1
Annual Report
Pursuant to
Executive Law 75
Office of the New York State
Attorney General Letitia James
December 29, 2023
Law Enforcement Misconduct Investigative Office
2
This is the third annual report of the New York Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Misconduct Investigative
Office (LEMIO). LEMIO, which is established by Executive Law 75, is tasked with helping to prevent and address
misconduct at local law enforcement agencies in New York State. Our statutory goals are “enhancing the
effectiveness of law enforcement, increasing public safety, protecting civil liberties and civil rights, ensuring
compliance with constitutional protections and local, state and federal laws, and increasing the public’s
confidence in law enforcement.
1
To advance these important goals, Executive Law 75 provides LEMIO with authority to investigate misconduct
at more than 500 covered agencies across the state, examine policies and procedures, issue reports on the
offices findings, and recommend reforms. These recommendations can include legislation, policy changes,
disciplinary action, and other remedial steps.
On an annual basis, LEMIO is required to submit a report “summarizing the activities of the office and
recommending specific changes to state law to further [its] mission.
2
Section II of this report provides an
overview of Executive Law 75 and the duties that it imposes on local law enforcement agencies. It also describes
LEMIO’s structure and our priority areas. Section III discusses LEMIO’s online portal. Members of the public and
employees of covered agencies may use this portal to report allegations of misconduct to LEMIO. Section IV
summarizes LEMIO’s activities over the past year, including our investigative activity and review of Executive
Law 75(5)(b) referrals (and Appendix A, at the end of this report, provides a list of closed referrals). Finally,
Section V identifies a series of recommended legislative changes that would further the goals of effective and
accountable law enforcement.
One crucial reform would be the adoption of legislation banning bias-based profiling and requiring increased
data collection and reporting on law enforcement activity. Such a bill would bring New York State in line with
established best practices in other states, promote transparency, and help LEMIO and the public ensure that
law enforcement is operating fairly and effectively.
Introduction
1. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(2)(d).
2. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(3)(h).
3
Other recommendations include legislation that would:
» Facilitate access by the OAG, and other law enforcement oversight agencies, to sealed records in
connection with law enforcement accountability investigations;
» Facilitate civilian oversight of law enforcement agencies;
» Limit negative outcomes from non-public-safety related traffic stops;
» Encourage alternative public health approaches for people in mental health crisis to minimize the risks
of police involvement; and
» Require the use of body-worn cameras.
4
Overview of LEMIO and Executive Law 75
Executive Law 75 was enacted in June 2020 following state- and nation-wide protests regarding high-profile law
enforcement abuses and a perceived lack of accountability. Its passage reflected the legislatures recognition
of the need for a stronger system of independent statewide oversight to preserve civil rights and civil liberties,
protect public safety, and help increase public trust in law enforcement.
A. Executive Law 75
Under Executive Law 75, LEMIO’s jurisdiction extends to more than 500 local enforcement agencies (known
as “covered agencies”) across New York State, ranging from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) to
county sheriffs to smaller police departments in towns and villages. Every agency that employs police officers
as defined in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 1.20 is a covered agency for purposes of Executive Law 75, other than agencies
under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Inspector General, the Port Authority
Inspector General, and the State Inspector General.
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Executive Law 75 empowers LEMIO to “receive and investigate complaints from any source, or upon [its] own
initiative, concerning allegations of corruption, fraud, use of excessive force, criminal activity, conflicts of
interest or abuse in any covered agency,” to review policies and procedures of covered agencies with regard to
the prevention and detection of misconduct, and to “investigate patterns, practices, systemic issues, or trends
identified by analyzing actions, claims, complaints, and investigations.
4
The statute also authorizes LEMIO to determine whether disciplinary action, civil or criminal prosecution, or
further investigation by an appropriate federal, state, or local agency is warranted, to prepare and release
written reports of investigations, and to recommend remedial action.
5
LEMIO and other units within the Office
of the Attorney General (OAG) also may bring civil litigation against covered agencies, as appropriate, to
address patterns of misconduct and seek structural changes to protect civil rights.
6
3. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(1).
4. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(3)(a),(e) & (g).
5. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(3)(c),(d) & (f).
6. See In re: New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, No. 20-cv-8924, 2021 WL 2894764, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 9, 2021) (finding OAG has
parens patriae power to pursue Section 1983 claims against the New York City Police Department); New York v. Town of Wallkill, No. 01-cv-0364, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13364, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2001).
5
LEMIO is required to inform the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the heads
of covered agencies of allegations of misconduct and the progress of its investigations unless special
circumstances require confidentiality.
7
This statutory requirement is crucial to ensuring that covered agencies
can investigate and address potential misconduct involving their personnel, as is the case when accountability
systems are working properly.
Executive Law 75 also imposes new reporting duties on covered agencies and their personnel, including the
Section 75(5)(b) requirement that covered agencies refer to LEMIO instances in which an officer or employee
has been the subject of “at least five complaints from five or more individuals relating to at least five separate
incidents … within two years.” Upon receiving such a referral, LEMIO is required to “investigate such complaints to
determine whether the subject officer or employee has engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct, excessive
force, or acts of dishonesty.” These referrals are discussed in more detail in Section IV.C below.
B. Overview of LEMIO
LEMIO has dedicated personnel in the OAGs New York City, Albany, and Buffalo offices. Our team includes
assistant attorneys general, investigative analysts, a senior data analyst, and support staff. We also work closely
with other units within the OAG, including the Civil Rights Bureau, the Research and Analysis Department, the
Office of Special Investigation, and staff across the OAG’s regional offices.
C. LEMIO priority areas
With its broad scope and mandate, Executive Law 75 is a powerful vehicle for identifying and addressing
misconduct, improving policies and practices, and enhancing trust in law enforcement, all of which are crucial to
the safety and well-being of New Yorkers.
