111.18 Scienter required to prove violation or business licensee liability
111.19 Failure of county to meet time frame not to risk applicant/licensee rights
111.20 Conflicting code provisions repealed
111.99 Penalty
§ 111.01 RATIONALE AND FINDINGS.
(A) Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate sexually oriented businesses in order to promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of the citizens of the county, and to establish reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the deleterious secondary
effects of sexually oriented businesses within the county. The provisions of this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect of
imposing a limitation or restriction on the content or reasonable access to any communicative materials, including sexually oriented
materials. Similarly, it is neither the intent nor effect of this chapter to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials
protected by the First Amendment, or to deny access by the distributors and exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their
intended market. Neither is it the intent nor effect of this chapter to condone or legitimize the distribution of obscene material.
(B) Findings and rationale. Based on evidence of the adverse secondary effects of adult uses presented in hearings and in
reports made available to the Fiscal Court, and on findings, interpretations, and narrowing constructions incorporated in the cases of
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002);
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972);
Bellanca v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 452 U.S. 714 (1981); and Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville
and Davidson County, 466 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2006) (Deja Vu III); 729, Inc. v. Kenton County, 2006 WL 2842884 (E.D. Ky.
2006); Deja Vu of Cincinnati, L.L.C. v. Union Township Bd. Of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Fantasy
Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2006); City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WL 2827608
(Ill. 2006); Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 2006 WL 2504388 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Andy's Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v.
City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2006); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir. 2006); Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City
of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1998); ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 1994); Kentucky
Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 209 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Ky. 2002); Restaurant Ventures v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Gov't, 60 S.W.3d 572 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d
1186 (9th Cir. 2004); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 274 F.3d
377 (6th Cir. 2001); Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003); Ctr. for Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa
County, 336 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md.
2003); Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. Metro Gov't, Case No. 04-CI-01967 (Jefferson Circuit Court, Summary Judgment
Order, Dec. 14, 2004); Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2005); DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d
403 (6th Cir. 1997); Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2004); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed.
Appx. 438 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2002); Broadway Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (ED. Tenn. 1986); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of
Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378 (ED. Ky. 1993); Richland Bookman v. Nichols, 137 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Tennessee Public
Indecency Statute, 172 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999)(table); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton, 923 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1991);
Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Connor v. City and County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210 (10th
Cir. 1990); Threesome Entertainment v. Strinmather, 4 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Lady J Lingerie, Inc. v. City of
Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999); Commonwealth v. Jameson, 2006 WL 3386489 (Ky. 2006); and based upon reports
concerning secondary effects occurring in and around sexually oriented businesses, including, but not limited to, Austin, Texas - 1986;
Indianapolis, Indiana - 1984; Garden Grove, California - 1991; Houston, Texas - 1983, 1997; Phoenix, Arizona - 1979, 1995-98;
Chattanooga, Tennessee - 1999-2003; Los Angeles, California -1977; Whittier, California - 1978; Spokane, Washington - 2001; St.
Cloud, Minnesota -1994; Littleton, Colorado - 2004; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma - 1986; Dallas, Texas - 1997; Kennedale, Texas - 2005;
Greensboro, North Carolina - 2003; Amarillo, Texas - 1977; New York, New York Times Square - 1994; the Report of the Attorney
General's Working Group On The Regulation Of Sexually Oriented Businesses, (June 6, 1989, State of Minnesota); and Kenton and
Campbell Counties, Kentucky - 2003, 2005, the Fiscal Court finds:
(1) Sexually oriented businesses, as a category of commercial uses, are associated with a wide variety of adverse secondary
effects including, but not limited to, personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, lewdness, public indecency,
obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault and
exploitation.
(2) Sexually oriented businesses should be separated from sensitive land uses to minimize the impact of their secondary effects