S
AFRA
11/20/00
6:30 PM
2000]
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GFSZA AMENDMENTS
643
Congress’s power over activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce has been succinctly stated: “‘[i]f it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.’”
24
To assure that Congress
regulated only activities whose squeeze was felt by interstate
commerce, early-twentieth-century
Commerce Clause jurisprudence
limited Congress’s powers to activities with a direct impact on
interstate commerce.
25
Eventually, whether a pinch on interstate
commerce was sufficient to justify federal regulation became a
question of degree, much like proximate cause in tort.
26
In
application, the modern test has shifted from whether there is a direct
impact on interstate commerce to whether Congress rationally could
have believed that the activity affects interstate commerce.
27
24. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
25
. See, e.g.
, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935)
(noting that Congress’s power is limited to transactions that directly affect interstate commerce
and hypothesizing that if the commerce power reached all activities with an indirect effect on
interstate commerce, “even the development of the State’s commercial facilities would be
subject to federal control”).
26
.See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (describing the
boundary of Congress’s power as a question of degree, bounded by activities with “effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government”). Perhaps the question of degree is best
illustrated by the metaphor in Justice Cardozo’s concurring opinion in
Schechter Poultry
, two
years before the approach was adopted by a majority of the Court:
Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording
instruments at the center . . . . Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is
distant may at times be uncertain.
Schechter Poultry
, 295 U.S. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
27
. See, e.g.
,
Heart of Atlanta Motel
, 379 U.S. at 258. Although the Court’s recent opinion
in
Morrison
recognized that the modern commerce power is much broader than it was
historically,
see
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000) (“Congress has had
considerably greater latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce
Clause than our previous case law permitted.”), language in that opinion could in fact narrow
Congress’s power. Citing cases that stood for the proposition that the Court is the ultimate
arbiter of whether Congress could have had a rational basis for concluding that an activity
substantially affected interstate commerce, the Court asserted that “‘[w]hether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative
question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court.’”
Id.
at 1752 (emphasis added) (quoting
Lopez
, 514 U.S. at 557
n.2). Although it remains to be seen how this language will be applied, this assertion could limit
the deference traditionally given to Congress’s determination of the extent of its power.
Compare id. with
J
OHN
E. N
OWAK
& R
ONALD
D. R
OTUNDA
, C
ONSTITUTIONAL
L
AW
§ 4.8, at
154 (4th ed. 1991) (“The Court [before
Lopez
] now will defer to the legislature’s choice of