Yet with coverage over more than 500 agencies employing more than 80,000 personnel, LEMIO is not a
substitute for effective local accountability mechanisms, which must be the first line of review of allegations of
misconduct.
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Police chiefs and sheriffs, internal affairs and professional standards units within covered agencies,
civilian review boards, district attorneys, and legislative oversight are key players when it comes to effective and
accountable policing. Community and advocacy groups and other stakeholders also have a crucial role.
Given the scope of Executive Law 75, LEMIO will focus on taking action where there is reason to believe that
existing accountability procedures may be insufficient. Our aim is to ensure accountability where it is lacking,
strengthen local oversight, increase transparency, and improve policies and practices. We will prioritize
investigations of potential patterns and practices of misconduct and systemic issues that impact significant
numbers of community members or are directed towards marginalized groups.
7. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(3)(b) & (b-1).
8. Executive Law 75 emphasizes the importance of local accountability mechanisms. For example, Section 3(b) requires LEMIO to inform covered
agencies of allegations involving their personnel and Section (5)(b) states that referral investigations “shall be in addition to and shall not supersede
any civil, criminal, administrative or other action or proceeding relating to such complaints or the subject officer or employee.
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Our areas of focus for the coming year include:
 Policing practices that have a discriminatory impact on the basis of race, gender, and other protected
classes, including racial disparities in police stops, searches, ticketing, and uses of force and systemic
failures to appropriately respond to sexual assault and domestic violence;
 Traffic enforcement for non-safety-related violations that result in punitive ticketing or unlawful search
and detention, or escalate into the unreasonable or excessive use of force, particularly involving racial
disparities and patterns of pretextual stops;
 Retaliation in connection with First Amendment-protected activity, including inappropriate or unlawful
responses to protests and to individuals making critical comments to police;
 Responses to people in mental health crisis;
 False testimony and other instances of dishonesty; and
 Inadequate complaint procedures, internal investigations, and other lapses in accountability and
disciplinary processes.
We will also focus on outreach to covered agencies, community groups, and others to help guide our activity.
Finally, a number of LEMIO intakes and referrals have involved traffic stops for vehicle and traffic violations that
then led to searches based on the purported smell of marijuana. In some cases, no contraband was recovered,
and in others, the municipality had a policy not to arrest people for possessing small amounts of marijuana.
These situations raise questions as to whether the officers actually smelled or were looking for marijuana, or
instead were using marijuana as a justification to search for other contraband. Following New York’s legalization
of marijuana in 2021, the use of its smell as a pretext for searches should no longer occur, and this will be an issue
that LEMIO will monitor going forward.
7
Online portal for reporting misconduct to LEMIO
Executive Law 75 authorizes LEMIO to investigate complaints received from members of the public and to
investigate police misconduct on our own initiative.
9
The law also imposes a duty on personnel of covered
agencies to report information concerning certain types of misconduct to LEMIO.
To these ends, the OAG has created an online portal for members of the public and personnel of covered
agencies to report misconduct, which can be accessed at
https://ag.ny.gov/law-enforcement-misconduct-investigative-office.
Every report of alleged misconduct that we receive is carefully considered by LEMIO staff. We use the information
that is reported to guide our investigative and enforcement activity.
We are not able to fully investigate and resolve every report of misconduct that we receive through the portal,
but every submission is valuable in helping us shape our oversight.
LEMIO is required by statute to inform covered agencies of reports of misconduct involving their personnel unless
special circumstances require confidentiality. We may also share submissions with other local, state, or federal
agencies when appropriate.
9. N.Y. Exec. Law § 75(3)(a), (e) & (g).
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Summary of activities
This section summarizes LEMIO’s work, including our ongoing investigations and litigation, completed
investigations, the Executive Law 75(5)(b) referral process, and our outreach and engagement.
A. Ongoing investigations and litigation
LEMIO has a number of ongoing investigations into potential misconduct pursuant to Executive Law 75(3)(a) and
(g). Investigations may be prompted by reports received through the online portal, referrals or notifications from
other government agencies, media reports, contacts with community groups and nonprofits, data analysis, and
other sources.
Some of these investigations relate to individual instances of alleged misconduct, particularly where the covered
agencys internal accountability and disciplinary process does not appear to have properly addressed the
incident.
In other cases, including matters conducted jointly with the OAGs Civil Rights Bureau, LEMIO investigations focus
on potential patterns and practices of misconduct. These broader investigations involve potential discriminatory
policing, including racially-motivated stops, seizures, and enforcement of low-level violations, and the use of
excessive force, including against vulnerable groups such as young people and people in mental health crisis.
Retaliation by police against people engaging in First Amendment-protected activity, particularly in connection
with racial justice protests, is another issue of statewide concern to the OAG and is the subject of ongoing
investigations.
The OAG has also sued the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in federal court seeking to end the
department’s pattern of excessive force and false arrests against New Yorkers during First Amendment-protected
protests, including the summer 2020 racial justice protests. In September 2023, the OAG, several groups of
private plaintiffs, the City of New York, and two police unions reached an agreement that will require NYPD
to fundamentally reform its policies and practices with respect to how it polices First Amendment activities.
Following its approval by the Court, the settlement will require NYPD to, among other things, adopt a graduated,
multi-tiered system of protest response that emphasizes de-escalation, implement new restrictions on use
of force and the practice of “kettling” at protests, and establish new protections surrounding treatment of
members of the press. The agreement also establishes a collaborative oversight committee to assess NYPD’s
ongoing compliance during the term of the agreement and provides funding for engagement with community
stakeholders during the oversight period.
