If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JANICE SHERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
FOR PUBLICATION
June 20, 2024
9:20 a.m.
v
No. 364393
Washtenaw Circuit Court
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
LC No. 22-000075-NI
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JOHN DOE,
Defendant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and N. P. HOOD and YOUNG, JJ.
CAMERON, P.J.
In this interlocutory appeal arising under Michigans no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.,
defendant, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company (Progressive), appeals by leave granted
1
the
order denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine question
of material fact) and ordering reformation of plaintiffs, Janice Shermans, automobile insurance
policy.
We clarify that, in these cases, courts should examine the conduct of the parties to
determine the equitable result. Because this case involves misconduct by Sherman, but not
Progressive, the trial court erred to the extent it concluded Progressive should bear the financial
risk. We therefore reverse the trial courts order denying summary disposition and ordering
1
Sherman v Progressive Mich Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 27,
2023 (Docket No. 364393).
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reformation of the policy, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 2020, Sherman applied to Progressive for a no-fault insurance policy for
two vehiclesa 2006 Cadillac DTS sedan and a 1993 Chrysler New Yorker sedan. In the
application, she identified her address as 16845 Tremlett Drive, Clinton Township, MI 48035, and
confirmed that the vehicles were garaged at this address. The application required Sherman to
disclose the total number of resident relatives, 14 years of age or older, and all regular drivers
of her vehicles then residing in her household. Sherman identified herself as the sole resident and
driver of the vehicles. She did not change this information when she renewed her policy on May
15, 2021.
On July 14, 2021, Sherman was a passenger in one of these vehicles when it was hit from
behind by John Doe.
2
She was injured in this accident and turned to Progressive for personal
protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Progressive notified Sherman that it was denying coverage
and rescinding the policy ab initio because of misrepresentations in her application. According to
Progressive, Sherman garaged her vehicles at 12525 Gunston Street, Detroit, MI 48205, not
Tremlett Drive. Additionally, Sherman had other individuals residing with her who she did not
list on her application. Progressive estimated that, had Sherman included this additional
information, it would have increased her premium by 83.2%. Progressive refunded the $1,491.54
of previously paid premiums to Shermans credit card.
Sherman then filed the complaint in this case. In addition to her claim against Doe,
Sherman alleged that Progressive unlawfully refused to pay PIP benefits and had breached her
insurance contract. Progressive moved for summary disposition, arguing Sherman was not entitled
to recover PIP benefits because the policy of insurance was rescinded ab initio after Progressive
uncovered evidence of Shermans material misrepresentations, including the location where the
vehicles were garaged and the identity of Shermans resident-relatives. Sherman disagreed,
contending summary disposition was inappropriate because revocation is not an automatic remedy
in cases concerning alleged fraud. Rather, the remedy should be tailored to the equities of the
situation and needed to produce a fair result for all parties. The trial court denied the motion for
summary disposition and ordered that the policy be reformed to reflect the insurance premium
that [Progressive] believes it would have been entitled to had the insured listed Detroit as the
residence. This appeal followed.
II. FRAUD IN AN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY
Progressive argues the trial court erred when it denied its motion for summary disposition.
According to Progressive, summary disposition is appropriate in light of Shermans fraud, and that
rescission is the appropriate remedy. We agree.
2
Doe has apparently never been located.
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial courts determination on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). When reviewing a
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Rose v Natl Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455
(2002). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate if there is no genuine issue
regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rose,
466 Mich at 461. This Court reviews de novo a trial courts interpretation of an insurance contract,
and also whether a trial court properly applied equitable principles. 21st Century Premier Ins Co
v Zufelt, 315 Mich App 437, 443; 889 NW2d 759 (2016). Finally, the application of an equitable
doctrine such as rescission is also reviewed de novo. Wilmore-Moody v Zakir, 511 Mich 76, 83;
999 NW2d 1 (2023).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The purpose of the Michigan no-fault act is to broadly provide coverage for those injured
in motor vehicle accidents without regard to fault. Iqbal v Bristol West Ins Group, 278 Mich App
31, 37; 748 NW2d 574 (2008). [T]he no-fault act requires registrants and operators of motor
vehicles to maintain compulsory no-fault insurance. Wilmore-Moody, 511 Mich at 83, citing
MCL 500.3101(1). MCL 500.3105(1) requires insurers to pay PIP benefits to those whom they
insure who are accidentally injured in the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle[.]
But, an insurer has a reasonable right to expect honesty in the application for insurance[.]
Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 407; 919 NW2d 20 (2018). Indeed, it is well settled that
an insurer is entitled to rescind a policy ab initio on the basis of a material misrepresentation made
in an application for no-fault insurance. 21st Century Premier Ins Co, 315 Mich App at 445. A
misrepresentation is material if the insurer would have rejected the risk or charged an increased
premium and would not have issued the same contract had it been given the correct information.
See Oade v Jackson Natl Life Ins Co of Mich, 465 Mich 244, 255; 632 NW2d 126 (2001).
