail, it was typically via his

own scheduling team, Inspector Redmond, or direct communications –

in person, phone call, or email – with the on-duty detail members or

supervisors.

Text message communications between EPU members referenced two

“number 1” phones, but it is unclear from these messages how

specifically these “number 1” phones are used, or if either remains with

Mayor de Blasio’s on-duty security detail.

DOI also reviewed an October 2019 text message conversation among

detectives assigned to the First Lady’s security detail, wherein one

detective asked the on-duty detective to delete text messages from the



“confirm that the phone number for the cellphone provided to the Mayor’s NYPD security detail

for the purpose of for direct communication with the First Lady is [XXX-XXX-XXXX]. If this is

incorrect, please provide the correct phone number.” In response, City Hall responded only that

“there is no cellphone matching” the number identified in DOI’s request. After learning, directly

from First Lady McCray, the correct phone number of the number 1 phone used by her security

detail, DOI contacted City Hall to request records associated with that phone number. City Hall

promptly responded that MIS “records show that the number … is for an iPhone that travels

in/with the First Lady’s car for the exclusive use of the NYPD Security Detail.” DOI did not

obtain communications from this phone prior to the publication of this report.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

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“number 1” phone that she had forgotten to delete before ending her

shift.

The issuance of electronic devices to NYPD employees for use in official

business that were not disclosed by the head of the EPU, were not

disclosed by any EPU member until specifically asked by DOI, and were

unknown to City Hall counsel (who is responsible for responding to

records requests from outside City Hall) raises serious concerns

regarding oversight, record keeping, and record retention.

(iii) NYPD Failure to Appear

On June 15, 2021, in an attempt to clarify the issues surrounding the

“number 1” phones, as well as other outstanding matters, DOI emailed

a set of written questions to the EPU sergeants’ union attorney,

who

had previously represented all three sergeants in their interviews with

DOI, requesting responses from each of the three EPU sergeants. The

attorney advised DOI that his clients would respond to additional

questions only if compelled to do so. On July 1, 2021, pursuant to its

authority under Mayoral Executive Order 16 and the City Charter, DOI

emailed the attorney three letters, addressed to each EPU sergeant,

compelling their appearance at interviews with DOI on July 14, 2021.

The attorney confirmed these interviews and the scheduled date via

email. On July 14, 2021, neither the attorney nor the sergeants

appeared as scheduled.

Approximately two hours past the scheduled start of the interviews, DOI

called the attorney and the attorney represented to DOI that two of the

sergeants were on vacation and would not appear for their interviews.

He represented to DOI that he had not forwarded DOI’s letters to the

sergeants, but had spoken with them about DOI’s notice for a compelled

interview, although he did not specify when those discussions occurred.

Furthermore, he represented that he, personally, could not compel his

clients to appear at DOI for an interview and provided no explanation

for why he had failed to notify DOI of his clients’ refusal to appear nor

made any effort to reschedule those appearances. Although two of the

interviews were subsequently rescheduled (after DOI had to enlist the

assistance of NYPD’s Legal Bureau to enforce the compulsion notice),



The EPU sergeants’ union attorney is not an employee of the NYPD or the City of New York.

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the failure of the sergeants and their attorney to appear when compelled

is unacceptable.

c. Retention of EPU Communications

The New York City Charter requires City agencies and employees to

retain municipal records long enough to satisfy administrative, fiscal,

legal, research, and historical needs. The Charter calls for the disposal

of municipal records to be in accordance with “an approved records

disposal schedule,” and provides for the disposal of records to be

overseen by the New York City Department of Records and Information

Services (DORIS).

DORIS’s current retention schedule, entitled

“Supplemental Records Retention and Disposition Schedule” was

updated in August 2021. New York City agencies are permitted to follow

their own retention schedules, and agencies may adopt policies that

differ from DORIS’s retention schedule. The Office of the Mayor has

been using its current retention schedule since at least June 3, 2014.

Neither DORIS’s nor the Mayor’s Office’s current retention schedules

provide specific retention requirements for text messages or encrypted

text messaging application communications; rather, all “documents” are

classified by the substance of the communication, not the form in which

the communication takes place. This is an appropriate approach to

retention, so long as the form of the communication does not make it

technologically infeasible to retain the communication based on the

substance of the communication.