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10. See In re: New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, No. 20-cv-8924, 2021 WL 2894764, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 9, 2021); see also OAG
Press Release: Attorney General James, The Legal Aid Society, NYCLU Announce Agreement with NYPD to Reform Policing of Protests, Attorney General
James, The Legal Aid Society, and NYCLU Announce Agreement with NYPD to Reform Policing of Protests: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/
attorney-general-james-legal-aid-society-and-nyclu-announce-agreement-nypd
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B. Completed investigations
This section provides brief summaries of completed LEMIO investigations. Investigations pursuant to Executive
Law 75(5)(b) are discussed in the following section (Section C).
Access to Reproductive Health Care at the Jefferson County Jail: On September 14, 2023, the OAG
entered into an agreement with the Jefferson County Sheriffs Office to institute new policies and require
additional training to protect the rights of incarcerated individuals to reproductive health care. This
agreement follows an investigation regarding the treatment of a pregnant woman who initially was
denied access to an abortion. The investigation was conducted jointly with OAG’s Civil Rights Bureau,
Watertown Regional Office, and Special Counsel for Reproductive Justice.
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Excessive Force and Wrongful Arrest by an Officer of the Niagara Falls Police Department:
On October 23, 2023, LEMIO issued a report concluding that an NFPD officer arrested a Niagara Falls
woman without probable cause in retaliation for making a critical comment and used excessive force
to effectuate the arrest. The report includes recommended remedial actions, including policies and
training to prevent such conduct in the future, and LEMIO is in discussions with NFPD regarding the
implementation of those recommendations.
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Excessive Force and Wrongful Arrest by an Officer of the City of Tonawanda Police Department:
On December 29, 2023, LEMIO issued a report concluding that a TPD officer (who subsequently
became the chief) arrested two minors without probable cause and used excessive force, including
an impermissible neck restraint, when arresting one of the minors. The report includes recommended
remedial actions, including disciplinary action, updating the TPD use of force policy so that it complies
with New York State law, training, and adopting a policy on how to interact with young people.
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11. Press release: Attorney General James Protects Abortion Access at Jefferson County Jail (ny.gov); Assurance of Discontinuance:
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/settlements-agreements/jefferson-county-abortion-aod.pdf.
12. Press release: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-law-enforcement-misconduct-investigative-office-0 ; Report:
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/reports/lemio-nfpd-report.pdf.
13. Press release: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2023/attorney-general-james-law-enforcement-misconduct-investigative-office-release; Report:
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/reports/753report-tonawandacity-pd.pdf
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C. Section 75(5)(b) referrals
Executive Law 75(5)(b) requires covered agencies to refer to LEMIO incidents in which an officer or employee
has “receiv[ed] at least five complaints from five or more individuals relating to at least five separate incidents
involving a certain officer or employee within two years.” Upon receiving such a referral, LEMIO is required to
“investigate such complaints to determine whether the subject officer or employee has engaged in a pattern
or practice of misconduct, use of excessive force, or acts of dishonesty.” LEMIO’s Executive Law 75(5)(b)
investigations are focused on determining whether the referred complaints indicate a pattern of misconduct,
although the investigations may include a review of other incidents when appropriate.
At the conclusion of an Executive Law 75(5)(b) investigation, the OAG notifies the head of the referring agency
whether a pattern of misconduct has been identified. If a pattern has been identified, LEMIO will describe the
conduct that makes up the pattern and recommend remedial actions to the referring agency, which may include
discipline, monitoring, training, and policy or other changes.
14
In certain investigations that do not result in a
finding of a pattern of misconduct, LEMIO may identify specific incidents or issues to the employing agency and
recommend remedial action. The results of concluded Executive Law 75(5)(b) referrals are made public on the
OAGs website, as noted below.
Importantly, the Executive Law 75(5)(b) process does not replace or supersede the covered agencys duty to
monitor the conduct of its officers and to identify those who require guidance, correction, further support, or
discipline to perform their duties effectively and legally. To that end, Executive Law 75(5)(b) makes clear that the
“referral and investigation … shall be in addition to and shall not supersede any civil, criminal, administrative or
other action or proceeding relating to such complaints or the subject officer or employee.
In cases in which a referred officer has left the referring agency before the investigation has concluded, the
referral will be administratively closed without a determination as to whether the officer has engaged in a
pattern of misconduct. In these cases, LEMIO will cooperate with DCJS with respect to information regarding
whether the officers departure may be considered a “removal for cause” for purposes of New York States’s police
officer registry.
15
The investigation may be reopened if the officer subsequently is re-employed as a police officer.
As of publication, LEMIO has received 252 referrals pursuant to Executive Law 75(5)(b). We have resolved 40
referrals to date, four of which resulted in a finding of a pattern or practice of misconduct. In addition, 16
referrals have been administratively closed due to an officer’s separation from their agency after the referral was
made. Investigations regarding the remaining referrals are ongoing.
14. The Civil Service Law imposes an eighteen-month statute of limitations for disciplinary proceedings for police officers absent evidence of criminal
conduct. Due to this statute of limitations, discipline may not be available in all instances in which LEMIO identifies misconduct.
15. See Executive Law 845; N.Y.C.R.R. Part 6056.
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A list of concluded Executive Law 75(5)(b) referrals is set forth in Appendix A to this report, and the letters or
reports notifying the agency of the conclusion of the investigation can be accessed on the OAG website.
To protect ongoing investigations, LEMIO does not identify the referred officer or agency before the conclusion of
the referral. Importantly, a higher rate of referrals from a particular agency should not be viewed as an indication
of bad performance or misconduct, and may be a positive sign that the agency is promoting and tracking
feedback from the public.