There are three types of misrepresentations which may entitled an insurer to rescind a
policy: [A]ctionable fraud, also known as fraudulent misrepresentation; innocent
misrepresentation; and silent fraud, also known as fraudulent concealment. Titan Ins Co v Hyten,
491 Mich 547, 555; 817 NW2d 562 (2012).
Rescission does not function by automatic operation of the law. Wilmore-Moody, 511
Mich at 85, quoting Bazzi, 502 Mich at 411. [B]ecause rescission is an equitable remedy, it
should be granted only in the sound discretion of the court.’ ” Wilmore-Moody, 511 Mich at 85,
quoting Lenawee Co Bd of Health v Messerly, 417 Mich 17, 31; 331 NW2d 203 (1982). Put
differently, [e]quitable relief by way of cancellation is not strictly a matter of right, but rather a
remedy, the granting of which rests in the sound discretion of the court. Amster v Stratton, 259
Mich 683, 686; 244 NW 201 (1932). [R]escission should not be granted in cases where the result
thus obtained would be unjust or inequitable. Bazzi, 502 Mich at 410, quoting Amster, 259 Mich
at 686. Courts should “balance the equities” to determine whether rescission is appropriate.
Johnson v QFD, Inc, 292 Mich App 359, 370 n 3; 807 NW2d 719 (2011).
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For example, we have deemed reformation the appropriate remedy when an insurance
contract violates the law or public policy. Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Pena, 345 Mich App
270, 276; 5 NW3d 367 (2023). Similarly, reformation is possible if a party can prove a mutual
mistake of fact, or mistake on one side and fraud on the other, by clear and convincing evidence.
Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 398; 729 NW2d 277 (2006). This Court has
also held that reformation is available for contracts if the writing fails to express the intentions of
the parties . . . as the result of accident, inadvertence, mistake, fraud, or inequitable conduct, or
both fraud and mistake, fraud or inequitable conduct being on one side and mistake on the other.
Najor v Wayne Natl Life Ins Co, 23 Mich App 260, 272; 178 NW2d 504 (1970), quoting 45 Am
Jur, Reformation of Instruments, § 45, p 609
In this case, Progressive moved for summary disposition on the basis of Sherman’s alleged
fraud. While we reject Progressives argument for fraudulent misrepresentation, we agree there is
no genuine question of fact of innocent misrepresentation. Indeed, rescission is justified without
regard to the intentional nature of the misrepresentation, as long as it is relied upon by the insurer.
21st Century Premier Ins Co, 315 Mich App at 446. Rescission is justified in cases of innocent
misrepresentation if a party relies upon the misstatement, because otherwise the party responsible
for the misstatement would be unjustly enriched if he were not held accountable for his
misrepresentation. Lash v Allstate Ins Co, 210 Mich App 98, 103; 532 NW2d 869 (1995); see
also M & D, Inc v W B McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 27; 585 NW2d 33 (1998). [T]he party
alleging innocent misrepresentation is not required to prove that the party making the
misrepresentation intended to deceive or that the other party knew the representation was false.
M&D, Inc, 231 Mich App at 28.
Progressives litigation underwriting specialist, Janeen Copic, submitted an affidavit
stating that Progressive would have charged a 7.7% higher premium had Sherman accurately
disclosed the number of drivers and resident-relatives at the reported address, and a 75.5%
increased premium had Sherman disclosed her permanent Detroit residence. Progressive relied on
Shermans misrepresentations, as stated in Copics affidavit, to determine a lower premium for
coverage than what Progressive would otherwise have charged. Sherman does not dispute this
reliance. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Sherman made an innocent
misrepresentation, and that Progressive would have issued a different contract but for this
misrepresentation.
The trial court, sitting in equity, should have next examined Progressive’s conduct related
to the procurement of the policy. Sherman did not allege bad faith or wrongdoing by Progressive
prior to the rescission. Further, there was no evidence that Progressive engaged in misconduct in
the procurement of the policy. In these circumstances, Michigan jurisprudence has
overwhelmingly held that courts should uphold the insurer’s rescission.
3
For example, in United
Security Ins Co v Commr of Ins, 133 Mich App 38, 40; 348 NW2d 34 (1984), this Court
considered a situation in which the insured made intentional misrepresentations in his application
3
See also Hammoud v Metro Prop & Cas Ins Co, 222 Mich App 485, 488; 563 NW2d 716 (1997);
Auto-Owners Ins Co v Mich Comm’r of Ins, 141 Mich App 776, 780; 369 NW2d 896 (1985);
Cunningham v Citizens Ins Co of America, 133 Mich App 471, 478; 350 NW2d 283 (1984).
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for insurance. The insurer rescinded the policy ab initio on the basis of these representations. Id.
In examining the rescission, we noted there was no reason in law or policy for the burden of such
a risk to be placed on the insurer in preference to the insured who made the intentional material
misrepresentations. Id. at 43. Accordingly, we upheld the trial courts order upholding the
rescission. Id. at 45.
The trial court’s balance of the equities should have revealed misconduct by Sherman, but
none by Progressive. The trial court erred by failing to recognize this distinction. Compounding
this error was the trial court’s decision to reform, rather than rescind, the policy. Not only did
Sherman fail to request reformation in her demand for relief, United Security stands for the
proposition that innocent insurers should not bear the burden of an insured’s fraud. By ordering
the policy reformed, the trial court placed the financial burden of paying PIP benefits on
Progressive, notwithstanding the fact that Sherman obtained those very same benefits by way of
fraud. Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered reformation, rather than rescission.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Noah P. Hood
/s/ Adrienne N. Young