Despite repeated attempts to clarify, it is unclear whether the NYPD

follows DORIS’s retention schedule or has established its own. An NYPD

representative told DOI that NYPD does not follow a specific schedule

regarding text message retention, but “when there isn’t a specific policy

in place, unaddressed items are retained indefinitely.”

DOI notes that the use of City-Hall-issued cell phones and email

addresses by NYPD employees results in uncertainty concerning which

retention schedule applies to the EPU’s communications. Neither



See NY City Charter § 1133; NY City Charter §§ 3000-3011. The New York State Archives’

“Retention and Disposition Schedule for New York Local Government Records” sets forth the

regulations that govern records retention in New York State. In it, DORIS is given the authority

to promulgate the rules for the government of New York City.

Investigation into Mayor de Blasio’s Security Detail

NYC Department of Investigation | 38

retention schedule contains specific retention requirements for EPU

communications.

Additionally, the use of communication channels that are not approved

or supported by City information technology to communicate about

official business also raises record-keeping concerns. Such unregulated

use creates a risk that official records will not be retained and available

for collection when needed. For example, the encrypted text messaging

applications used by the EPU have a setting that, when enabled,

automatically deletes sent and received messages. Even if not

automatically deleted, these encrypted application messages are not

maintained in a centralized City database and are inconvenient to

forward to an official government account for proper retention.

Furthermore, as noted above, DOI’s text message review found

numerous references to EPU members deleting text messages, message

threads, and encrypted messaging applications – and, thus, all the

communications conducted therein – from their City-Hall-issued cell

phones. It appears that such deletion was, at a minimum, a regular

shared practice among EPU members, if not an informal policy.

Moreover, in approximately May 2019, the EPU stopped using a

particular encrypted text messaging application because it was

transitioning to a paid service. DOI was unable to determine whether,

or how, the EPU communications stored in this application were

retained or reviewed to determine that retention was unnecessary.

DOI reviewed training materials provided by City Hall that instruct

employees not to use their personal phones and email accounts to

conduct City business. These materials note that text and other

messaging formats are subject to FOIL disclosure and must be retained

according to the substance of the communication, regardless of format.

However, this training is not provided to members of the Mayor’s

security detail, despite their use of City-Hall-issued phones, because

they are not City Hall employees and are not supervised by anyone

within City Hall. This is yet another example of the oversight gaps

created by EPU’s practices: NYPD has no control over the phones used

by their employees for official business and City Hall takes no apparent

measures to ensure the appropriate usage of these phones or the

retention of records created by them. Moreover, City Hall’s training does

not provide guidance to employees as to how to ensure that official

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communications sent via text or messaging applications are retained

and made available for production when required.

d. Inspector Redmond’s Cell Phone Communications and Obstructive Conduct

DOI requested Inspector Redmond’s communications on December 20,

2019, and again on April 3, 2020. It is DOI’s understanding that City

Hall repeatedly requested that Inspector Redmond provide his City-

Hall-issued cell phone to an attorney at City Hall for production to DOI,

but that he did not comply. DOI was informed that City Hall counsel

sought the assistance of NYPD and, on multiple occasions in May and

June 2021, Inspector Redmond was requested by an attorney in NYPD’s

Legal Bureau to provide his City-Hall-issued cell phone to the City Hall

attorney or to NYPD’s Legal Bureau. Again, he did not comply. In July

2021, the DOI Commissioner personally had to ask senior leadership of

NYPD to issue a direct order to Inspector Redmond to turn in his City-

Hall-issued cell phone. Only then did Inspector Redmond comply.

As per the protocol described above on page 34, NYPD conducted the

initial analysis of Redmond’s City-Hall-issued cell phone. On July 23,

2021, DOI received a report and related records of Redmond’s

communications conducted on this phone. While DOI was able to review

some limited data associated with Redmond’s text message and

encrypted text messaging application communications – such as date

sent, message sender, and recipient(s) – the content of very few

messages was available for review because they had been deleted from

the phone. DOI’s review of other EPU members’ text messages showed

that Inspector Redmond had exchanged thousands of text messages

with, for example, the EPU sergeants, relating to EPU business on this

City-Hall-issued cell phone.

After realizing the extent of the deletion of records on the City-Hall-

issued phone, DOI requested (1) direct access to Redmond’s City-Hall-

issued cell phone to conduct its own analysis; and (2) access to

Redmond’s NYPD-issued cell phone.

On July 27, 2021, DOI received Redmond’s City-Hall-issued cell phone.