D. Engagement and outreach
To effectively fulfill our statutory mandate, LEMIO must build strong and productive relationships with those
who are affected by our work, from law enforcement agencies to impacted community members. To that end,
we have focused on engaging and working with stakeholders, including community groups, covered agencies,
law enforcement associations, experts, academics, and other oversight practitioners. Over the past year, LEMIO
personnel met with representatives of covered agencies, community groups and nonprofits, experts on policing,
and other police accountability agencies, among others.
Continuing and expanding upon these outreach efforts will be a priority in the year ahead.
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16. See, e.g., Empire Justice Center, Stop the Stops: The Disparate Use and Impact of Police Pretext Stops on Individuals and Communities of Color (Jan.
2003), available at https://empirejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Stop-the-Stops-Empire-Justices-Preliminary-Report-on-Racial-Disparities-in-
Pretext-Stops.pdf (“Because there is no required conformity in data collection between states, counties, towns, cities, and villages, we have no way of
comparing the racial disparities in police stops and searches between jurisdictions. While New York State Police collect data, many county, city, town
and village police departments in New York, either do not, or do not make it transparent and available.”).
17. While there has been progress in New York, it has often come piecemeal and at times due to litigation rather than legislation. For example, in 2023
Suffolk County entered into a settlement agreement after years of class action litigation alleging racially discriminatory policing that will require the
Suffolk County Police Department to collect data about traffic and pedestrian stops. See Plaintiffs 1-21 v. Suffolk County Police Department, 2:15-cv-02431
Docket #443 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2023); https://www.latinojustice.org/en/press/federal-judge-approves-settlement-lawsuit-against-suffolk-county-police-
racial-discrimination.
18. See, e.g., NYCLU, NYPD Traffic Stop Data, available at https://www.nyclu.org/en/nypd-traffic-stops-data (analyzing NYPD stops and searches by
race, outcome, and location).
19. See Traffic Stop Data, National Conference of State Legislatures, available at https://www.ncsl.org/civil-and-criminal-justice/traffic-stop-data.
Legislative recommendations
Executive Law 75(3)(h) requires LEMIO to “recommend[] specific changes to state law to further [its] mission.
The following legislative recommendations would promote civil rights and civil liberties, enhance public
confidence in law enforcement, and improve public safety.
A. Pass legislation that increases transparency and bans profiling
Law enforcement officers are empowered with broad authority to stop people, conduct searches, make arrests,
and use force to do so. Yet despite these sensitive and sometimes dangerous activities, community members
have limited access to data concerning interactions between law enforcement and the public.
While New York has taken initial steps to improve law enforcement transparency, our laws do not cover many
important indicators. With hundreds of law enforcement agencies in New York State, to the extent that some
individual agencies separately collect and track data, the data are often inconsistent and hard to access.
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As
a result, community members and the state and local governments that represent them may be left in the dark
when it comes to key information about policing and its impact.
17
The data that is available, both in New York State and across the country, suggests that enforcement often
disproportionately falls on people of color.
18
There is a growing movement towards transparency, with nearly half of U.S. states now requiring data collection
when an individual is stopped by law enforcement and most states prohibiting bias-based profiling.
19
New York
should join these states by mandating uniform statewide data collection and by banning bias-based profiling by
law enforcement.
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One important component of such legislation would be to prohibit agencies from relying on race and other
protected characteristics in initiating or determining the scope of law enforcement action, including pedestrian
and traffic stops, searches, and arrests. This prohibition not only would bring New York in line with most other
states, but also would permit New York to access a federal funding program to help support the collection and
analysis of police traffic stop data as a means of reducing profiling.
20
To provide just a few examples, states like
California,
21
Connecticut,
22
and Kansas
23
have all banned bias-based profiling in this manner.
24
In addition, law enforcement agencies should track and report a standardized set of data on traffic and
pedestrian stops including the duration and location of each encounter, the reason the encounter was initiated
and its result, the perceived race, gender, and age of the person stopped, and actions taken by the officer during
the encounter such as ordering a person out of a vehicle, handcuffing, searching people and vehicles, seizing
property, making arrests, and using force.
Law enforcement agencies should also make their policies publicly available online, except for policies that, if
disclosed, would substantially undermine ongoing investigations or endanger officers or members of the public.
They also should be required to publish collective bargaining agreements and disclose the amount they spend
on settlements relating to alleged misconduct.
Given the logistical challenges involved, data collection should be facilitated by a centralized state agency such
as DCJS. DCJS would also periodically collect and publish key data reported by law enforcement agencies. These
efforts could be supported by the federal funding that would be made available by the anti-profiling provision of
the legislation.
20. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, §1906 Grant Program to
Prohibit Racial Profiling (2005) (providing resources to states that ban bias-based profiling to collect, maintain, and analyze data on traffic stops).
21. See Cal. Penal Code § 13519.4.
22. See Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-1l, § 54-1m.
23. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-460E6, § 22-4609, § 22-4610, § 22-4611.
24. In the last year, Louisiana passed HB 89, requiring the state police to collect & report traffic stop data, and Minneapolis entered a settlement with
the state of Minnesota to reduce discriminatory policing, including a requirement that the city record and publish pedestrian and traffic stop data,
including officer name, perceived race of the pedestrian, duration of stop, whether a weapons frisk occurred, whether a search was conducted, the
type of search, whether weapons were found, and the outcome of the stop.
14
Data collection and reporting systems have been implemented in states such as New Jersey
25
and California
26
and were recommended for police departments in the 2015 Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing.
27
In sum, legislation that bans profiling and requires agencies to track and publicize important data and policies
would advance public accountability, help agencies manage and evaluate their own performance, and further
LEMIO’s statutory mission to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement and protect civil liberties and civil
rights.
B. Pass legislation to explicitly facilitate access by the OAG, and civilian
oversight agencies, to sealed records
New Yorkers are protected by laws that restrict access to—or “seal”—certain criminal justice records maintained
by law enforcement agencies and the courts. While these sealing laws serve important functions, they can
unintentionally hinder investigations of police misconduct conducted by the OAG and police oversight bodies.
LEMIO and oversight entities such as civilian review boards often require access to sealed criminal justice records
to fully investigate allegations of misconduct. For example, investigators may need to review body-worn footage,
arrest records, and other documents related to incidents involving police interaction with young people or cases
in which charges were dismissed—yet access to these records by the OAG and other oversight entities may
be blocked by sealing laws (although Executive Law 75 permits the OAG to access sealed records maintained
by covered agencies). Improved access to sealed records is particularly important in cases of systemic or
widespread misconduct, including investigations of patterns of discriminatory policing.
The laws that require the sealing of arrest records were created to help protect young people and those whose
charges were resolved favorably (in other words, who were not convicted) from long-term consequences from
their contact with the criminal justice system. Yet ironically, those same sealing laws can end up preventing
oversight agencies from investigating potential misconduct that led to the arrest and charges in the first place.
25. New Jersey law requires that the Office of the Attorney General publish aggregate data regarding N.J. State Police motor vehicle stops, including the
reason for the stop, the actions the trooper took during and after the stop, the drivers race, and whether any evidence was seized. This information
is available on a database that is updated every 6 months and includes a public feedback mechanism. See N.J.S.A. 52:17B-222 et.seq., “The Law
Enforcement Professional Standards Act of 2009”; see also New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, State Police Traffic Stop Dashboard,
https://www.njoag.gov/trafficstops. The N.J. A.G. also promulgated a new Use of Force policy requiring covered law enforcement agencies to report
involved officers’ names, the age, race, and gender of the victim of each use of force, whether injuries were sustained, the underlying circumstances of
the incident, and the kind of force used, within 24 hours of the incident. See Office of the Attorney General, Use of Force Policy, Dec. 2020,
https://www.nj.gov/oag/force/docs/UOF-2020-1221-Use-of-Force-Policy.pdf.
26. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12525 (use of force data), § 12525.2 (deaths in custody and arrest-related deaths), § 12525.5 (stops), Cal. Pen. Code § 13010-13012
and § 13020-13021 (arrests), and Cal. Pen. Code § 13012(a)(5) (civilian complaints against peace officers). All of this data and more, including crimes and
clearances and officer staffing, are publicly downloadable and viewable on regularly updated dashboards at California Department of Justice, “Open
Justice Data Portal,” https://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/data. See also Cal. Sen. B. 16 (2020-2021), Chapter 402 (Cal. Stat. 2021), making sustained findings of
excessive or unreasonable force and of failures to intervene in such force subject to disclosure.
27. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, (2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
15
Legislation to address this problem should amend various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, Civil Rights
Law, and Family Court Act to make clear that the OAG, as well as other agencies investigating misconduct, can
access sealed records as needed.
C. Facilitate civilian oversight of law enforcement
Other legislation to remove obstacles to strong independent civilian oversight could improve accountability and
help prevent misconduct, particularly in the wake of the Court of Appeals’ recent ruling in Rochester Police Locust
Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester.
In 2020, Rochester residents voted to create a civilian Police Accountability Board (PAB) authorized, among
other things, to discipline Rochester police officers for misconduct. In the Rochester Police Locust Club ruling, the
Court of Appeals stripped the PAB of its disciplinary authority, holding that a 1985 change to municipal law in
Rochester meant that, from that point forward, the discipline for Rochester police would be subject to collective
bargaining with the local police union, regardless of any future municipal law-making or referenda. This ruling
followed other Court of Appeals decisions in which the Court had concluded that the specific local legislative
history of other municipalities (in particular, New York City, Schenectady, and Walkill) meant that those other
municipalities, unlike Rochester, retain control over discipline without union approval. Both the majority and
dissent noted that the ultimate resolution of these complex issues rests with the state legislature.
28
Over the past several decades, many jurisdictions have established external civilian-led entities designed to
provide independent oversight of law enforcement agencies.
29
The development of these civilian oversight
entities generally has resulted from concerns over inadequate internal accountability processes and resulting
breaches of public trust. Recently, prompted by increased scrutiny in the wake of high-profile incidents of police
misconduct, civilian oversight entities have expanded—both in number and in the extent of their authority—in
New York State and across the country.
30
28. Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v. City of Rochester, --- N.E.3d ---- (2023), 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 05959, 2023 WL 8007121, at * (Nov. 20, 2023) (explaining
that “[t]he Legislature may therefore act to articulate a public policy that would prevail over the ‘strong and sweeping’ one favoring collective
bargaining that it has already adopted in the Taylor Law”); see also id. at *15 (Chief Justice Wilson, stating in dissent that “[f]ortunately, the legislature
has the power to break the cycle…. If Rochester’s desire to establish an independent disciplinary commission is in fact consistent with state policy, the
legislature may easily correct our error).
29. See generally, Michael Vitoroulis, Cameron McEllhiney, & Liana Perez, The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight: Key Principles and Practices for
Effectiveness and Sustainability, Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services (2021); Michael Vitoroulis, Cameron McEllhiney, & Liana Perez, Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field and Effective Oversight Practices, Office Of Community Oriented Policing Services (2021).
30. See, e.g., Cheryl Corley, Across The Country, Voters Approve More Civilian Oversight for Police, NPR, Nov. 7 2020,
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/07/931806105/across-the-country-voters-approve-more-civilian-oversight-for-police; Sharon R. Fairley, Survey Says?: U.S.