DOI’s analysis found that the phone was set to auto-delete text



DOI’s investigation found that Inspector Redmond extensively used both his City-Hall-issued

and NYPD-issued cell phones to communicate with the EPU.

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messages after 30 days. However, this setting would not account for the

absence of any text messages from the prior month.

Around the same time, Inspector Redmond was directed by NYPD Legal

Bureau personnel to provide his Department cell phone to the Legal

Bureau. On August 3, 2021, the NYPD provided DOI with information

extracted from Inspector Redmond’s NYPD-issued cell phone. The

analysis indicated that the phone Redmond had surrendered had only

been placed into service and issued to Redmond on July 29, 2021. DOI

then learned that, after being directed by an NYPD attorney to provide

his Department-issued phone for production, Inspector Redmond

instead turned his previous cell phone in to an NYPD IT office for an

“upgrade.” Redmond then surrendered this new and essentially unused

device to the Legal Bureau for production to DOI, without informing the

Legal Bureau that the device was new. After discovering that Redmond’s

prior device had been handed over by him to NYPD’s IT personnel and

then (unwittingly, by IT personnel) submitted for recycling and erasure,

NYPD was able to recover Inspector Redmond’s prior NYPD-issued cell

phone from its technology recycling vendor. NYPD then provided DOI

with the communications and other information from this prior phone

on August 9 and August 11, 2021.

NYPD Legal Bureau personnel were aware of all of these facts and

assured DOI that the matter would be investigated by the NYPD. DOI

was subsequently informed that the matter would not be investigated

further by the NYPD, nor would any disciplinary action be taken against

Inspector Redmond, because NYPD had concluded that his conduct did

not violate any NYPD policies. This conclusion was reached despite the

knowledge that Inspector Redmond had deliberately sought to destroy

official communications that he knew were sought in a DOI

investigation and then misled the NYPD’s own attorneys about his

compliance with the demand for records.

DOI’s review of Inspector Redmond’s prior NYPD-issued cell phone

communications found that the earliest substantive text message

remaining therein was dated July 29, 2021, after Redmond was told he

must surrender his NYPD phone for production to DOI and the date that

he, instead, decided to turn the phone in for destruction under the guise

of receiving an upgraded device. While some evidence remained of

messages sent or received before July 29, 2021, the messages themselves

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had all been deleted. DOI’s review found that Redmond’s NYPD cell

phone, like his City-Hall-issued cell phone, was set to auto-delete text

messages after 30 days. However, this setting should not have deleted

messages sent and received between June 30 and July 29, 2021, and yet

those messages were also not present on the phone.

Inspector

Redmond’s prior NYPD-issued cell phone also included a calendar

appointment for Sunday, July 25, 2021 entitled “Meeting Gracie”;

approximately three days before DOI interviewed the First Lady and

then the Mayor at Gracie Mansion about the matters contained in this

Report.

Inspector Redmond sought to obstruct this investigation by refusing to

provide his City-Hall-issued phone for production, deliberately seeking

to destroy his NYPD-issued phone after he was informed that he must

surrender it for production to DOI, and deleting all communications

from both phones before they could be provided to DOI. These actions

are a continuation of his conduct during his sworn DOI interview, in

which he demonstrated a lack of candor, repeatedly claimed he could not

recall the facts around matters under his direct supervision, and gave

multiple answers that were not credible in light of the objective evidence

and the sworn statements of other witnesses.

e. Lack of Records Regarding Daily Movements

According to many EPU detectives interviewed in this investigation,

they began using memo books and vehicle logbooks only in

approximately September 2018, when a new captain joined the unit, and

had not previously kept similar records. Regarding the memo books, the

detectives interviewed stated that they typically only recorded two

pieces of information: the time they clocked in, and the time they clocked

out. Regarding the vehicle logbooks, the detectives explained that one

logbook is kept in each vehicle, and it is used to track the user of the

vehicle, the time of the usage, the mileage, and anything unusual found

in the vehicle.

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Based on DOI’s review of other EPU text message communications from previous months,

Redmond’s NYPD cell phone should have contained at least approximately one to two hundred

text message exchanges with EPU sergeants, alone, during those thirty days, and likely would

have contained additional text messages, for example, with other EPU personnel and mayoral

staffers.