Cities Double Down On Civilian Oversight of Police Despite Challenges and Controversy, Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo (2020).
16
As the ruling in Rochester Police Locust Club makes clear, despite the trend towards local oversight, certain
provisions of state law have had the unintended consequence of restricting the development of civilian oversight
entities. The civil service laws at issue in Rochester Police Locust Club are one example. As another example,
Unconsolidated Law § 891 has been interpreted to prevent non-police personnel from presiding over police
disciplinary hearings, unlike disciplinary hearings for other municipal employees.
31
In the coming session, the legislature should address these issues and, more generally, facilitate civilian oversight
by removing restrictions that prevent localities from determining the best way to establish police oversight and
accountability mechanisms that serve the needs of their communities.
32
D. Develop legislation to reduce negative outcomes from traffic stops
Law enforcement officers make more than a million traffic stops each year in New York.
33
These stops may
involve speeding and safety-related issues, but many stops are based on vehicle and traffic law (VTL) violations
that have less of a connection to safety, such as an expired registration or equipment violations like a broken
taillight or tinted windows.
Under current law, these traffic stops can be “pretextual” in nature. In other words, the primary reason for the
stop may not be the potential VTL violation, but rather the officers hunch—which on its own would not meet the
constitutional standard—that stopping the car might lead to evidence of another offense.
34
Given the wide range
of potential VTL violations, it is not hard to find a reason to stop a car and hold its owner on the side of the road.
Traffic stops may seem commonplace, but they can have serious consequences that range from the financial
burdens of tickets to lengthy roadside detentions and searches. The racial disparities are significant. Black drivers
are far more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.
35
While most New York agencies do not track searches
and their outcomes, analyses from other states that do track data show that while drivers of color are more likely
to be searched, the likelihood of officers finding contraband from those searches is much lower than for white
drivers who are searched.
36
And, tragically, some of the high-profile deaths of individuals at the hands of police
31. See, e.g., Lynch v. Giuliani, 301 A.D.2d 351, 359 (1st Dep’t 2003) (holding that Unconsolidated Law § 891 required disciplinary hearings to be conducted
by employees of the NYPD Commissioner, rather than the Office of Administrative Hearings and Trials).
32. Resources on police accountability and oversight include What Does Police Oversight Look Like?, Policing Project (2020),
https://www.policingproject.org/oversight#chart; Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1033 (2016).
33. While precise data is not available for all New York state law enforcement agencies (see Section IV.A above), in 2022, NYPD officers alone made
more than 670,000 traffic stops.
34. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996); People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341 (2001).
35. See, e.g., CitiStat, Buffalo Open Data (2020), https://data.buffalony.gov/stories/s/ftkr-cpvn (showing traffic stop data in Buffalo); New York Police
Department Traffic Stops Data, New York Civil Liberties Union (2023), https://www.nyclu.org/en/nypd-traffic-stops-data.
36. See, e.g., Empire Justice Center, Stop the Stops (Jan. 2023) at 12-17, https://empirejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Stop-the-Stops-Empire-
Justices-Preliminary-Report-on-Racial-Disparities-in-Pretext-Stops.pdf (summarizing analyses from several states and municipalities).
17
over the past decade originated with simple traffic stops that escalated into violence or high-speed pursuits.
37
Some states and localities have attempted to mitigate the disparities and harmful outcomes from traffic stops by
limiting stops for low-level equipment violations, implementing voucher programs to help fix equipment issues,
repealing excess fees, restricting high-speed pursuits to stops involving specific serious offenses, and expanding
data collection and transparency. New York should consider legislation that adopts these reforms across the
state.
E. Develop alternative public health approaches for people in mental
health crisis to minimize the risks of police involvement
In our previous annual reports, we called for legislation to help localities establish specialized mental health units
to de-escalate situations involving people experiencing mental health crises instead of relying on armed police
officers as first responders, and we reiterate that call here. Sobering statistics demonstrate that the status quo
has resulted in tragic outcomes. Studies indicate that people with mental illness generate one in ten calls for
police service, and account for at least one in four fatal police encounters.
38
People with serious mental illness are
more than 11 times as likely to experience police use of force, more than ten times as likely to be injured, and 16
times more likely to be killed by law enforcement as those without serious mental illness.
39
Recognizing the problems resulting from relying on police as the default first responders to mental health
crises, more and more local governments are turning to co-responder models (in which civilian specialists pair
with police responders) or alternative first responder models (in which armed police are not involved in the
response).
40
A 2022 study by the Brennan Center for Justice shows that, among the 50 jurisdictions with the
largest law enforcement agencies, more than half had adopted a co-responder program by 2020, and since
2020, 15 of these jurisdictions created new co-responder programs. Of those same 50 jurisdictions, 19 have
37. See, e.g., Elisha Fieldstadt, Newly aired Sandra Bland cellphone video shows traffic stop from her vantage point: Sandra Bland was pulled over for failing to
use her turn signal and was found dead in her Texas jail cell a few days later. Her death was ruled a suicide., NBC News (May 7, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/newly-aired-sandra-bland-cellphone-video-shows-traffic-stop-her-n1002756; Philip Heisel and Jacquellena Carrero, Philando Castile,
Killed By Police During Traffic Stop, Remembered as Gentle Man: Philando Castile was a kitchen supervisor for Saint Paul Public Schools, where those who knew
him were shocked and saddened by his death, NBC News (July 7, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/philando-castile-killed-police-during-
traffic-stop-remembered-gentle-man-n605581; New York State Office of the Attorney General: Attorney General James’ Office of Special Investigation
Announces Indictment of New York State Trooper on Murder Charge (October 27, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-
announces-indictment-new-york-state-trooper-murder-charge.
38. See Doris A Fuller et al., Overlooked in the Undercounted, The Role of Mental Illness in Fatal Law Enforcement Encounters, Treatment Advocacy Center
(2015), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf
39. See Ayobami Laniyonyu and Phillip Atiba Goff, Measuring Disparities in Police Use of Force and Injury Among Persons with Serious Mental Illness, BMC
Psychiatry (2021) https://bmcpsychiatry.biomedcentral.com/counter/pdf/10.1186/s12888-021-03510-w.pdf
40. See Ashley Krider et al., Responding to Individuals in Behavioral Health Crisis via Co-responder Models: The Role of Cities, Counties, Law Enforcement, and
Providers, Policy Research Inc. & National League of Cities (Jan. 2020), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/SJCResponding%20to%20Individuals.
pdf; Amy C. Watson et al., Crisis Response Services for People with mental Illnesses or Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on
Police-based and Other First Response Models, Vera Institute of Justice (Oct. 2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/crisis-response-services-
for-people-with-mental-illnesses-or-intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities.pdf
18
adopted alternative first responder programs since 2020, including New York City.
41
Alternative first responder models are taking root across the State. For example, in 2021, New York City launched
B-HEARD (Behavioral Health Emergency Assistance Response Division), a pilot program that diverts 911 mental
health calls to a specialized division that dispatches mental and physical health professionals.
42
Also in 2021,
Albany implemented the ACCORD (Albany County Crisis Officials Responding and Diverting) program, which
provides an alternative response unit comprised of County social workers and paramedics from the Sheriffs
Office to assist with nonviolent calls for emergency assistance.
43
Earlier this year, Albany city and county officials
pledged to expand ACCORD across the city of Albany.
44
The city of Rochester continues to dispatch its “Person
in Crisis” team of professionals trained in crisis intervention, de-escalation, and social work, which it launched in
2021.
45
While the programs described above are promising, several remain at the pilot level, and have yet to provide
alternatives at scale, whether due to lack of resources or difficulties in implementation, particularly in routing
mental health calls to specialist responders.
46
This suggests a role at the state level to assist communities with
funding and technical assistance in establishing these programs.
Accordingly, we strongly recommend legislation to help localities establish specialized mental health units
that are specifically trained and equipped to provide assistance to those in mental health crisis, including by
providing funding and technical support. Such legislation could also require training for emergency dispatchers
and potentially create regional mental health councils to provide structure and oversight to local responses.
Building up non-law enforcement responses to people struggling with mental illness has the potential to better
allocate resources towards helping people in need of mental health assistance and decrease the risk of harm
from police encounters.
41. Ram Subramanian and Leily Arzy, Rethinking How Law Enforcement is Deployed, Brennan Center for Justice (Nov. 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/rethinking-how-law-enforcement-deployed?s=03.
42. See B-Heard, City of New York, https://mentalhealth.cityofnewyork.us/b-heard
43. Albany County launches ACCORD pilot program to modernize dispatch response for mental health crises (June 11, 2021, 1:30 PM),
https://www.albanycounty.com/Home/Components/News/News/1204/59.
44. See Rachel Silbertsein, Albany officials pledge to expand mental health, homeless services, Times Union (Sept. 20, 2023),
https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/albany-officials-pledge-expand-mental-health-18377555.php.
45. See Person In Crisis Team, City of Rochester, https://www.cityofrochester.gov/person-in-crisis-team/; Dan Schrack, City Leaders Launch New ‘Person in
Crisis’ Team, WHAM (Jan 21, 2021), https://13wham.com/news/local/city-leaders-launch-new-person-in-crisis-team-for-mental-health-substance-abuse-
calls
46. See Greg B. Smith, Non-Cop Response Teams Handled Just 16% of 911 Mental Health Crisis Calls, The City (Jul. 18, 2022), https://www.thecity.
nyc/2022/7/18/23267193/mental-health-911-b-heard-teams (noting that EMS operators referred less than 1 in 4 mental health calls to B-HEARD teams).
19
F. Require the use of body worn cameras
Video footage of interactions between law enforcement and the public can promote accountability
for misconduct that might otherwise go undetected and protect officers who are wrongly accused. As
recommended in the October 1, 2023 Annual Report of the OAG’s Office of Special Investigation, the legislature
should require by statute that all police and sheriffs departments deploy and use body-worn cameras
and dashboard cameras in all encounters with members of the public. The statute should provide smaller
departments with funding from the state as needed for such deployment and training by DCJS as needed for
such use. The statute should permit departments to create exceptions to such deployment or use, but exceptions
must be limited to specific and clearly articulated and justified law enforcement need.
47
47. See Office of the New York State Attorney General, Office of Special Investigation Third Annual Report (Oct. 1, 2023),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2023-10/20230929f-third-ann-rpt.pdf.
Executive Law 75 provides a first-of-its-kind framework for improving law enforcement practices, increasing
accountability, and promoting public trust—all of which are crucial to enhancing the safety of New Yorkers. We
look forward to the work ahead.