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Detail members confirmed that they maintained no records concerning

their daily activities, such as the stops, official or unofficial, actually

made by the protectee throughout the day, or any duties they assumed

beyond direct coverage for their assigned protectee. Detail members told

DOI, and email records confirm, that the protectee’s daily schedule is

circulated to detail members before the start of each day. The schedule

may be re-circulated with any subsequent changes. Detail members also

use text messages to relay their movements in real time to one another

and to their supervisors. However, DOI was only able to review the text

message communications of a small sample of EPU members, and, as

described above, due to the dispersal of communications between City-

Hall-issued cell phones, NYPD-issued cell phones, and the sanctioned

use of personal devices and encrypted text messaging applications, there

is no system for appropriately preserving these records for official

purposes, for litigation, for investigations, or for any other legitimate

purpose. Moreover, even if they were being properly preserved, these

communications (which sometimes, but not always, reference the

location) do not constitute sufficient or complete records of the EPU’s

movements or activities for any of these purposes.

Conclusion and Recommendations

No reasonable person disputes that the Mayor of New York City should

have security protection and that providing such protection, consistent

with the City’s ethics rules, is in the interest of the City. Likewise, where

the spouse of the Mayor is performing public duties as First Lady (or,

someday, First Gentleman), few would dispute that he or she is also

entitled to appropriate security protection and that doing so serves an

official purpose. However, because of the nature of protective work (to

include both the inevitability of idle time and the intimacy of the

relationship between detail and protectee over time), the provision of a

standing security detail is potentially vulnerable to corruption and

misuse of public resources. Appropriate policies and practices can guard

against these risks.

As to the specific complaints and allegations that prompted this

investigation, DOI’s investigation revealed that the City has not been

reimbursed by the de Blasio Campaign for the travel expenses of the

security detail during the Mayor’s presidential campaign, totaling over

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$300,000. The investigation also found that, in addition to the

appropriate use of EPU resources used in Chiara de Blasio’s move to

Gracie Mansion, such as transporting the First Lady to assist in the

move, and transporting Chiara and her belongings to Gracie Mansion,

additional NYPD resources were inappropriately utilized, including an

NYPD sprinter van and at least one NYPD member who assisted in

physically moving Chiara’s belongings. DOI’s investigation was unable

to determine whether these NYPD resources assisted in the Move at

Mayor de Blasio’s instruction.

Additionally, DOI’s investigation found misuse of the EPU and UOU in

that non-protectees were regularly transported outside the presence of

designated protectees. In several instances, such transportation

occurred at the direct request of Mayor de Blasio. Many of these

instances involved Dante de Blasio, who may or may not be entitled to

security detail protection, but who has not had an assigned detail since

approximately August 2015. DOI found that the NYPD does not appear

to have followed any formal processes or procedures, nor created any

written records, regarding Dante de Blasio’s or Chiara de Blasio’s

eligibility for, and declination of, security detail protection. There is no

written threat assessment or security analysis, no documentation

regarding the de Blasio children’s declination of their security details,

and no written policies or procedures regarding any episodic or ad hoc

use of NYPD resources following the dissolution of their standing

details. As a result, irrespective of the Intelligence Bureau’s unwritten

assessment of their security needs, their use of security detail resources

has, in practice, operated as a matter of personal preference and

convenience, combined with availability of NYPD resources, divorced

from any meaningful evaluation of their security needs or the threat

associated with any particular situation or even broad categories of daily

activities. NYPD transportation of other non-protectees outside the

presence of designated protectees (e.g., guests of the Mayor, official

visitors to Gracie Mansion, or mayoral staff) also appears to have no

security rationale whatsoever and is, instead, viewed merely as a

resource that can be called upon as a “courtesy.”

At the root of nearly all of these issues is the complete lack of any written

policies or procedures at the NYPD for the operation of the mayoral

security detail. Because it does not exist, neither the NYPD nor, as far

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as DOI is aware, any other City entity provided the Mayor, his family,

or his representatives with any guidance – written or otherwise –

concerning the appropriate or inappropriate uses of the security detail.

Furthermore, the NYPD does not appear to conduct formal or written

security analyses or threat assessments for potential protectees,

formally initiate or terminate security detail protection, or even properly

train detail members to ensure against corruption vulnerabilities.

In the course of this investigation, DOI identified several vulnerabilities

concerning the operation of Mayor de Blasio’s security detail,

particularly regarding official communications, compliance with record

retention protocols, and a culture susceptible to abuse.