Conclusion
20
Appendix A
Closed Executive Law 75(5)(b) investigations as of December 31, 2023
Agency Last name First name Closing date OAG finding
Utica City Police
Department
Aiello Joseph 5/11/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
48
Syracuse City Police
Department
Anthony Mitchell 3/23/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
49
New York City Police
Department
Aquino Danny 12/15/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
50
Wallkill Town Police
Department
Ashworth Julia 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
51
Syracuse City Police
Department
Atkins Thomas 3/23/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
52
Syracuse City Police
Department
Bach Brian 7/10/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
53
Syracuse City Police
Department
Bebernitz Reed 12/13/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
54
Syracuse City Police
Department
Blauvelt Jeffrey 8/24/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
55
New York City Police
Department
Bomparola Anthony 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
56
48. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-aiello-upd.pdf
49. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-anthony-spd.pdf
50. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-d-aquino-nypd.pdf
51. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-ashworth-wtpd.pdf
52. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-t-atkins-spd.pdf
53. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-b-bach-spd.pdf
54. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-r-bebernitz-spd.pdf
55. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-blauvelt-spd.pdf
56. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-a-bomparola-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
21
Nassau County Police
Department
Boyce Michael 12/13/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
57
Syracuse City Police
Department
Briedis Aylan 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
58
Buffalo City Police
Department
Briggs Lawrence 11/28/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
59
Syracuse City Police
Department
Buske Christopher 12/18/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
60
Nassau County Police
Department
Cincotta John 12/20/2023 Administrative closure
61
Syracuse City Police
Department
Coleman William 12/13/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
62
New York City Police
Department
Connell Tearle 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
63
Nassau County Police
Department
Cracchiolo Anthony 11/15/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
64
Yonkers Police
Department
Deane Liam 11/17/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
65
New York City Police
Department
Diorio Christopher 10/6/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
66
57. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-boyce-ncpd.pdf
58. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-a-briedis-spd.pdf
59. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-l-briggs-bpd.pdf
60. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-c-buske-spd.pdf
61. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-cincotta-ncpd.pdf
62. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-w-coleman-spd.pdf
63. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-t-connell-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
64. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-a-cracchiolo-ncpd.pdf
65. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-l-deane-ypd.pdf
66. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-c-diorio-nypd.pdf
22
Syracuse City Police
Department
DiPuccio Gregory 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
67
Syracuse City Police
Department
Duval Devin 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
68
New York City Police
Department
Dym Eric 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
69
Syracuse City Police
Department
Falise Brandon 12/13/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
70
Syracuse City Police
Department
Ferris Melissa 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
71
New York City Police
Department
Ferrufino James 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
72
New York City Police
Department
Francesquini Annette 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
73
Nassau County Police
Department
Gaudio Matteo 4/11/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
74
New York City Police
Department
Gengo John 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
75
Nassau County Police
Department
Green Jason 6/28/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
76
Nassau County Police
Department
Guest Sherry 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
77
67. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-g-dipuccio-spd.pdf
68. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-d-duval-spd.pdf
69. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-e-dym-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
70. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-b-falise-spd.pdf
71. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-ferris-spd.pdf
72. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-j-ferrufino-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
73. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-a-francesquini-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
74. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-gaudio-ncpd.pdf
75. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-j-gengo-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
76. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-green-ncpd.pdf
77. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-s-guest-ncpd-.pdf
23
Syracuse City Police
Department
Heider Joseph 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
78
New York City Police
Department
Howard Joseph 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
79
Syracuse City Police
Department
Hughes Kristin 12/27/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
80
Nassau County Police
Department
Ibanez Daniel 11/15/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
81
Saugerties Town
Police Department
Johnson Dion 7/7/2023
Officer engaged in a pattern of
misconduct
82
New York City Police
Department
Lee Steven 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
83
Syracuse City Police
Department
Linnertz Ryan 5/4/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
84
New York City Police
Department
Martinez Robert 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
85
New York City Police
Department
McCurry Matthew 12/27/2023
Officer engaged in a pattern of
misconduct
86
Nassau County Police
Department
McMullen James 11/15/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
87
Wallkill Town Police
Department
Medina Michael 9/14/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
88
78. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-heider-spd.pdf
79. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-j-howard-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
80. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-k-hughes-spd.pdf
81. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-d-ibanez-ncpd.pdf
82. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-report-d-johnson-spd.pdf
83. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-s-lee-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
84. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-r-linnertz-spd.pdf
85. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-r-martinez-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
86. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-mccurry-nypd.pdf
87. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-mcmullen-ncpd.pdf
88. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-medina-wtpd.pdf
24
New York City Police
Department
Mestre Gina 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
89
Nassau County Police
Department
Nadel Brian 12/20/2023
Officer engaged in a pattern of
misconduct
90
Buffalo City Police
Department
Ottey Davon 12/28/2023
Officer engaged in a pattern of
misconduct
91
Syracuse City Police
Department
Pastorello James 8/24/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
92
Endicott Village Police
Department
Quinn Jennifer 5/9/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
93
New York City Police
Department
Radoncic Adnan 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
94
Nassau County Police
Department
Romano Matthew 11/15/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints; issue(s)
noted
95
Suffolk County Police
Department
Searles Christopher 9/18/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
96
Nassau County Police
Department
Sierzant Michael 11/15/2022
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
97
Buffalo City Police
Department
Slawek Mark 9/13/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
98
Syracuse City Police
Department
Smith Michael 8/24/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
99
89. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-g-mestre-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
90. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-b-nadel-ncpd.pdf
91. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-d-ottey-bpd.pdf
92. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-pastorello-spd.pdf
93. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-quinn-evpd.pdf
94. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-a-radoncic-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
95. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-romano-ncpd.pdf
96. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-c-searles-scpd.pdf
97. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-sierzant-ncpd.pdf
98. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-slawek-bpd.pdf
99. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-smith-spd.pdf
25
New York City Police
Department
Tantillo Philip 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
100
Syracuse City Police
Department
Ternosky Jacob 8/24/2023
No finding of a pattern of misconduct
based on referred complaints
101
New York City Police
Department
Terrell Shante 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
102
Buffalo City Police
Department
Thomas Mitchell R. 12/21/2023 Administrative closure
103
100. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-p-tantillo-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
101. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-j-ternosky-spd.pdf
102. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-admin-closures-s-terrell-12.21.23-nypd.pdf
103. https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/lemio-report/755b-letter-m-r-thomas-bpd.pdf