DOI is making a number of referrals to the appropriate authorities and

also makes the following recommendations:

The New York City Police Department

1. The NYPD must collect and maintain the records regarding the

travel expenses incurred by Mayor de Blasio’s security detail

during his Campaign, so as to facilitate reimbursement of those

expenses.

2. The NYPD should consult with experts on official protection

outside of the NYPD to develop and adopt improved practices for

standing or long-term security details. DOI recommends that the

NYPD take the following steps:

a. Implement a formal process, including written records, for

determining eligibility for standing or long-term security

detail protection. This determination should not be made

by the NYPD personnel serving on or directly supervising

the details to ensure independence and remove incentives

to recommend additional security resources.

b. Implement a formal process, including written records, for

declination of security detail protection

c. Create a clear written policy regarding permitted use of

detail resources and personnel. Convey that policy to all

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current protectees, and create a standardized procedure for

conveying that policy to future protectees.

d. Require and provide high-quality executive protection

training to personnel assigned to the Executive Protection

Unit. Such training should ideally be provided by experts

outside the NYPD who have experience with best practices

in establishing clear boundaries and navigating the

challenges inherent to the detail-protectee relationship, in

addition to effective techniques for protection.

e. Maintain appropriate records establishing location and

time of each stop when detail resources/personnel are in

use, such as detailed memo books and car logs, as well as

any other duties undertaken by EPU members.

f. Establish an automatic rotation system of two to three

years’ service for all NYPD members assigned to the EPU.

3. The NYPD should create a policy concerning out-of-state travel

records at the NYPD. Travel records should specify the purpose

of the travel, especially for trips that require any reimbursements

to the City.

The Office of the Mayor

1. The Office of the Mayor should not issue electronic devices,

including cell phones, to members of the EPU.

2. The Office of the Mayor should not assign City Hall email

addresses to EPU members.

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During the course of its investigation, DOI requested information from the NYPD about the

professional trainings offered to members of the EPU and UOU. The NYPD responded that its

Intelligence Bureau offers a two-day “dignitary protection training course,” and that this

training “is currently the only required training” for members of the EPU. The NYPD’s response

listed just 15 EPU members, including only two of the EPU’s three sergeants, who have received

this training since January 1, 2013. The majority received the training in 2013 or 2014. It does

not appear that EPU members have received any additional professional training since that

time. The NYPD’s response also named 24 UOU members who have received this training since

January 1, 2013, including several trained in 2018 and 2019, and two trained in 2021.

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3. Trainings on document retention obligations should be delivered

to all individuals who regularly use electronic devices and emails

issued by the Office of the Mayor, whether or not they are

formally employed by Office of the Mayor.

4. The Office of the Mayor should develop and provide trainings

regarding use and retention of text messages to any City

employee to whom it issues City Hall cell phones.

5. The Office of the Mayor should amend its internal policies and

compliance trainings to specifically address retention obligations

with respect to messaging applications, such as Signal and

WhatsApp.

6. All individuals who regularly use electronic devices issued by the

Office of the Mayor should be instructed, to the extent they use

messaging applications to communicate about City business,

that:

a. Accounts regularly used to communicate about City

business should have auto-delete functions turned off;

furthermore, users should never delete messages relating

to City business and should, at a minimum, retain

messages within the application.

b. Messages sent to or from other accounts that do concern

City business should not be deleted. Insofar as these

messages are sent to or from a personal account with auto-

delete settings enabled, it is the user’s responsibility to

ensure that messages are retained – through an export

function, screenshot, or other mechanism. To the extent

this is impracticable, the user must use an alternate

method of communicating about City business.

c. Users should not delete messaging applications from their

City-issued devices without taking practicable steps to

retain the communications therein concerning City

business.

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7. The Office of the Mayor should notify all relevant City agencies,

including the EPU, when mayoral staffers with whom they

regularly interact and communicate, take leaves of absence from

their City positions to work on a political campaign of any kind.

The Conflicts of Interest Board

1. The Conflicts of Interest Board should publicly release as

guidance any advice issued to elected officials regarding the use

of City resources in connection with political activities.

2. If the Board’s advice or guidance provides for the reimbursement

of expenses to the City, it should specify, at a minimum,

a timeline for such reimbursements to the City and the parties

responsible for reimbursement.

New York City Department of Records and Information Services

1. DORIS should issue an updated retention schedule to include

rules governing text messages, messaging applications, and any

communications not conducted via official government accounts

nor retained on government servers.